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4Preface
Education was granted great importance in traditional Chinese society. At times of
drastic social change, Chinese idealists tended to appeal to school education. From the
time of Confucius (551-479 B.C.) to Y. C. James Yen (1890-1990), hope for society
was based on education as a means of reforming society. Likewise, in a traditional
agricultural country they were deeply concerned about peasants, with the hope that
upgrading the substructure of society through education could lead to social equality.
However, the massification of higher education that is taking place in China seems to
have achieved something else that is far removed from this goal, as inequality in
education has become an increasing marked trend in this country, which may
consequently entrench class differences. The prospect of the peasants upgrading
themselves through education appears to be poor.
I became a university student as soon as the Chinese higher education system
was restored to normal student recruitment after the Cultural Revolution. Later I worked
as a university teacher for sixteen years, having witnessed the period when Chinese
higher education shifted from being an elite system to being an institution for the
masses. I am, so to speak, a witness to the history of the Chinese higher education
system over a period of more than thirty years. Because of my personal experience, as
well as my interest when I was pursuing Master's and Doctoral degrees, my research has
been focused on the process of massification in Chinese higher education. I especially
examine the rural students as a disadvantaged group on the university and college
campuses. This study examines how the current Chinese higher education institutions
give rise to inequality. This is a theme that has been widely discussed in China, but the
main targets, the rural students, are far from being well studied as the focus of scientific
research.
5I intended to tell the story about the rural students, but found it difficult to make
it comprehensible unless I told the story of their parents, as well as the story of their
universities and colleges, and ultimately pointed to the power of the state that has
largely defined these three stories. This leads to some specificities in my research
"journey": as the study into rural students delved deeper, the research has been extended
in scope out of necessity, and has eventually involved three different social categories,
i.e. the rural students, peasants and university intellectuals. The continuity of my
journey through the different fields points to the inherent relation between these topics,
which may be interconnected through an integrated theoretical framework and a shared
theme: the relationship between the state, society and the university.
Although my research started on the rural students, the story I am telling here
starts from the very beginning, i.e. from their rural homes, and then their universities
and colleges. Therefore, the first step is to present the process when the state established
a rural-urban segregation system and gradually deprived the peasants of their basic
rights. The aim is to uncover the root cause of the plight that the Chinese peasants and
their children have suffered. Next is the analysis of the restructuring of the Chinese
higher education system which was more or less synchronous with the process that
rendered the peasants powerless. The intention is to reveal how the intrusion of state
power has changed the nature of Chinese higher education. After having first informed
about the background, I commence the story of the rural students. China is currently
long overdue for a comprehensive reform. In Chinese society, the community of
intellectuals and peasants undoubtedly represent two highly important variables. As the
rural students relate to both communities, they may be a critical factor for the future of
the country, and it is this that makes the focus of this study, on the rural students, so
important. It intends to provide important reference points for any efforts aiming to
contribute to the peaceful transformation of China, or to the wellbeing of other
6analogous societies.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1. 1. Background and research rationale
Peasants constitute the majority in the overall population of China.i The rural college
students are the elites in the countryside and will undoubtedly make themselves felt in
the future of the country. Nevertheless, very little scientific research has been conducted
on this group. This study intends to provide knowledge on this widely discussed but
poorly researched group. Out of necessity, this study also involves two other social
categories that are closely related to the rural students: peasants and university
intellectuals. Consequently, it uses some terms that are unique to the Chinese context
and these three groups. Rural students refers to students who are registered as
permanent rural residents or reside in rural areas before they enter university or college.
Before they have become financially independent, they are mainly supported by family
members who are permanent rural residents. Social categories that are closely related to
rural students are peasants and off-farm workers;1 the latter term refers to those who, on
the one hand, leave their villages and migrate to urban areas to work as cheap labourers
but, on the other hand, are not granted the status of permanent urban residents. By now,
14.96 million rural students who have pursued a tertiary education have difficulty being
formally employed and have to work temporarily as cheap labourers (Worker's Daily,
June 28, 2013, parag. 1), and for these people, the term college-graduate-off-farm
workers has been introduced. The urban-rural segregation system,ii which Whyte
i According to the China Data Centre of Tsinghua University, permanent urban residents make up
27.6% of the population (China Youth Daily, November 05, 2013).
ii In the urban-rural segregation system, most peasants are registered as permanent rural
residents and are excluded from many privileged professional fields and social welfare, a
status passed down from parents to children.
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(2010, 1) labels as "socialist serfdom" and which will be introduced in detail in Chapter
Three, is the principal mechanism that has excluded peasants from the urban society and
has forced some of their children with tertiary education qualifications to follow a
historical cycle, with their status shifting from that of rural students to that of
college-graduate-off-farm workers. Another category, which will be introduced in detail
in Chapter Four, consists of intellectuals in government-run universities and colleges;
members of this group are employees of the state, labelled as the establishment
intellectuals by Hamrin and Cheek (1986).
The point of departure for this study, which tends to be pragmatic and
problem-oriented, is the research on the rural students. As mentioned-above, the
research has been extended in scope, involving not only higher education, but also the
rural society and, above all, the state, which plays a decisive role in all aspects.
Consequently, it has resulted in four relatively independent chapters that centre on three
topic areas which follow different theoretical guidelines and apply different methods.
The inherent relations between these chapters make it possible to integrate them in a
common theoretical framework and under a common theme: how the state policies have
impacted the society and university and, in turn, the agents in these fields. Under this
broad theme, the scope of the research may be gradually narrowed down until the focus
is fixed on the rural students. To put it another way, the presentation of the overall
thesis starts from looking at the macro context (state vs. rural society and university)
and progresses to the micro focus (rural students), and from emphasizing the objective
structure to further examining the nuances on the subjective side.
In the presentation of the overall thesis, the first two topics are intended to
contextualize the rural students both in history and in the present. The first topic
attempts to uncover the real status quo of the Chinese peasants and traces the rural
students to their home background as this can help to explain the limited opportunities
17
they have. In the second topic, the Chinese higher education institutions and university
intellectuals, which mirror China's politics and culture, are examined to understand the
new environment that the rural students move into after they have left their homes. In
these two topics, special attention is paid to historical factors, focusing on two systems:
the urban-rural segregation system and the higher education system. The urban-rural
segregation was initiated in 1958 and is still in existence today. This system witnessed a
"man-made disaster" (Tian2 2004) during which more than thirty million peasants died
of starvation over a three-year period (J. Yang 2009). It has not only seriously impeded
the development of rural areas, but it has also reshaped the mentality and behaviour of
the Chinese peasants. The higher education system was restructured in 1952.3 Since
then it has served as the centre of a series of political campaigns such as the
"Anti-rightist Campaign"4 and the "Great Cultural Revolution" and its unique structure
has remained fundamentally unchanged right up to the present day. It has impacted the
identity and mentality of the Chinese intellectuals in a devastating way and it humiliated
Chinese intellectuals in a way that is unprecedented in the history of the country. When
it comes to the present situation, we find the third and central topic. At the end of the
last century, the Chinese higher education system suddenly began to progress towards
massification, in sharp contrast to its previous resistance to an increase in the enrolment
rate.5 This was a government policy of coercion as a means of addressing and
counteracting the financial crisis (Lanqing Li6 2003, Part 4). Consequently, the student
body on campuses has expanded dramatically.7 Within four years, the numeric index of
mass higher education, the 15% participation rate, was reached (L. Cheng 2008). In
2012, the proportion of the age group entering tertiary education institutions was 30%,8
with 59.1% of the students enrolled from the rural areas (CNS China News Service
2014). This is understandable in terms of demographic structure, but might be difficult
to understand from an economic perspective. For one thing, under urban-rural
18
segregation, most Chinese peasants are disadvantaged in an economic sense; for another,
with government funding seriously insufficient,9 state policies allow tertiary education
institutions to charge high tuition fees. Higher education may be too expensive for
peasants (Dong 2004; Yanzhong Wang 2012). Just as the following discussion reveals,
the rural students and their families have paid a great price for the massification of
higher education in China.
1.2. Central research problems
The primary aim of this research is to uncover how the urban-rural segregation system
and the higher education system may influence the students. This objective has been
used as the foundation for developing the central research problems of the study:
How is the urban-rural segregation system related to the motivation of
the rural students in their pursuit for higher education? What is the role of
the Chinese higher education institutions when the rural students break
through urban-rural segregation?
The above-mentioned central research problems cover three interrelated topics: the rural
students, higher education and urban-rural segregation, and these topics are invariably
defined by state policies. The very general central research problems will be further
elaborated upon when the researcher looks for answers to some more specific research
questions. These research questions are distributed across the four relatively
independent chapters, Chapter Three to Six.
1.3. Methodology
1.3.1. Paradigm choice
The approach in this study is guided by Bourdieu' notion of relational thinking.
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According to Bourdieu:
... the goal of sociology is to uncover the most deeply buried structures of the
different social worlds that make up the social universe, as well as the
"mechanisms" that tend to ensure their reproduction or their transformation....
Indeed there exists a correspondence between social structures and mental
structures, between the objective divisions of the social world... and the principles
of vision and division that agents apply to them. (1996, 1)
The above statement points out the importance of the underlying structure, and
highlights the relation between objective and the subjective aspects, the macro and
micro world, history and the present, individuals and society. Accordingly, the first
feature of this study is the emphasis on objective structure. This may help to pinpoint
what is a necessity without misconstruing it as a contingency. This may also provide a
more or less common point of departure for biased rival arguments. As a second feature,
attention is also given to the subjective aspect of the groups and individuals being
studied, which is closely related to the objective structure. As a third feature, much
attention is paid to the macro context, and highlight the correlation between local
phenomena and the overall background. The fourth feature is emphasis on the
inseparability of history and the present.
In the choice of paradigm, this study prefers a qualitative method which belongs
to the interpretive repertoire. This study does not have the benefit of a body of literature
established by previous researchers or variables that can be easily identified. The aim of
this study would be to recommend methods of an exploratory and interpretive nature.
This is in accordance with Creswell's (1998, 17-18) reasons for undertaking a
qualitative study: 1) to develop theories; 2) to study individuals in their natural setting
rather than out of context; 3) to present a detailed view of the topic, sometimes even
20
engage a storytelling form of narration; 4) to take the view of a participant rather than
an "expert" who passes judgement on participants. Thus, the social research techniques
chosen should fit such definitions as given by Neuman (2011, 102, 104, 107): be
sensitive to context, capture people's subjective sense of their contexts rather than
reduce social life from abstract, logical theories that may not relate to the daily feelings
and experiences of those being studied.
This study is problem-oriented rather than structured according to preconceived
theories. Therefore, the design of the study, according to Creswell (1998, 19, 21), is
open and evolving. In the research process, the rules and procedures are not fixed, and
the theories and specific methods are chosen according to the aims of the study. The
first instrument is grounded theory that satisfies the need for an empirical study. The
researcher takes the perspective of those who are being studied, extends the scope of the
study and gradually transcends this limited perspective. It is at a later stage that
high-level theories of wide applicability are incorporated to theoretically strengthen the
study and to explore the macro structure. Nevertheless, the presentation of the thesis
starts with a general theoretical framework to inform the overall approach.
This comprehensive approach is challenging: if several topics are confined
within the university field alone, it will be difficult to interpret the situation
comprehensively; when, however, this study is embedded in a wider macro context, it
becomes entangled in a very complex reality. Aided by the analytic triangle of Maassen
and Cloete (2002), the contents can be categorized under one central topic on the rural
students, and two subtopics on peasants and on university intellectuals. Each time, the
analysis may be focused on one topic, while the overall study is still integrated.
However, since the chapters are relatively independent, the research methods, the
theories applied and the information sources that meet specific needs of the chapters
will be detailed in each chapter, respectively.
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It is particularly interesting that the author has conducted the research abroad.
While the Chinese peers have access to limited literature because the publications and
the internet in China are under official supervision, the author has access to a rich
source of information which may give her a more comprehensive perspective.
Meanwhile, the author's wide experience of China may open for a more nuanced
reflection on the issue.
1.3.2. Information source
Part of the data comes from the interviews of the 50 rural students. But the study is
mainly based on literature from various sources, including works by other researchers,
government and CPC documents, articles, news reports and surveys in the public media
oriented to a mass audience. The literature has mainly been obtained from libraries, the
internet, or private sources. Some websites are referred to for information. Personal
observation and work experience also form a complementary source of information. The
internet is indispensable as an information source. China has very strict censorship,
while the internet is too large in size for the authorities to examine exhaustively, so that
it has become a platform where the people can have relatively liberal voices, including
some anti-establishment voices. Also, due to censorship, critical works formally
published in Continental China are under close scrutiny. Therefore, this study heavily
relies on works which are published outside Continental China.
1.4. Delimitation and limitation
This study covers three interrelated topics, among which the topics on urban-rural
segregation and on the establishment university will help to interpret the situation of the
rural students. On the other hand, research on the rural students issue may help to
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interpret the other two topics. Rural students, the rural areas and higher education
institutions are very general topics. This study is mainly limited to the structures of the
rural society and the internal structure of the higher education institutions, as well as to
how such structures may shape the mentality and behaviour of the agents in these
structures. Part of the study is based on a review of history and refers to state policies
with the aim of illustrating how the state has managed to establish and maintain
urban-rural segregation and dominate intellectuals in the higher education institutions.
Most of the theories employed here have been created for the general landscape
rather than being tailored for the specific context of China. There are few indigenously
produced mature theories to employ or ready models to follow that the researcher can
use. CPC and government documents serve as an important source for this study.
However, as many documents related to CPC policies have not been disclosed to the
public due to secrecy measures, the researcher has had to rely on what is revealed in the
public media. While this study involves history, the focus is on the present, and for this
reason the history section is limited to events and figures that are considered
representative and relevant to this study. China is in the midst of a time of drastic
change. The subjects of this study and their conditions are constantly changing. The
existing materials on which this study is based can hardly be satisfactorily up-dated,
although every effort has been made to include the latest data as far as possible. An
important source of empirical data is the interview of 50 rural students, while the
researcher's personal experiences and observations are also a source for the analysis.
Due to the biased nature of personal experience, this information may lack in accuracy
and coherence and will be insufficient to cover the extensiveness and diversity in the
country of China. As a result, this study is limited in terms of generalization,
authenticity, scope, timeliness and objectivity.
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1.5. Structure of the thesis
Following this introduction in Chapter One, Chapter Two reviews the theories adopted
in this study, mainly the theories of Galtung, Bourdieu and Lindner. These theories are
considered illuminating as they are focused either on the objective or subjective side, or
both, and deal with the macro and the micro world as well. Aided with the analytic
triangle devised by Maassen and Cloete (2002), the researcher has managed to integrate
the theories used into an overall theoretical and conceptual framework. This analytic
triangle also delimits this comprehensive study by interrelating the state, the rural
society and the higher education institutions. Some theories that are tailored for the
landscape of China are also reviewed, which facilitates the application of the above
theories of European origins in the Chinese context.
Chapter Three is based on a comparative analysis focusing on the status of the
Chinese peasants. The land reform in Taiwan, serfs in Russia and migrant workers
under apartheid in South Africa are cases used as references. It is found that the free
peasantry tradition in China was dismantled and the contemporary peasants have been
reduced to the status of unfree labourers under urban-rural segregation. Further
exploration of this theme in reference to Galtung argues that the extreme conditions in
China were due to, among other things, a social structure dominated by structural
violence. One of the most important pillars of this structure has been the urban-rural
segregation system with which the state manages to maintain the existing power
relations.
Chapter Four aims to explore how the current Chinese higher education
institutions have shaped the status quo and the mind-set of university intellectuals,
which in turn heavily influences their choices, including their attitude to their public
roles. With Bourdieu's field theory as the guiding approach, it analyses the process
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through which the university field has been invaded by the forces of politics and
economics. In conclusion, the Chinese higher education institutions has been under a
condition of heteronomy, and the intellectual community has developed a habitus
corresponding to the unique structure of the field.
Chapter Five commences with an inquiry on the economic aspect of the life rural
students have in the Chinese higher education institutions at a time of mass higher
education, but the discussion goes beyond the economic field. Strauss's approach of
grounded theory is the main notion used to generate a substantive grounded theory from
data through systematic comparison. Based on qualitative interviews, this study
compares rural students who are located at different levels in the higher education
system, which eventually leads to such findings as: all the rural students are pressed into
poverty, their subjective responses to such deprivation, however, vary according to how
much they are distanced from the big metropolis; the more they are marginalized and
the less they are aware of their marginalization.
Chapter Six is a relatively comprehensive analysis based on the previous
chapters. Bourdieu's field theory and Lindner's theory of humiliation are applied to shed
light on how the rural field and the university field may influence the rural students. It
leads to such conclusions as: first, the rural students located at different levels of the
hierarchical system respond to their tertiary education experiences in different ways
presumably because they are either exposed to absolute or relative deprivation; second,
when invaded by heterogeneous forces, the higher education institutions are not likely
to provide a platform for the students of different social backgrounds to compete on an
equal basis, even in scholastic areas; third, the rural students may find that their efforts
to reproduce capital by way of the higher education institutions tend to return little gain
or are even in vain, and thus there is a process of reproduction of the urban-rural
segregation in which the higher education institutions play a critical role.
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Chapter Seven briefly informs of the recent situations, presenting some
quantitative data which are considered relevant to the future of the rural students. The
pattern in power relations has remained basically unchanged right to the present day. It
may serve as a mechanism to reproduce history and facilitate the state's continued
exploitation of the rural society. However, new factors, such as changes in the education
level of the rural population and in the demographic structure of the younger generation,
may have an impact on Chinese society. Bearing this in mind, the rural students as a
marginalized group today may turn out to be a critical variable in the future.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Conceptualization
2. 1. An analytic triangle
Trow (1973, 35) identified and analysed a number of problems characteristic of mass
higher education as early as 1973, including the conflict between the two cherished
ideals of quality and equality. This is understandable. On the one hand, as Scott (1998,
113) points out, massification implies an increase in the financial dependence of the
universities on the state. On the other hand, as Trow (1973, 36; 2003, 6) claims, no
country in the world can afford a system of mass higher education at the same cost
levels that it formerly provided to its elite research universities. Up to now, increasing
participation in higher education has become a "global orthodoxy" (Maassen and Cloete
2002, 24). It has also been argued that entrance to higher education has become part of
the quest for democratization (Scott 1998, 125). All in all, the massification of higher
education will inevitably give rise to multiple problems that may go beyond the
university field and enter the political arena.
In the specific case of China, the massification of higher education is invariably
heavily influenced by the unique political context. The issue of rural students that gives
rise to this study, in particular, is entangled in this complex background. Consequently,
this study involves several topics, and out of necessity, applies different theories. These
theories contribute to a comprehensive study, but such complexity also makes the
structuring of the thesis a challenge, i.e. the need to integrate the different theories
coherently and at the same time present the multiple facets of this study in an orderly
and clear fashion. This challenge, nevertheless, creates the opportunity to tentatively
make a breakthrough: the application of the analytic triangle devised by Maassen and
Cloete (2002) as the framework to integrate the different theories. This analytic triangle
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may define the general profile of this study and set delimitations on it. In this triangle,
the state, society and higher education institutions are seen in relation to each other, and
three dimensions are identified: the state-society dimension, the state-institution
dimension and the institution-society dimension. The advantage of this model is that, on
the one hand, it studies higher education in relation to the general context rather than
considering it in isolation, and on the other hand, it reduces the complicated reality to
three relations, placing various issues that are entangled and complex into three
dimensions, and dealing with them in turn. In the state-society dimension, an analysis at
the macro level is focused on the relationship between the state versus the rural society.
Galtung's theory of structural violence helps to clearly depict the structures of rural
China at different points in time, which explains why urban-rural segregation was
established and how it has been maintained. By now, an increasingly larger rural
population has migrated to and been distributed in urban areas. In this case, Bourdieu's
concept of field is found to be more applicable, as it allows for a focus on the rural
students and off-farm workers regardless of their geographical locations. In the
state-institution dimension, an analysis at the macro level is focused on the relationship
between the state versus the higher education institutions. Bourdieu's field theory is
applied to describe how the state has managed to reshape the objective structure of the
higher education institutions and how university intellectuals have developed
corresponding dispositions. The research on the rural students is located in the
institution-society dimension. Part of it is an analysis on the micro-level focused on
individual rural students and applying grounded theory. The other part is a more
comprehensive research on the rural students by applying the theories of Bourdieu and
Lindner to analyse their objective environments and their subjective responses to the
environments. The exploration is focused on the educational system as a mechanism of
capital reproduction, and on the deprivation and humiliation that the educational process
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may impose on the rural students and the potential negative impact this might then have
on society.
It thus can be seen that, within the general framework of the analytic triangle,
the research has several facets. It intends to 1) involve three social categories, i.e. the
rural students per se, as well as peasants and university intellectuals who are closely
related to them; 2) consider both the objective and the subjective aspects of the three
groups; 3) put focus on the evolution from the past to the present; 4) operate at both the
macro and the micro level. Therefore, the theories adopted for this analysis should allow
for the generalization of a dynamic, evolutionary process, a relative panoramic picture,
relating the multiple aspects to each other rather than considering them as isolated, and
covering a long period of time. Bourdieu's field theory, above all, can fit such needs,
both in constructing a major theoretical and conceptual framework and in functioning as
an instrument of analysis. Bourdieu's theory allows for the combination of a micro study
with researches on the macro level, emphasizes history and gives consideration to both
the objective and cognitive structures. When the study is focused on the objective and
the subjective aspect, respectively, Galtung's theory of structural violence, which
focuses on objective structure, and Lindner's theory of humiliation, which is a
psychological approach, will be integrated as an extension of Bourdieu's theory. The
former helps to depict the major framework of the objective structure, screening for
details that might be distracting, while the latter sheds light on a detailed study of the
cognitive structure which is generated from the objective structure. Grounded theory is
applied in a micro study to present the subjective aspect in support of the analysis of the
cognitive structure.
2. 2. The position of higher education in the analytic triangle
In the triangular relation, the state-institution dimension was traditionally dominated by
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the state, at least in Continental Europe. "Social expectations with respect to higher
education were not addressed in direct links between social actors and higher education,
but were taken up by the state." The state occupied this "near monopolistic position" in
many countries until recently (Maassen and Cloete 2002, 10). On the other hand,
international reform ideologies see the growing prominence of the institution-society
dimension in the triangular relation. According to the underlying ideas and assumptions
of reform thinking, the activities of universities and colleges:
... should be formally evaluated, they should be held accountable for their
performance, they should be steered by market forces and not by governmental or
state mechanisms.... Societal participation takes place through organised interest
groups.... This would imply that instead of isolating itself from social needs, higher
education is now trying to respond to all social and economic demands unloaded
on it.... [This may lead to a] growing imbalance between demands and the
institutional capacity for responding to them [and, in turn, a dilemma where] the
more they move away from the traditional basic characteristics, legacy and
functions of higher education, the more they seem to face formidable legitimacy
challenges as public institutions. (9, 13, 14)
In practice, however, it may be difficult to initiate and steer organizational changes in
universities and colleges from the outside, most likely because a number of traditional
characteristics still define these institutions. Above all, the university has a
knowledge-based structure. Consequently, it has such features as: 1) a knowledge-based
structure which leads to a high level of organizational fragmentation; 2) loosely
articulated decision-making structures; 3) change generally takes place in an
incremental, grassroots way. Such characteristics, in turn, lead to differences between
higher education institutions and other business: A) higher education institutions lack a
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single, clearly definable production function, and demonstrate low levels of internal
integration; B) the commitment of the academic staff to their discipline and profession
is higher than the commitment to their institution; C) the nature of institutional
management allows for a low ability of institutional managers to hire and fire staff
(Maassen and Cloete 2002, 26-7).
To summarize, as a general tendency in the international landscape, the power of
the state is decreasing in the triangular relation. The society, in the form of organized
interest groups, increases its participation in higher education. Higher education
institutions steered by market forces should be held accountable for their performance
and their activities should be formally evaluated. Whatever the changes in the triangular
relation, the university, with its unique structure, manifests an inherent dynamic to
maintain institutional autonomy, which, as Olsen (2000, quoted in Maassen and Cloete
2002, 8) puts it, is a "condition for legitimate governmental steering of higher education
and peaceful co-existence with other institutions."
2. 3. Galtung's theory of violence
Galtung's theory of violence, which emphasizes causality, is widely applicable.
In this study, this theory, especially the theory on structural violence, is applied to
illustrate the situation in the state-society dimension, and to describe and analyse the
urban-rural segregation system that dominates the objective structure of rural China.
Moreover, the application of this approach of peace studies is intended to define the
existing system of urban-rural segregation as a violent structure, which in the first place
helps to establish the attitude of this study as critical.
Galtung (1996, 196-200) identifies three types of violence that construct a
cultural-direct-structural-violence triangle. Structural violence, which is manifested as
fact, direct violence, which is manifested as act, and cultural violence, which is
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symbolic, are interrelated, form causal chains and cycles and mutually strengthen each
other. Cultural violence and direct violence function, respectively, to legitimate and
maintain structural violence; structural violence, in turn, internalizes cultural violence
and sustains direct violence. The central underpinning of structural violence is
inequality, especially the inequality in the distribution of power (1969, 175).
Exploitation is one of its core elements and is so strong at times as to violate the basic
needs for human survival (1996, 198). However, there is no identifiable actor who
commits structural violence (1969, 170). Galtung highlights such "protective
accompaniment" strategies as penetration, segmentation, marginalization and
fragmentation. By using such strategies, the dominant group is capable of "implanting
the topdog inside the underdog, ... giving the underdog only a very partial view of what
goes on, ... keeping the underdogs on the outside, ... keeping the underdogs away from
each other" (1996, 199). A society dominated by structural violence may have the
following features: structural similarity; linear ranking order, leaving no doubt as to
who is higher in any pair of actors; only one "correct" path of interaction between actors;
the higher the rank of an actor, the more central the position; actors at the lower level
are represented at the higher level through the highest ranking actor in their community
(1969, 176). As a way of strengthening structural violence, "[t]he culture preaches,
teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and /or repression as
normal and natural, or into not seeing them" (1996, 198, 200). In this way, structural
violence deprives people of their human identity and freedom and reduces the victims to
passive acceptors of oppression. "With the violent structure institutionalized and the
violent culture internalized, direct violence also tends to become institutionalized,
repetitive, ritualistic" (208).
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2. 4. Bourdieu's theory of field
2.4.1. Field
The main theme in Bourdieu's theory is to think relationally (Bourdieu and Wacquant
1992, 96). Bourdieu has managed to reduce the complicated reality to an abstract
structure of relations. Aided by the concept of field, different domains which are
heteronomous in nature may be related to each other. The structure of a field is defined
as "systems of relations" and can be understood as "a space of objective relations
between positions defined by their rank in the distribution of competing powers or
species of capital" (106, 114). These fields may serve as the locus where one can study
the objective structures, and the cognitive structures of the agents in the objective
structures. In the study of a given field, according to Bourdieu, it is necessary to learn
about the habitus of the agents in the field, to examine how the objective positions in the
field occupied by the agents are related to each other, but first of all, to analyse how the
field is related to the field of power (104-105).
The field of power is a unique field, which may be defined as a:
... field of forces structurally determined by the state of the relations of power
among forms of power, or different forms of capital.... [In this field, the] objective
is no longer the accumulation of or even the monopoly on a particular form of
capital..., but rather the determination of the relative value and magnitude of the
different forms of power that can be wielded in the different fields. (Bourdieu 1996,
264-5)
Another important field is the state, which Bourdieu reduces into the meta-field, and
then examines the meta-capital or statist capital that is particular to this meta-field:
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[T]here has occurred, since the construction of the... state, a long-term process of
concentration of different species of power, or capital.... The result of this process is
the emergence of a specific capital, properly statist capital, ... which allows the state to
wield a power over the different fields.... This kind of meta-capital... grants power over
the different species of capital and over their reproduction (via the school system in
particular). (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 111, 114-15)
The above quotations indicate that, the field of power does not have its own specific
capital, rather, it is a battle field where holders of various forms of capital struggle, not
over a particular form of capital, but over, as Bourdieu (1996, 265) puts it, "the
legitimate principle of legitimation," or the power to determine the "exchange rate"
between different forms of capital. In the field of power, the state represents an
overpowering force. Whoever seizes power over the state would control the statist
capital capable of exercising power over other types of capital, and particularly over
their rate of exchange (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 114-15). This explains Bourdieu's
assumption: many struggles within the field of power belong to those aimed at seizing
the power of the state and, in turn, over the economic and political resources that enable
the state to wield power over all games and over the rules that regulate them (99-100).
A field is relatively autonomous and regulated by its own specific logic and
necessity (Ibid, 97). Since the various fields are both related to each other and located in
unequal positions in the field of power, a given field may be penetrated or even
dominated by external forces when a state of heteronomy arises. In this case, as depicted
by Bourdieu (1998, 54-63), the field will become structurally subordinated to external
pressures, i.e. heteronomous agents are introduced into this previously autonomous
world and heteronomy is brought into this field. To illustrate, someone who is not an
expert gives an opinion about a specific field and is listened to. Of course, a
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heterogeneous force only functions through the specific mediation of the field's
particular forms and forces after undergoing re-structuring (Bourdieu and
Wacquant1992, 105). It is especially noteworthy that whether a certain field is invading
or being invaded by other fields is largely defined by its position in the field of power. It
thus follows that the effect of the field of power is especially significant in the issue of
heteronomy.
2.4.2. Habitus
Bourdieu finds that the objective structure of a field fosters habitus which is subjective
(Ibid, 127). He defines habitus as "a system of lasting and transposable dispositions
which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of
perceptions, appreciations and actions", or a set of historical relations deposited within
individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perceptions,
appreciations, and actions. Agents who have internalized the specific necessity of a field
in the form of habitus would become active reproducers (16, 18, 140). On the other
hand, habitus helps make the field a meaningful world. A field is different from an
apparatus that is constructed to attain certain goals. Social agents are not "particles" that
are mechanically pushed and pulled about by external forces. The moves that they make
may be defined by both the volume and structure of their capital, their trajectory and
their objective relation to other positions. Agents in the field are constantly involved in
the struggle for their own benefits. They possess capital of a different volume and
structure, and in turn occupy unequal positions. Accordingly, they have tendencies
either to preserve or subvert the existing structure. In this way, they actively contribute
to shaping the environment that has shaped them -- through their habitus which
generates perceptions and practices (102, 108-09, 127, 136).
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The field and habitus may define each other because there is a homology
between them, i.e. they are genetically linked and recursively and structurally
correspondent to each other. Moreover, it is found that a whole range of structural and
functional homology exists between a field and the structure of social space, or class
structure (Ibid, 13-4, 105-106, 127). It follows that habitus may not control its field of
action unless it is fully inhabited by the field of power which has been the very source
of its structures (Bourdieu 1996, 228). This may explain why Bourdieu (1-2)
emphasizes that "the analysis of the acts of construction performed by agents, in their
presentations as much as in their practices, can only become fully meaningful if it also
sets itself the task of grasping the social genesis of the cognitive structures that agents
implement in them".
2.4.3. Capital
Just as the concept of field may help to reduce the structure of different domains to
various comparable relations, Bourdieu has managed to convert the different forces in
the fields into various forms of capital so that heterogeneous elements from different
fields become comparable. In a field, different species of capital circulate and vary in
value (Bourdieu and Wacquant1992, 98). An agent in a given field may possess several
forms of capital, including cultural, social, political and economic capital. To illustrate
using the definitions of some forms of capital: cultural capital may be institutionalized
in the form of academic qualifications, or it may be in the embodied state, i.e. in the
form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body. Social capital is not defined as
individual, but rather as the aggregate of the actual or potential resources linked to
membership of a group. It is this group that provides each member with the backing of
the collectively-owned capital (Bourdieu 1986, 243, 248-249).
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According to Bourdieu, the position of an agent in a field is largely determined
not only by the volume of capital, but also by the "structure" of capital (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992, 108). The structure of capital, according to Bourdieu's (1996, 278)
definition, refers to the profile of the distribution of the different forms of capital (e.g.
economic, cultural, political capital) that an agent possesses. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that while the struggle within a given field may be more apparently focused on
the volume of a specific form of capital that is unique to this field, the struggle in the
field of power may be more apparently related to how different forms of capital are
distributed. The latter struggle operates across the boundaries of different fields, and the
issue of heteronomy involves struggles of this type.
2.4.4. Educational institutions and reproduction
Bourdieu defines the school system as the mechanism of social reproduction. This
definition is contrary to the assumption that schools may benefit the dominated classes
in social mobility and cultural advancement. Bourdieu points out that the objective
interest of the dominated classes may be misrecognized as the sum of the individual
interests of their members. Educational institutions may allow controlled mobility of a
limited number of members of a dominated class while denying such mobility to the
class as a whole. This "can help to perpetuate the structure of class relations" (Bourdieu
and Passeron 1990, 54, 167).
Bourdieu (1996, 219, 276-78) also labels the school system as one of the
institutionalized mechanisms of capital reproduction, capable of converting a given
form of capital into another form currently in use in another field. This then entails a
displacement between fields. For instance, when the transfer of family capital cannot be
directly passed down along hereditary lines, the holders of capital may transform the
forms of capital they hold into forms that are rated as more valuable in the current state
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of the instruments of reproduction so as to maintain their position in the social space.
The strategies of different agents vary depending on the volume and structure of their
capital in relation to the education system, on the relative value of the profits that they
expect from their investments and on the distance between them and the appropriate
information. Since the transformation of one type of capital into another means
displacements between fields, its meaning and value would be especially defined by the
objective relations among the different fields, or by the pattern in the field of power.
Cultural capital is relatively immune to the exploitation of the holders of
economic or political capital. However, cultural capital varies in forms. One form of
cultural capital is institutionalized in the form of academic qualifications, i.e. the
academic capital (e.g. diploma). In comparison with embodied cultural capital (e.g.
academic learning), the institutionalized academic capital may be more vulnerable and
tend to have a dominated status. Bourdieu relates academic capital with other forms of
capital and points out that what ultimately allows an academic qualification to acquire
its full value in economic and social return is mainly the social capital or even economic
capital (Bourdieu, 1986, 243, 245, 248; 1996, 276). Therefore, in capital conversion,
more attention should be paid to the relations between different forms of capital. The
pattern of such relations is invariably defined by the pattern in the field of power.
According to Bourdieu's (1996, 141) research, young people coming from
different positions of the field of power are channelled into different educational
institutions. The structure of the distribution of power over the instruments of
reproduction determines that these different instruments will reward different agents
with differential returns, hence determining the reproducibility of their capital and social
positions (277). It follows that there are two aspects in this process of capital
reproduction: first, different social classes have different educational chances; second,
different sections and types of schools promise different chances of success. The
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disadvantages of these two aspects may combine into a mechanism of deferred selection
that excludes working-class students, and will eventually convert social inequality into a
specifically educational inequality. However, the educational institution, which imposes
symbolic violence, has been able to conceal this truth (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 13,
158 ).
2.4.5. A summary of field theory
In short, the various fields are just social microcosms that constitute the social cosmos.
The field defines the habitus and vice versa, given the homology between the two
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 13-4, 97, 127). Different forms of capital circulate in a
field, and they have a potential capacity to produce profits, reproduce themselves and to
be transformed into other forms (Bourdieu 1986, 241; 1996, 277). To think relationally,
such concepts as field, habitus and the specific forms of capital that are active in a field
should not be defined in isolation, but within the theoretical system that they constitute.
The different fields are related to each other and occupy unequal positions, among
which the field of power is of great importance to other fields, while the state, or the
meta-field, occupies a unique position in the field of power (Bourdieu and Wacquant
1992, 96, 104, 114-15). A field is relatively autonomous; when it is dominated by other
fields, heteronomy arises (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97; Bourdieu 1998, 57).
In a modern society, families finding it increasingly difficult to transfer capital
directly between generations may choose to invest in education. Aided with the
educational institutions as the instrument of capital conversion, the patrimony may be
transferred into academic capital. This may be one of the important strategies of family
capital reproduction. It deserves special attention that the school functions as a
mechanism of reproduction in two senses, both socially and economically: on the one
hand, it reproduces the existing social structure; on the other, it transforms a given form
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of capital into another as a way of reproducing capital. It is the former function that
defines the latter.
2. 5. Lindner's theory of humiliation
Traditionally, humiliation was "a universally accepted and honorable [sic] tool" used to
maintain stability, law and order, which was the order of "vertically ranking human
value and essence". In a hierarchical honour society, in particular, each level has its own
sense of honour. Underlings might be assisted by what could be called "voluntary
self-humiliation," wrapped in various definitions of honour (Lindner 2006, 34). In such
situations, anguish and pain were valued as honourable medicine rather than as
something unfortunate. Such humiliation practised in hierarchical honour societies,
which Lindner labels as honour humiliation, is opposed to the understanding of
humiliation in a human rights context, which Lindner labels as dignity humiliation.
Only after making long mental and emotional journeys from honour humiliation to
human rights steered dignity humiliation is it possible for individuals to define
themselves as victims (18, 29, 165). When people have more opportunities to compare
themselves with others, especially when the human rights ideal has become more
widespread, expectations of equal dignity and opportunity rise, and unawareness of
absolute deprivation may be replaced by an awareness of relative deprivation; what used
to be accepted as "normal" may be rejected as inequalities. This awakening, however,
may become the source of such ill feelings as humiliation (xv, xvi, 42-43). A possible
consequence of such ill feelings is that those who have learnt to consider themselves as
victims of undue humiliation may turn their rage inwards, or they may explode in a hot
desperate and destructive rage, and result in passionate murder and/or suicide. They
may even attempt to redress their humiliation by inflicting humiliation on the supposed
humiliators, achieving only another spiral in the cycle of humiliation (31-32).
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2.6. Grounded theory
Grounded theory, which fits empirical situations, is found suitable for the chapter based
on the data obtained from the interviews of the rural students. It discovers theory from
data that are "systematically obtained and analyzed [sic] in social research" through the
application of "a general method of comparative analysis" (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 1).
It aims to view this world as the research participants do (Charmaz 2006, 14). On the
other hand, there are critics who claim that the theory is more about particulars than
about universals (Thomas and James 2006, 781) and, therefore, question the status of
this approach as a theory. Nevertheless, this study may benefit from grounded theory in
that the chapter on the subjective feelings and local situations of the rural students tends
to be open and empirical. The substantive grounded theory generated in this chapter will
be combined with the above-mentioned theories which have wider applicability, as a
way of strengthening the theory base of the research.
2.7. Conceptualization in the context of China
As the theories that this study will apply originate in the West they will not reflect all
the details and nuances of the Chinese context. Moreover, with the exception of
grounded theory, which has found some cases of application in China, these theories are
far from being widely applied in the Chinese context, meaning that there are few
examples of precedence that can be used here. Therefore, the concepts of these theories
need to be clarified, not only in relation to the specific context of China, but also to the
specific case being considered in this study. In particular, the analytic triangle of
Maassen and Cloete which sees the state, society and higher education institutions in
relation to each other has a wide applicability, but the manner in which the three
agencies are related varies from context to context. The most salient feature in the
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Chinese context is that the state heavily overpowers the university and the society
because of its peculiar form, often referred to as "the party-state". In this study, it will
be referred to as "the state", "the party-state", or "the state of China". It is found to be
necessary to distinguish the concept of the party-state from Continental China (in this
study mostly referred to as "China" for brevity), which is a geographic concept.
2.7.1. The party-state
Xin10 (2010b, parag. 2) defines the party-state as duplicated from the Soviet model and
patterned after Leninism, and M. Xia11 (2006, parag. 1) labels it as "partocracy", where
the CPC accurately captures China's political reality. In this unique structure, Xin
(2010b, parag. 4) finds that the CPC is de facto above the Constitution and in command
of the army, an assumption evidenced by the Constitution of the PRC (2004) and
"Regulations on the Political Work of the PLA of China" (September 2010, Item 4). Xia
(2006, parag. 1) finds that the CPC commands, controls and integrates all other political
organizations and institutions in China, and Taylor et al. (2003, 19) and Z. Ma (2009,
375) present figures which vividly illustrate this model of absolute top-down
administration. Given the power of the party-state, it follows that the Chinese university
has been reduced to a subservient establishment and urban-rural segregation has been
imposed upon Chinese society.
Bourdieu highlights the privileged position of the state, or the meta-field, in the
field of power, which helps to explain why, in the triangular relationship, the party-state
of China has managed to establish this model of top-down control and invaded other
fields. As a political party, the CPC has established its dominant position in the field of
power step by step. First, it seized power over the state, by military force, and
consequently controlled statist capital. Second, with statist capital, it has the capacity to
define the pattern in the field of power and decide upon an exchange rate in its own
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favour, i.e. increasing the value of its own capital while decreasing the value of other
forms of capital. The result of this is that political force is lifted to a dominant position
in the field of power in relation to economic and cultural forces. Third, the fact that the
political field overpowers other fields has in turn strengthened the CPC's domination
over the field of power. Given that in China the political field, the party-state and the
field of power are related in a unique way, the key to understanding Chinese affairs,
including the operation of universities and colleges, would be an understanding of the
political field.
2.7.2. The political field
The Constitution of the PRC (2004) emphasizes the leadership of the CPC and
centralization, i.e. all decisions are made in a top-down manner. It follows that the
political field is monopolized by the CPC, and the CPC in turn is monopolized by the
privileged groups within this political party. As can be envisioned, the political field is
an exclusive space that forbids the intrusion of external forces. In this field, two closed
systems are in operation: first, the CPC organization system has created a gap between
the party members and the masses; second, the government administration practises a
monopoly over public affairs and has created a gap between the officials and the people.
Within this second closed space, however, the boundary between the CPC and
administration is blurred, i.e. it is institutionalized that the party departments may
manipulate administrative affairs, and party workers may be appointed to administrative
positions. Outside the two closed systems, civil societies are completely prohibited.
Even the people's congresses, according to the research of Z. Ma (2009, 372), have a
"rubber-stamp" function. The structure depicted above, in which the
party-administration system is exclusive and the populace is atomized, indicates that
individuals find that all channels through which they could give voice in public affairs
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are basically blocked. Since this situation has been established by the Constitution of the
PRC, and hence has become persistent, the status of officials tends to be secured for life,
or is even a hereditary posting.12 Ultimately, interest groups based on political power
have become consolidated at different levels of the entire society, forming an
anti-democratic mechanism.
With respect to economic and political resources, the party-state, as a totalitarian
regime, is better equipped than any other type of state governance. It can afford to
substantialize the symbolic political capital. For example, representatives of the political
field can be installed in various fields as secretaries of CPC committees and branches.
CPC members can benefit from their membership, such as being given access or
promotion to more privileged positions. The volume of political capital that individuals
possess depends on the distance between them and the dominant groups in the field. In
the Mao era, unequal volumes of political capital were allocated to people from birth
according to "family backgrounds".13 In adulthood, an individual could acquire a
certain political identity, for example, by joining the CPC or having a close affinity to
this organization.14 More often than not, political capital could be generated from
obedience to the leaders of CPC grassroots organizations. In the post-Mao era, various
forms of capital, such as economic and cultural capital, began to show some muscle.
However, the objective structures of different fields reveal very well that the
representatives of the political field still occupy the dominant positions and in fact
control various resources in the fields, although less directly. It can be envisioned that,
as long as the state of China remains under the monopoly of a single party, the political
field may continue to overpower other fields, subverting the specific logic and necessity
of these fields, interfering in their normal operation and undermining their autonomy.
This, according to Bourdieu, is heteronomy.
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2.7.3. Establishment intellectuals
Although the intellectual community may be categorized by their interests, spiritual
goals or moral appeal, this study adopts the definition of Gramsci and Julien Benda
(quoted in Said 1994, 9) and aims at university intellectuals who are "connected either
with the production or distribution of knowledge". In this category, Chinese intellectuals
differ from their peers in most other countries in that they are "establishment
intellectuals", as labeled by Hamrin and Cheek (1986). As is defined by some historians,
the basic political formula laid down early in the post-1949 period defined the
intellectual community as undoubtedly subordinate to the wishes of the CPC (Suttmeier
and Cao 2004, 152). Or, to put it another way, vertical patron-client relations dominated
the pattern of communication between the top CPC leaders and intellectuals (Goldman,
quoted in Hamrin and Cheek 1986, 15). Hamrin and Cheek describe their unique status
as follows:
As a subgroup within the ruling elite, they had a deep interest in perpetuating the
system.... We stress... that there is no clear gap between the Party and intellectuals.
Rather, there are interlocking sets of patron-client relationships, with a mix of
political and intellectual roles and interests at each level. (1986, 3, 15)
This community is considerable in size, with its members' behaviour largely defined by
the authorities:
In contemporary China, if you are not some kind of establishment intellectual, you
are not a legitimate intellectual at all.... [C]ritics as well as supporters of the status
quo must operate within a well-defined institutional framework and circulate their
opinions only through authorized channels in which one's status and personal
connections play a determining role. (Isreal 1986, x)
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The decade following the military suppression of the democratic movement in 1989 saw
considerable evolution and change in the Chinese intellectual community. Some
researchers may find the label "establishment intellectuals" appropriate for only a small
number of the intellectual elite who held key posts or monopolized resources (E. X. Gu
and Goldman 2004, 7). Nevertheless, most of the intellectuals who are state employees,
to a great extent, retain characteristics of the establishment intellectuals as follows:
There is a more cooperative and more symbiotic relationship between China's
intellectuals and the state's leaders than between intellectuals and the common
people. (Ogden 2004, 128)
As beneficiaries of state policies over the past decade, members of the technical
community are thus often more interested in protecting their gains than in
challenging the political leadership, suggesting that the inherited patron-client
relationship between intellectuals and the Party may now be stronger than ever.
(Suttmeier and Cong Cao 2004, 153)
Bourdieu's field theory, especially the concept of heteronomy, sheds light on how the
Chinese higher education system has been transformed into a subservient establishment,
and why the institutions have lost many of the features as specified by Maassen and
Cloete (2002, 27), such as decision-making structures that are loosely articulated,
changes taking place in an incremental, grassroots way, and little authority for
institutional managers to hire and fire staff. In this study, the discussion on
establishment intellectuals is limited to the intellectual community in the
government-run universities and colleges, rather than on intellectuals in general. For
one thing, it is in such institutions that one finds the most intellectuals working as state
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employees. For another, higher education institutions as a whole are strictly controlled
by the government.
2.7.4. The rural society of China
That the analysis of the triangular relation includes the rural society rather than society
in general is based on such facts as: only 27.6% of the Chinese population are granted
the status of permanent urban residents (China Youth Daily, November 05, 2013), while
the rest, whether they are living in the city or village, are formally registered as
permanent rural residents and excluded from the state welfare system in many ways.
Many agents in the rural field have left the countryside and quit farming. Therefore, the
concept of rural field adopted in this study is a social concept rather than a geographical
one, and the term "peasant" referring to the agent in the rural field, indicates
membership of a disadvantaged, deprived group, rather than the term relating to a trade.
Other social categories that are related to the peasants, such as rural students, off-farm
workers or college-graduate-off-farm workers, are invariably considered as indicating
that they are members of disadvantaged groups because of their kinship with the peasant
community. Comparable cases in other countries are referred to with the aim of defining
the status of these disadvantaged groups in China. In this process, the social categories
that are disadvantaged in other societies, such as working-class students in France, serfs
in Russia, migrant workers under South African apartheid, underlings in stratified
societies, are regarded as categories that are comparable to the above-mentioned rural
students, peasants, off-farm workers or college-graduate-off-farm workers.
2. 8. Summary
A summary may help to articulate the theme of this study: Bourdieu has envisioned a
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social cosmos composed of relatively autonomous social microcosms (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992, 97). The three agencies in Maassen and Cloete's (2002) analytic
triangle can be easily identified in Bourdieu's theoretical system, such as the university
field, the social field, the meta-field and political field that are the counterparts of the
state. The analytic triangle, which integrates these relevant fields into a triangular
relation, helps to delimit this study in the social cosmos. On the other hand, Bourdieu's
emphasis on the privileged position of the state in the field of power sheds light on why
the party-state can be perched on top of the triangle, while it dominates and reshapes the
structures of the society and the university.
This study progresses from the macro and objective structure to the micro and
subjective world. Galtung's theory of violence helps to interpret the evolution in the
objective structure of the rural society, tracing the causal chains and cycles. Bourdieu's
theory of field helps to interpret the evolution of the objective structure of the university,
also considering the subjective aspect. In the system of field theory, the rural students as
a social category are a stride above the university field and the field of rural society; in
the analytic triangle, they are located in the institution-society dimension. Urban-rural
segregation and university heteronomy will inevitably impact them and ultimately be
reflected in their subjective dimension. Grounded theory helps to discover the
correlation between their objective financial security and their subjective sense of
financial security. Bourdieu's theory on strategies of capital reproduction will help to
uncover how educational institutions may influence the rural students' academic
investment. And Lindner's humiliation theory helps to delve further into the subjective
aspect of the rural students, shedding light on the prospect of their unique mind-set in
relation to the context.
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Chapter Three: Reflections on the Status of Contemporary Chinese Peasants
3.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the state-rural society dimension in the analytic triangle, focusing
on the urban-rural segregation system. This research covers a period of time of over
sixty years, during which the state prepared, initiated and has maintained urban-rural
segregation. It has been a long-standing problem that peasants constitute the main
disadvantaged group in Chinese society. Up to now much research has been conducted
on the situation of Chinese peasants. To list a few authors and their works as
illustrations: Whyte (2010, 1) labels the Chinese system as "socialist serfdom", which
highlights the urban-rural inequality. Economic deprivation is characteristic of this
system and Dikötter (2010) and J. Yang (2009) find the most extreme case of
deprivation when they examine the "man-made disaster" (Tian 2004) during which
more than thirty million peasants died of starvation over a three-year period. In the
post-Mao era, economic deprivation continues to be a problem in rural China, as has
been recorded by G. Chen and Wu (2004) and Liang (2010). Even the peasants who
migrate to work in urban areas have difficulty escaping the economic deprivation and
suffer from the lack of basic rights, as Zou and Q. Gao (2010) find in their study of
legislation. Apart from economic conditions, according to Dong (2004) and Lu Wang
(2008), peasants are also marginalized in the area of education. M. Zhang (2004)
examines the political structure of rural China. Qin, a well-known specialist in
agricultural history, sketches a relative panoramic picture by reviewing the evolution of
the social structure of rural China and comparing the case of China to other unfree
labour systems (Qin 1994, 2003, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Qin and Su 1996).
49
In most cases, however, the research is limited to a specific period of time or a
specific event, and more on studies in history than analysis based on sociological
theories. Researchers in Continental China, moreover, tend to refrain from openly
criticizing the current system due to the censorship code, i.e. more concerns over the
plight of the peasants than queries over the situation in the state-rural society dimension.
All in all, the role the state has played in defining the status quo of rural China has not
been clearly identified. However, this chapter focuses directly on the relationship
between the state and rural society, and some relevant historical events that occurred at
different points in time are considered relationally in order to examine the evolution of
the social structure. The aim is to define the status of the Chinese peasants in the
contemporary state system and to identify the main patterns in the state policy.
It is found that the application of Galtung's theory of violence, the theory on
structural violence in particular, may satisfy the needs of this study in several ways: an
emphasis on causality may help to trace the "causal chains and cycles" (1996, 198)
between different forms of violence. The focus on structure may help to retain a
relatively objective position. Through the light of Galtung's theory of structural violence,
this chapter explores what is behind the state policy. The research questions are
formulated as follows:
What is the position of Chinese peasants in the state system?
What mechanisms keep them confined in their current position, and why?
3.2. Methods
The research in this chapter is problem-oriented and literature-based. In the process of
reviewing relevant literature, the researcher finds illumination in other authors who
compare the Chinese peasants with unfree labourers in other societies. This has inspired
the author to look for similarities and differences between the Chinese case with
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comparable cases in other contexts, adopting what Glaser and Strauss (1967, viii) refer
to as a "general method of comparative analysis". The comparison method has the
following features that in several ways facilitate the work of the researcher. First, it
allows the researcher to have a pragmatic attitude without commitment to preconceived
high-level theories. Second, it allows the researcher to see the case being studied in
different lights and relates this research, which is limited in scale, to the substantive
material from other relevant cases. Third, the choice of methods is also justified by the
idea that "any analysis of social development should be comparative" (Mjøset 2000,
392-3; 2006a, 759).
The comparisons between the Chinese case and cases in other contexts are
oriented to specific pragmatic problems as the intention is not to go into a
comprehensive comparative study. The contents chosen for comparison are limited to
specific times and specific events that are considered relevant to the research questions.
The first step is to divide the time of over sixty years into three periods according to the
evolution in the state policies governing the peasants during different historical periods;
the foci are respectively on the land reform around 1949, the People's Commune in
Mao's era, and the off-farm workers in the post-Mao era. The second step is to choose
three comparable categories in other contexts. Hence three groups of comparison are
generated. 1) Comparison between the land reforms in Continental China and that in
Taiwan; this is justified by the fact that traditionally the two contexts shared the same
political ideological orientations. 2) Comparison between the labour system in Mao's
era and that in serfdom Russia; this is justified by researchers (e.g. Qin 2010c; Whyte
2010) who refer to the Chinese peasants as serfs. Besides, of all the slave societies,
Russian serfdom allowed the greatest independence (Kolchin 1987, 237), and hence
may be used as a criterion of definition. 3) Comparison between the labour system in
the post-Mao era and the system under apartheid in South Africa; this is justified by Qin
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(1994, 2010a) who compares the urban-rural segregation to apartheid, and also by the
fact that China has adopted measures similar to the migrant worker system and influx
control that were part of apartheid.
The comparisons may provide an answer to the first research question, as
mentioned above. However, for the second research question, the same effort, which is
limited in scale and depth, is insufficient for providing an answer. Nevertheless, the
lengthy process of comparison has the advantage that the social structure being studied
has been roughly outlined. The researcher then turns to a new instrument to analyse the
social structure as a way of continuing the exploration of this theme. Eventually, Johan
Galtung's theory of violence is applied as the theoretical foundation, which helps to
identify elements of violence and to reveal the way in which these elements are
combined and function.
The literature that forms the basis of the comparison mainly comprises Taiwan
Land Reform Museum (1995), works by Kolchin (1987), Terreblanche (2000), Zou and
Q. Gao (2010), and, in particular, works by Qin (1994, 2010a, 2010c) that legitimates
the comparison and contrast between the Chinese peasants and other forms of unfree
labourers. The personal knowledge of and observations made by the author, as a
contemporary Chinese, also form the basis of the analysis. The chapter first examines
the similarities and contrasts between the comparable cases, where the aim is to define
the status of Chinese peasants. This is followed by an analysis of the structure in which
the Chinese peasants find themselves, where the aim is to reveal the elements and
mechanisms that maintain their disadvantaged position. Since the researcher cannot find
and, therefore, cannot obtain help from other authors who apply Galtung's theory of
violence in the study of the urban-rural segregation, this research tends to be limited in
depth. However, the findings in this chapter contribute to the overall study in that it
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sheds light on the motivation of the rural youths who are urged to break through the
urban-rural segregation.
3.3. Preparation for, initiation and continuation of urban-rural segregation
3.3.1. Preparation: Land reform in Continental China as opposed to Taiwan
3.3.1.1. Land reform in Continental China
For a long time, the equal distribution of land was the justification for the acts of direct
violence in the CPC's revolution. In 1947, when the communist army conquered
northern China, the General Outline of Chinese Land Laws was pronounced, which
called for a bottom-up land reform. This policy was based on a very thin outline, more
political than economic, and in the name of the class struggle, the reform relied on
direct violence. The fundamental aims of the land reform were to: 1) organize the mass
peasants into a union, which would exclude landlords and the rural gentry, as the
institution in charge of land redistribution; 2) redistribute lands equally among peasants
and deprive the rich of their wealth; 3) classify peasants according to their possession of
land into the exploited class and the exploiting class, the latter being targets of political
censure, and labelled as such from generation to generation.15 In practice, rather than
being a bottom-up mass movement, the land reform process was manipulated from
above by the armed "work groups" (gongzuozu 工作组) which penetrated the villages
as the representatives of the government.16
3.3.1.2. Land reform in Taiwan
In 1949, the Kuomintang government in Taiwan also introduced a land reform policy
based on three principles where the aim was to: 1) reject direct violence; 2) grant poor
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peasants land and consider the interests of the landlords at the same time; 3) help the
landlords, who obtained capital from land sales, to invest in industry. This land reform
policy was also a form of government coercion, but based on full investigation and
supervised by experts and scholars. On the condition that their living standards would
not be reduced below the average level, the landlords were compelled to sell their
surplus lands to the government; the latter in turn sold the lands at par value to poor
peasants and granted loans to those who did not have sufficient funds to buy the land.
To ensure fairness and social stability, the government acted as a mediating agent for
land purchase and distribution (Land Reform Museum 1995).
3.3.1.3. Comparison
Apparently, the land reform in Taiwan was in accordance with a traditional ideology
that emphasizes private property protection and respects rural autonomy. In the
traditional structure, rural autonomy and a unique form of "democracy" were based on
the patriarchal clan conference and formed the foundation on which social stability was
built. The peasants were free and self-reliant farmers under the rule of a weak central
government (Yen 1929, 46-7; 1934, 59). The above-mentioned structure of power
relations, as defined by Yen, to a large extent protected the substructure from the
intrusion of the comings and goings of dynasties at the overriding level. The rural elites
and gentry often functioned as the pillar of the local economy, as well as the protector
of local culture, social order and public services. Some of the rural elites had such status
as intellectuals or retired officials, but they were born with the membership of their
patriarchal clan, a status that lasted for life and was passed down to their children. They
were deeply rooted in their clan and had vested interests in it. This loose structure
emphasized family bonds as the law of nature and therefore established the private
sector as a realm partly independent of the state. However, some Confucius and
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Mencius literature reveals that this did not come into being by natural force, but had
been introduced by ancient idealists to shelter the people from the tyranny of the state.17
Nan (1976, Chapter One, under "Content of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism")
suggests that at a time when there was no constitution such ancient doctrines functioned
as constitutional ideas. Moreover, the prominence of the clan in ancient times also
created a more or less laissez-faire approach to the monarchy. Nevertheless, patriarchy
is structural violence, according to Galtung (1996, 33). As can be seen, the inequality in
status within the patriarchal clan had remained unchallenged because it was the
foundation of the clan organization; collectivism was a prominent feature because it
played a utilitarian role in consolidating the small rural community. There were
pioneering democratic reformers who expressed regret that the humanitarian ideals
underpinning clan autonomy were not interpreted in a way that would enlighten the
peasant masses.18 Contemporary historians also prove that the power of the emperor
encroached on the territory of the patriarchal clan, making it increasingly symbolic (e.g.
Qin 2003, 79-81). Eventually, educated youths with modern ideas of individual liberty
began to criticize the dominance of the patriarchy.19 This change notwithstanding, Yen
(1928, 30; 1929, 46) observed that the patriarchal institutions were still the basic units
in the state organization, especially at the local-government level. And for the peasant
masses, extended patriarchal families continued to be the mainstream power in their
culture. Given that peasant autonomy was the foundation of the traditional society, and
that the intellectuals were closely related to the clan, it is reasonable to assume that the
rural community was the matrix of traditional values and the cradle of intellectuals.
With respect to the economy, land resources were put under constant pressure by
the growth in population. In most cases, as is proved by Qin's (2010b, sec. 6, parag. 4)
research, lands were rarely amassed by big landlords. Other researchers also cite data
material that points to the same conclusion. According to an official survey conducted
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in several provinces in 1937, 98.66% of the families covered by the survey possessed
land of less than 120 mu; in 98.62% of the families, individual possession of land
averaged less than 16 mu (1 acre = 6.07 mu). It can thus be inferred that those with more
land tended to be large families (Kuisong Yang 2008). In commercially developed areas,
most, sometimes as much as 70% of the land in the village was collective property
(Wen 2004). Land prices were low, in contrast to the monthly income of wage earners
in the early twentieth century. For example, a university professor could have a monthly
income of about 200-300 silver yuan, whereas an ordinary worker in industry could
earn anywhere from ten to forty silver yuan. In some fertile areas, where land was more
valuable, 1 mu of land could be sold for approximately only 2-3 silver yuan or 300-400
kilos of grain. Take, for example, a typical family with six members and 100 mu of land.
The family property equalled the monthly income of a university professor. If the
family cultivated the land all by themselves, the annual net income would amount to
several thousand kilos of grain (L. Qu 2010). As can be seen, the income would be less
if the land was cultivated by sharecroppers or farmhands. As capital, land provided
limited protection against disasters in comparison to other forms of capital, such as
positions in the bureaucratic system. Land was valued, presumably, not only because it
was inflation proof and more secured than other forms of capital, but also because it
symbolized "the root" in one's ancestral place.
On the other hand, in a pre-industrial, small farmers' society, as can be inferred
from the data above, it was possible to use manpower alone as capital in exchange for
land. In this way, family wealth witnessed an ebb and flow; land was transferred from
owner to owner. Since the rural communities were connected according to their
bloodlines, land property transfer often occurred within the circle of kin and
neighbours.20 The status of landlord or poor peasant was rarely hereditary. It is thus
reasonable to conclude that, on the whole, the major institutionalized conflicts in the
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traditional society were not between poor peasants and landlords, who were
economically different, but within the same "class". Peasant uprisings that were
recurrent in history may serve as evidence that the major conflicts were between the
peasants and the ruling authorities.21 However, the land reform policy ruled that
whoever leased the land to tenants or hired farmhands belonged to the exploiting class.
In fact, the traditional society was far more complex. The research of Qin and Su (1996,
63-4) proves that, more often than not, economic inequality was the result rather than
the precondition for inequality in other capital distribution. The CPC rulers, however,
using a simplistic definition of exploitation, labelled landlords as the scapegoats for all
societal evils.
With hindsight, the two land reforms in Continental China and in Taiwan can be
seen as differing not only in that one relied on direct violence while the other did not,
but also in how they significantly defined later political and economic patterns. On the
political front, Taiwan realized the ideal of granting land to all farmers, while the
original social structure and traditional values of the rural areas were not radically
affected. On the economic front, the status of peasants remained that of private property
owners. Zou and Q. Gao (2010, 185) define Taiwanese agriculture as already "fully
developed" by the time of industrialization and urbanization. The development in urban
areas also brought benefits to peasants when land increased in value (Land Reform
Museum 1995). This serves as an illustration that Chinese traditional societal structure,
however obsolete, had the possibility to be transformed into a modern society through
reform. And the traditional ideological orientations, although outmoded, did not come
into sharp conflict with the general line of modern democratic thinking.
Continental China provided a sharp contrast to this picture. On the political front,
an "exploiting class" was identified and given the permanent label of "enemy of the
people", which was the start of a series of witch-hunts. When the employers and
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employees were divided into two conflicting camps with the government representing
"the people", the dividing line between the rulers and the ruled, which used to be open
and institutionalized, became blurred. The patriarchal institution was dismantled, and
declining with it were the coexistent ethical systems. The CPC organization branches
quickly replaced all previous rural institutions; even the peasant union initiated by the
CPC was not exempt from this purge. On the economic front, equal land ownership,
which was the alleged achievement of the land reform but which only existed
transiently, had in effect initiated a wide-ranging project that deprived peasants of their
lands and economic independence; it was a so-called "socialization of agriculture", as
Mao (1949, 1477) labelled it. Starting from 1951, step-by-step, the individual private
economy was converted into a village-owned collective economy. Ultimately, the
People's Commune, serving as a bottom-level government institution was established in
1958 to manipulate all the villages.22 This meant that the state in effect gained control
of all the land. Up to the present day, the state still benefits from the huge resources that
it inherited from Mao's era: the various levels of governments can easily obtain
collective land property from villages at a very low price without having to deal with
owners of private land property; most grave of all, the rural society has been completely
atomized ever since.
3.3.2. Initiation: The People's Commune in China as opposed to the serf commune
(mir) in Russia
3.3.2.1. The People's Commune of Mao's era
A. The main features of the People's Commune.
The People's Commune, consisting of several natural villages, was omnipotent,
58
covering everything from farming to justice, militia, commerce, basic education and
sometimes even small-scale industry. In this mini state, the CPC organization, which
was intended to reshape the values of the peasants to create consensus, paralleled the
administrative bureaucracy, which controlled the life of the masses and managed
agricultural productivity. All aspects of farm life, ranging from seeding varieties to
acreage, were governed through top-down directives. The inner workings of the
structure were unified and synchronized, making it what M. Zhang (2004, parag. 2) and
L. He (2008, parag. 4) define as a "military" organization.When first established, many
of these communes had "forced labour"23 camps (laogaiying劳改营) (M. Zhang 2004,
parag. 13). In this way, state domination reached from the capital right into the remote
villages, in contrast to the traditional assumption that the monarch's administration
should terminate at the county level.
In this system that was established and maintained through direct violence, the
commune members 1) were not allowed to migrate to urban areas, and their status was
hereditary; 2) had no ownership of land, nor large-scale husbandry or farming
instruments, nor guaranteed income or food rations; 3) had no say in farm management
and produce distribution; 4) were supervised by state bureaucrats at the commune level
and, in the village, were headed by production brigade cadres who were authorized by
the top political hierarchy in one way or another, and who were empowered to deprive
the villagers of the right to work and consequently their possibility to earn an income.
B. Related government policies.
1) The household registration system was gradually constructed in 1958.24 This
established that a citizen's legal status was bound to his or her place of residence. After
1949, with the aim of establishing an industrial and military power, the state moved
heavily from agriculture and into investment in the urban areas.25 To control the whole
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population, but most of all to stop an influx of peasants in the wake of urban prosperity,
the state adopted this discriminatory policy.
2) The repatriation system, which was in effect from 1953 to 2003, buttressed the
household registration system. Under this system, the police had the authority to
imprison and enforce the repatriation of peasants who entered the city without official
permission.26
3) The state monopoly over purchasing and marketing since 1953 meant that the state
had control over all staple farming produce while the market was by all intents and
purposes eliminated.27 In urban areas, food and other necessities of life were rationed,
making it almost impossible for peasants to survive in the city.
4) By 1956, all entrepreneurs were either state-owned or belonged to the collective but
were controlled by the state, and the private sector was eliminated. The government
rigidly controlled the recruitment of entrepreneurs from among the peasants.28
The status of urban resident was a privilege. Only those who were considered to
excel in some areas could be elevated from the countryside to the city; and on the other
hand, urban residents whose ideology needed to be "remolded" or who were to be
punished for criminal offenses could be temporarily or permanently driven outside the
city. Although the entire population was disfranchised and lost the right of free
migration, urban residents had the possibility of career advancement and enjoyed state
welfare. Most important of all, their food rations were for the most part guaranteed.
Exclusion from the city meant not only poverty, but also insecurity over one's
subsistence. The above-mentioned policies sealed off the city borders, while the
People's Commune locked peasants up in their villages.
3.3.2.2. Serfdom in Russia
According to Kolchin (1987, 2, 4), serfdom in Russian history also represented a
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regression from a free to unfree labour system. The serf commune was the basic
economic unit in the agricultural society that was in charge of evenly distributing land
among serfs and collecting taxes. Serfs, a status inherited from generation to generation,
had no right to land ownership or free migration, and were bonded to aristocratic
landlords (1, 10, 63, 77, 217). However, the commune could also function as the
political representative of the village in disputes with the government or landlords. On a
regular basis, serfs had the right to elect their own leaders, who remained ordinary
peasants without privileges (63, 201-3). Another function of the commune was to
enforce family morality and block external interference. Serfs were able to forge
communal values, customs and organizations based on centuries of tradition. Their
religion also sheltered them against the harsh realities of life (63, 201-3). In economic
terms, serfs owned large-scale farming tools and farm animals, managed their share of
the land and controlled the produce after taxes. On estates where the quit-rent policy
was adopted, the serfs could find employment in the city or engage in other activities
than farming (45, 335). It is reasonable to conclude that the serfs enjoyed considerable
de facto autonomy (217).
3.3.2.3. Comparison
Chinese peasants resembled Russian serfs in that they were unfree and landless, with a
hereditary status passed down from generation to generation. However, they were
different in some ways. In Russia, landlords hired managers to supervise the serfs. On
the other hand, the serfs had the right to elect the heads of the communes who
participated in administration but who had no standing in the state (Ibid, 63, 69). In the
People's Commune of China, the administrators acted as agents of the state who taxed
peasants unfairly. In contrast to their Russian counterparts, Chinese peasants had no
right to make decisions on farming production or on the distribution of produce after tax.
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They worked according to the rule of the para-military institution, completely chained
to the soil. It can thus be seen that with less independence, the Chinese commune
members were more deprived than the Russian serfs were.
To protect their own economic interests, Russian landlords would make an effort
to sustain the lives of the serfs. Even if they were exploited, the serfs had their share of
land and the commune's welfare system to fall back on (Ibid, 77). It thus can be inferred
that large-scale starvation was not likely to occur when harvests were normal. In
contrast, the state of China in fact controlled the commune economy. Sometimes
peasants were allocated small plots of land which they could manage by themselves
(ziliudi 自留地), but this was symbolic and far from sufficient for sustenance. The state
normally did not invest in farming production, nor did it guarantee minimum income or
other welfare for peasants.29 Most important, food rations for peasants were not
guaranteed. In the extreme case of the Great Famine between 1959 and 1961, peasants
were even deprived of their sustenance and more than thirty million died of starvation
even though there was no large scale natural disaster (Dikötter 2010; J. Yang 2009). In
fact, the Chinese peasants suffered more oppression than was necessary for the normal
operation of this exploitative mechanism. It is therefore assumed that the People's
Commune functioned as a coercive structure.
One of the basic factors leading to the erosion of peasant freedom in Russia was
the centralization and expansion of the state (Kolchin 1987, 4). The same is true of
China, where the state chose to rely on internal exploitation and coercion. Nonetheless,
there are obvious differences. Kolchin (2, 22) finds that the economy was one of the
important reasons for Russian serfdom, which was a response to the widespread scarcity
of agricultural labour and backward farming technology. With the development in
commerce and technology, serfdom became highly inefficient and was doomed to
decline. On the contrary, China always had surplus labour, but lacked the economic
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precondition of the restrictive labour system: widely available land in relation to scarce
labour. Chinese peasants were reduced to the state of fettered labour after WW II, which
was the period of modern industry. Whatever modern techniques were developed during
Mao's time failed to improve the peasants' income. As Qin's (1994, under "Reform
Eliminates Miracle") research proves, the People's Commune created the lowest
efficiency in farming production in the world and in Chinese history. Apparently, the
outmoded and stagnating production techniques and the lowest efficiency in farming
production were not the precondition but the aftermath of state coercion and
exploitation. As to why the Russian serfdom system came to an end in 1857, Kolchin
(1987, 179, 335) presents the following reason: free-labour ideas had become prevalent
and Russian serfdom began to develop moral problems; moreover, economic
development created new kinds of employment opportunities away from the nobleman's
estate, while serfdom led to a labour shortage in industry. The People's Commune in
China, on the other hand, was not terminated until 1982, when the state's economy was
already "on the brink of bankruptcy".30 This fact may lead to a focus on economic
factors. According to L. Sun31 (2011a, parag. 16), however, a more important force that
contributed to the economic reform in rural China is that those who lost power during
the Great Cultural Revolution intended to take the opportunity to return to the centre of
power. This may be a clue to why, up to this very day, peasants, unlike the freed serfs in
Russia, did not regain the right to own land as private property or to choose a place of
permanent residence.
The above comparisons show that, all in all, the exploitation and coercion that
was practised by the state of China through legal and administrative measures had many
typical features of unfree labour in Russia, but the Chinese peasants did not have the
rights and security that their Russian counterparts had. Russian serfs, more or less
sheltered by the commune, were mostly dominated by old-fashioned feudalist landlords,
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while the atomized Chinese peasants were directly exposed to an omnipresent
government network woven by a modern state. Qin (2010c, last parag.) refers to the
evidence that tens of millions of souls perished silently under the rule of the modern
state and arrives at the conclusion that, by contrast, the Russian feudalist lords appeared
to be more "merciful". Today, there is a gigantic income gap between rich and poor.
This has given birth to the myth that Mao's era was a time of equal distribution in spite
of material deficiency. This assumption, however, fails to consider the huge urban-rural
gap. Given that many peasants received no annual profit share and had no guaranteed
food rations, and especially given the great man-made famine which took the lives of
more than thirty million peasants, the status of peasant often meant abject poverty, or
even death. Ironically, poverty of the disadvantaged can be a resource for the
advantaged. For example, as Terreblanche (2002, 254) finds, the racist regime in South
Africa deliberately made the native reserves too small to sustain the blacks so that they
were forced to work as cheap migrant labour. In the same way, Mao reduced peasants to
abject poverty, which greatly facilitated the situation for his successors. In the post-Mao
era, rural China has become a huge pool of limitless cheap labour serving the interests
of the state.
3.3.3. Continuation: Off-farm workers in China as opposed to migrant workers in
South Africa under apartheid
3.3.3.1. Chinese off-farm workers
The economic reform at the end of the 1970s was significant in that it solved the
long-standing food-shortage problem, and peasants witnessed considerable
improvements in both their lives and production. But the reform was restricted to the
economic sector only, in the wake of which the controlling mechanism quickly grew in
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strength and size. Investigations made by G. Chen and Wu (2004) have exposed that the
cumbersome bureaucracy, in addition to such other public services as basic education,
placed a heavy burden on the peasants, who had very limited resources, especially land
resources (1 mu per peasant). Working in urban areas as off-farm workers would be the
only option for many peasants. This, however, meant a life of insecurity and
displacement, as is recorded by Liang (2010).
Currently, in the urban areas most off-farm workers who make a living in
labour-compact factories under poor working conditions toil for more than 10 hours a
day, earning approximately 1,300 yuan (about $200) a month.32 In this way, nearly 260
million off-farm workers33 in China form a huge pool of cheap labour that can then
supply cheap commodities to the whole world. Zou and Q. Gao (2010, 20) have pointed
out that these creators of the Chinese economic miracle are exposed to discriminatory
policies. Off-farm workers must pay "departure permission fees" to their home villages
because they have been registered as permanent rural residents; they must pay fees to
the local city authorities for influx administration, and for temporary work and
residence visas; sometimes they even have to pay a deposit to employers. Housing
prices in urban areas are another excluding factor: some of the big cities with a high
number of off-farm-worker inhabitants have more expensive housing than in
Euro-American countries.34 Zou and Q. Gao (192-98) have come to the conclusion that
the result of the discriminatory policies is paradoxical for rural China: on the one hand,
a surplus population of registered rural residents in relation to the limited land resources
leads to pervasive poverty; on the other hand, the outflow of labourers leads to a
shortage of farmhands in the agricultural sector and a waste of the limited land
resources.
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3.3.3.2. Migrant workers in South Africa under apartheid
Qin (2010a) has found an analogy in South Africa under the apartheid system and the
preceding prototypes of racial discrimination. Terreblanche (2002, 68-9) has identified
three pillars, established already at the beginning of the twentieth century, in support of
the South African economy: a cheap workforce based on the native reserves, primary
products for export and a socio-political stability that attracted foreign investment.
Terreblanche (6) points out that the white power elite managed to convert the natives
into cheap labour through three steps, by: 1) creating political and economic power
structures that put whites in a privileged position in relation to the natives; 2) depriving
the natives of their land and economic independence; 3) reducing the natives to unfree
and exploitable labour.
More specifically, the whites gained their privileged position because they
represented stronger and more sophisticated power constellations and they also
introduced social stratifications, modes of production, legal and property systems and
ideological orientations that were new in relation to those of the natives (Ibid, 20).
Through various measures, ranging from frontier wars to repressive legislation, the
whites were capable of dismantling traditional social structures of the natives,
eliminating African peasantry and tenantry, and forcing them into the limited space of
native reserves (or homelands) (11, Part Three). Once the natives lost their rights to
property ownership and economic independence, they also lost economic and political
bargaining power. Impoverished, proletarianized and confined within the native
reserves, and with insufficient resources and deteriorating conditions, the natives were
either forced or had no choice but to leave their homes and work for very low wages
(254).
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It was through legal, administrative power and, ultimately, the police force that
the state oppressed and discriminated against the natives. The Land Act was the
foundation on which the ultra-exploitative system was built and maintained (Ibid,
260-61). Together with other related legislative acts, it not only reduced the natives to
the status of proletarians, but also tied their identities to the so-called "homelands",
branding them as rural. A system of legislative and administrative measures such as
pass laws, urbanization laws, influx control and labour bureaus deprived the natives of
their freedom of migration and denied them their share of urban areas. A ban on African
strikes and on African trade unions, examples of extra-economic coercion, aimed to
impede African resistance and maintain the relative cheap price of African labour (70,
260-277, 335).
Chained within a frame of systemic exploitation and exclusion, the natives had
to adopt a mode of life that was destructive to their family, and their cultural and social
life. The migrant labour and compound systems coupled with the subsistence base in the
so-called "homelands" comprised a carefully planned trap. Worse than economic
exploitation, black townships and migrant worker hostels criminalized or brutalized
many Africans (Ibid, 42, 70, 261, 319). In this way, the natives devoted their most
productive years to urban areas, which were said to be the white man's creation, but
were excluded from the benefits of urbanization and modernization and, when past their
prime, they had to survive on the pre-capitalist economies in their impoverished
homelands (255, 315, 319).
3.3.3.3. Comparison
Similar to the case of South Africa, the economic miracle in China is mainly based on
cheap labour. The rapidly growing economy has not brought about a spontaneous
"trickle-down" effect, to borrow a term from Terreblanche (2006, 62). The majority of
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the Chinese population is left with a very low consumption capacity and the national
economy heavily depends on export. It was the state of South Africa that installed a
comprehensive apartheid system (314), while, in the same way, it is the state of China
that has initiated and maintained urban-rural segregation with overt legal and
administrative measures and even direct violence. In recent years, the occurrence of
violent conflicts has risen dramatically and the authorities are concerned about social
stability when the conditions peasants live under see some improvements in some
aspects, such as termination of the agriculture tax.35 But so far, as F. Li and X. Hu
(2010) criticize, resistance to any fundamental move from a rural migratory to a stable
urban labour force still appears to be vigorous, especially in the big cities where a large
population of off-farm workers lives. Through the above comparisons it can be seen that,
with respect to such measures as pass laws, migrant labour, single-sex living quarters
and being tied to native reserves, which were characteristic of apartheid, the situation of
the Chinese off-farm workers strikingly resembles what South Africans have
experienced. Today, such post-apartheid features as crime and moral decay are very
much in evidence in Chinese society.
Qin (2010a, under "Similarity between China and South Africa") points out that
the Chinese off-farm workers, like their counterparts under South African apartheid, are
more concerned about an absence of civil rights than deprived in economy. They have
the status of outcast, which is the direct result of the state practising "legitimate"
discrimination. Moreover, China is hardly a legal society, as Zou and Q. Gao (2010, 42)
remark. For example, most off-farm workers are not protected by employment contracts,
and one recurring problem is that entrepreneurs delay payment of wages. In South
Africa, the source of direct violence that maintained discrimination was the police force.
In China, on the other hand, peasants are routinely confronted with the "city
supervisors" (chengguan 城管), who are temporarily recruited by the local authority.
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Once the acts of direct violence of city supervisors gives rise to "group protests", the
state would then rely on the "armed police" (wujing 武警), a national army force used
to quickly put down any possibility of domestic public revolt.36
Terreblanche's (2006, 321, 322, 327) research in South Africa reveals two sides
of the story. Shantytowns were notorious; social engineering to remove blacks had
devastating effects on millions of natives; cutting down on the available housing for
blacks in "white" urban areas served as an instrument of exclusion. But on the whole,
the white government strove to make its coercion indirect. Such projects as housing
construction in the Bantustans and industrial decentralization were evidence that the
problem of physical accommodation for the cheap labour was considered part of the
overall economic development plan. The construction of bachelors' quarters for migrant
workers in the urban areas was under the supervision of the authorities, and therefore
satisfied the government's uniform quality standard. While the workplace was very far
from the Bantustans, commuting was provided for those who returned home daily. On
the other hand, Zou and Q. Gao's (2010, 14, 15, 20) research of the Chinese case reveals
almost a single-sided story. Most off-farm workers rent private houses in the suburbs or
live in the shanties on their work sites. Invariably, their living conditions are crowded,
dirty and unsafe. For example, in 1993, in the City of Shenzhen, one of the major bases
for cheap labour, a fire took the lives of 87 working girls. Even such inadequate
accommodation is never guaranteed. In municipal clearance projects, the living quarters
of off-farm workers are always targeted. Some local authorities mobilize cohorts of
policemen to repatriate off-farm workers, totally irrespective of their legal rights and
dignity.
The white democratic regime in power in South Africa respected the due course
of law. When applying its discriminatory policy, the racist government was torn apart
by powerful pressure groups in its own constituency. The open and institutional rivalry
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between various interest groups, such as political parties, the corporate sector and white
trade unions, gave room for the black opposition to grow. Black resistance and
opposition set limits on what the government could achieve with its social engineering
plan, and the white racist regime had to consider the cost of suppressing the blacks
(Terreblanche 2006, 66, 314). The political pattern in South Africa contrasts sharply
with the state of China which does not have a democratic foundation and does not
respect the due course of law. As Qin (2010a, under "Similarity between China and
South Africa") points out, while the discriminatory policy in China is as intense as it
was in South Africa, it is "blatantly unregulated".
Racial discrimination in South Africa broke with the mainstream ideology after
World War II, leading to world condemnation. In China, on the other hand, urban-rural
segregation tends to be confused with urban-rural disparity, a widespread problem that
could be alleviated through economic development or affirmative-action projects. When
the state has imposed a strict censorship on the media, it is capable of silencing
troublesome voices. Moreover, urban-rural segregation in China is different from
apartheid in South Africa, which was strictly regulated by law and clearly articulated.
As a large population of the rural people is moving across the geographic boundary
between the rural and urban areas, the discriminatory nature of this system may not be
readily detected, and the features of its structure may not be easily identified.
3.3.3.4. Summary of the comparisons
The structures depicted above exist in different historical moments that are
comparatively related to illustrate that for more than sixty years the Chinese peasants
have been deprived of freedom and dignity. Similarities between the comparable
categories reveal that the peasants have been reduced to the position of unfree labourers
under a segregation system. The differences reveal that modern rulers always treat the
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peasants in the most inhumane way, a way which has eliminated all elements of
humanism inherited from Chinese tradition, and which appears less "merciful" or is
"blatantly unregulated" in contrast to serfdom and apartheid (Qin 2010c, last parag.;
2010a, under "Similarity between China and South Africa"). Focus on the differences
between the urban-rural segregation in China and apartheid in South Africa may further
reveal some specificities of the Chinese case. We may envision a stratified society as a
pyramid and, aided by this image, we can highlight several differences. 1) Racial
segregation split the pyramid with more or less a vertical dividing line, separating the
whites and the natives into two sectors, with each sector composed of unequal social
strata, i.e. holders of different forms and volumes of capital. Urban-rural segregation
splits the pyramid with a horizontal dividing line, separating the peasant population
from the rest who are engaged in other trades, with the peasant sector mainly composed
of holders of physical capital. As a result, the rural society is deprived in various forms
of capital. 2) Racial segregation was a heritage from history, aiming to institutionalize
de facto segregation without a plan as to whether the majority or the minority were
marginalized. In China, there was no de facto segregation before the CPC came into
power. The substructure of the pyramid, or the majority of the population, was
composed of peasants. The segregation that marginalized peasants in effect
marginalized the majority. 3) Racial segregation was based on race difference, which is
immutable; urban-rural segregation was based on the status that the state assigned to
individuals according to their trades and places of residence, which can be changed. As
a result, unlike the dividing line between different races, which is impassible, the barrier
between the urban and the rural society may be overcome. Of course, such "flexibility"
is controlled by the dominant party. It is with such flexibility that the dominant party
had managed to continuously penetrate into and drain resources from the dominated
sector. The above outlined structure presents such a pattern as: the rulers, in the
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minority, ruled the overwhelming majority, with the majority being impoverished, their
private space penetrated and various forms of capital drained from them.
3.4. Discussion
The conclusions drawn from the above comparisons may give rise to new questions.
What is the purpose of the Chinese unfree labour system when the peasants are
exploited so extremely that the national economy is undermined? And why does the
regime deliberately defy the power of the majority while we fail to see the type of
repeated peasant uprisings that have occurred throughout the course of Chinese history?
If Galtung's concepts are applied, these questions can be reformulated as: why do the
rulers so readily resort to violence, especially direct violence, and why do the oppressed
tolerate such a violent structure that disregards their survival needs? To track the
ideological orientations underlying the state policies, some clues may be found in Mao's
declaration that he considered himself to be a combination of the First Emperor
(259-210 B.C.) in Chinese history and Karl Marx (D. Chen 1989, 28). Or to put it
another way, the state was continuing an ancient policy of "weakening the people in
power relations" (Shang Yang, 395-338 B.C.) while supporting the structure with
elements of modernity.
Mao's reference to the First Emperor may indicate his heritage based on ancient
Chinese tyranny. The First Emperor, building his power upon a para-military prince
state, conquered his rivals, unified China and established the first centralized regime.
One of the important reasons for his success was that he adopted a policy that
manipulated his subjects in his state with laws that disregarded moral rights. According
to his political backers, the power of the state would be correspondingly increased as the
power of the people was weakened. They believed that if the state monopolized all
resources, did not allow the people to own surplus property, denied them independent
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identity, freedom of speech or ideas, the people would be obedient and could be easily
manipulated; in the long run, the prince state could become a super power in inter-state
affairs (Ibid).
If we look at modern times to find the reasons for Mao's success in China, Mann
(1999, 21, 27, 28) may shed light on this issue through his analysis of how democracy,
which is the most sacred institution of Western modernity, may also give rise to some
undesirable consequences. In the twentieth century, citizens had more expectations of
their states. On the one hand, the most "advanced" political theory of mature democracy
could arouse aspirations for the central idea that the whole people must rule, while on
the other hand, in areas with a backward economy, "the people", mostly rural, were
largely outside the reach of working-class organizations and consequently had less
power to withstand the elites' manipulation and mobilization from above. Especially in
regions fraught with imperial versus local conflicts, the awakening to democracy could
escalate the conflicts by involving not only the elites but also the populace. In this case,
communism might rise as part of the central political theme of modernity, which viewed
dictatorial states as bearers of a moral project to cleanse this people of its enemies.
Through the modern practice of vesting political legitimacy in "the people", such
regimes could claim kinship to the bearers of true modernity, such as advocates of
liberalism and social democracy (19, 21, 39). In Yen's (1933, 54; 1937, 176)
observations of China, he finds that the ancient country was fraught with multiple
"social diseases", the traditional culture was losing legitimacy, and different values were
in conflict with each other. It was a crucial time when politics became a very sensitive
topic and sharp and value-loaded dichotomies were prevalent (1980, 294). Moreover,
the rise of the USSR exerted a strong impact upon Chinese mentality.37 Compared to
the new ideologies, traditional values on which peasant autonomy was based had much
less sophisticated ideological orientations. Hence the "roots of the roots" were shaken,
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to borrow an expression from Galtung (1996, 206). At a time of bewilderment and
vulnerability, what would eventually be ushered in instead was, according to the
criterion of Galtung (1996, 203), cultural violence: political ideologies made up for the
absence of religion and the modern state was lifted to the status of God. By the time
Mao claimed victories on the battlefield, the stage had already been set for a unique
structure of violence, often referred to as "the party-state".
The empire initiated by the First Emperor lasted only fifteen years before it was
overthrown. Classical texts38 put this short lifespan down to the extreme exploitation of
all the people in the country. Exploitation is a "center-piece" [sic] of violent structure, as
Galtung (1996, 198) puts it, and it is also one of the reasons why this structure is
maintained. In modern times, however, this old type of violence needs new and more
sophisticated strategies that can function as what Galtung (1996, 199-200) terms
"protective accompaniment." While the CPC military victory in 1949 paved the way, it
was more the process of land reform, the destruction of the patriarchal system, the
introduction of the People's Commune and urban-rural segregation that reconstructed
the entire society and perpetuated the structure of violence. In contrast to the First
Emperor, who mainly depended on military forces, the modern tyrant had a larger
repertoire and more sophisticated equipment, including cultural violence that lent
justification to other forms of violence, and more importantly, structural violence that
internalized cultural violence and institutionalized direct violence. Structural violence
was supported from the subsequent more specific strategies that were aimed at
depriving peasants of their freedom and identity.
Fragmentation and marginalization. Through redefinition and perpetuation of class
status, and with the traditional private economy transferred to a mode of public
economy that was directly or indirectly dominated by the state, the political and
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economic ties based on paternal blood lines were broken so that the peasants were
atomized. All villages were located at the bottom of a vertical bureaucratic structure,
while horizontal ties, such as those based on inter-village marriages or local culture, lost
their significance. Urban-rural segregation divided industrial workers and peasants into
two classes that were geographically distanced and economically and politically
unequal,39 making it difficult for the two to form alliances. Out of the ruins of all the
horizontal structures that had previously existed within civil societies grew a new and
consolidated state power. While this power mostly fed on agriculture, it put peasants at
the bottom of society. Industrialization and modernization ruthlessly drained resources
from rural China, while in the city the peasants were treated like pariahs. Fragmented on
multiple levels and totally marginalized, the peasants could afford neither to organize
nor to accumulate other resources that could help them resist exploitation and
oppression.
Penetration and segmentation.When the peasants were reorganized, the village
structure began to reflect the hierarchical structure of the party-state. Rural elites were
no longer village seniors, or rural gentry, or those esteemed by the villagers, but rather
production brigade cadres with "good" backgrounds and the "right" political attitude.
Since the new elites were chosen from among the villagers, the peasants could be under
the illusion that their ancestors' village was still in their own hands. Nor could they see
through the collective economy through which the land property of the village was
already monopolized by the party-state. In fact, the party-state had already penetrated
the village structure, using the peasants' own language and mobilizing the peasants
themselves to destroy their traditional values.40 On the other hand, urban-rural
segregation blocked the channels through which they obtained basic social, political and
economic information. Without the opportunity to compare their situation to others, the
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peasants were unaware of the extreme urban-rural disparity. They might gradually
become accustomed to a condition of absolute deprivation, or even be under the illusion
that acceptance of a poor living conditions could be equated with devotion to the
community. Using Galtung's (1969, 170) term, this is a "positive approach", in contrast
to the use of direct violence as a "negative" approach. The party-state adopted both the
positive and negative approaches to weave a systemic and imperceptible web of
manipulation but always remained remote and impersonal. It was difficult for the
peasants to identify the real culprit, and very hard for them to move from bewilderment
and dissatisfaction to consciousness formation.
Using various strategies to colour all its violence as progressive and modern, this
party-state managed to impose a system that reflected nearly all of what Galtung (1969,
174-77) defines as the mechanisms of structural violence: commune members formed a
linear ranking order with little horizontal interaction, and those filling the lower ranks in
the party-state system were also marginalized in their villages; all communes fit in the
party-state system with identical structures and status in which all members were
affiliated with the collective and adopted a uniform way of acting. The aftermath,
according to M. Zhang (2004, parag. 2), was that the overall rural society appeared
uniform in structure. This combination of multiple chains goes a long way to explaining
why, during the Great Famine between 1959 and 1961, the peasants just died silently in
their villages, whereas in similar cases in history, starving peasants would form waves
of refugees that might lead to peasant uprisings.
In the post-Mao era, the concept of modernity also dressed the economic reform
in a deceptive cloak. The termination of some restrictive policies may have given the
people a feeling of liberation. In fact, however, the two important legacies of the Mao
era, deprivation of peasants' land property ownership and urban-rural segregation,
continue. These two exploitative and discriminatory institutions, combined with the
76
scarcity of land resources, have left very little room for the peasants to manoeuvre. They
are therefore forced to migrate to the city but are excluded from the urban public goods.
When the identity of each peasant is tied to the village while they are actually migrant
workers in the city, it is difficult for them to form stable relations among each other in
either location. Excluded from the mainstream life of the city, they continue to be
denied basic political, social and economic information. An itinerant life is destructive
to their families, and urban-centred consumerism, a mode of living that is widely
marketed through the modern media, erodes the rural tradition and morals that somehow
survived the ravages of Mao's era. Such new concepts as the market economy and
modernization provide excuses for unequal distribution of wealth and disguise the many
sins that were unknown to the traditional society. Economic development may make the
threat of starvation less prevalent. However, with a legal system that prohibits
independent trade unions, strikes and participation in politics, and with the peasants
exposed to the direct violence of the "city supervisors" and "armed police" at both the
local and national levels, the Chinese peasants retain their position as unfree labour, still
chained in a violent structure that has extended from the village to the city.
The gravest abuse was the exploitation of the modern education system as a
means of penetration, segmentation and marginalization. In an issue related to education,
Bourdieu's comment is enlightening: social mobility granted to a controlled selection of
a limited number of individuals, rather than upgrading the underclasses, may guarantee
social stability and help to reproduce the structure of class relations. Compulsory
schooling, in particular, is capable of imposing upon the dominated groups the value of
the dominating class and, at the same time, relegating their own value and knowledge to
an inferior position (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 42, 167).
Since the 1950s, although higher education suffered greatly, the party-state did
manage to expand rural basic education, which raised the level of literacy. However,
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this process of education, according to the criteria of Haavelsrud and Galtung, could be
defined as anti-dialogic and the content of the education emphasized sharp and
value-loaded dichotomies, worship of the state ruler (Haavelsrud 1996, 143; Galtung
1996, 203). Such processes and content manifested structural violence. Especially
during the Great Cultural Revolution, intellectuals were sent to the rural areas to
perform manual labour in the name of moral purification, which would then deny them
professional identity. And, in the name of combining theory with practice, the peasants
who had the "right" political attitude were often invited to participate in education. This
kind of "dialogue" would give people a feeling of democracy, but the context of the
dialogue can be labelled as what Haavelsrud (1996, 87) calls "the framework of the
monopolized premises". In this way, without the support of the imagination of the
intellectuals, the rural schools in China were prevented from following the international
trend to democratize education, and the peasants could hardly realize the opportunity of
achieving a real education, but were permanently reduced to the status of simple,
manual labour. The expansion of the low-quality basic education in rural China during
the Mao era has a negative effect that it could deprive the peasants of their independent
values, representing a further destruction of the rural culture, in the process of state
penetration. But there is another negative effect: the monopoly of the government-run
education system meant destruction of the ancient tradition of private schools. In the
post-Mao era, basic education in rural areas has gradually declined, as has been
observed by Jiao (1999). Deficiency in funding may explain the decline. But an equally
important reason may be that the general context in rural China has also been reshaped
in a way that is unfavourable to non-official enterprises.
Urban-rural segregation has always been part of Chinese education, but is not as
defined by corresponding state laws as it was in South Africa. Discrimination to a large
extent is achieved through economic measures, as we can see, for example, in primary
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and secondary education: the village economy supports rural schools while the
municipal economy supports urban schools. In Mao's era, all the staff in urban schools
were state employees, while many rural teachers, without professional qualifications
and temporarily employed, were subsidized by the village. Such education policies that
correspond to urban-rural segregation have continued into the post-Mao era. By now,
the number of rural schools has sharply decreased. Within the twelve years between
1997 and 2009, half of the primary schools in rural China were shut down, with 64 rural
primary schools disappearing each day (China Youth Daily, December 24, 2011). More
than 60% of the rural children do not continue to senior middle school (M. Han 2009).
Insufficient funding to rural education accounts for much of this phenomenon. As a
large peasant population has migrated into the urban areas, and many are granted a
"long-term" urban residence permit, some private schools have emerged to admit their
children.41 Lu Wang's (2008, 700-01) research proves that these low-quality and
low-cost schools tend to reproduce the underclass. Even such opportunities are not
always available, for many of the low-quality schools are not authentically accredited
and hence are targets of municipal clearance projects (Sha 2014). Some municipal
schools are open to rural children, but charge extra fees,42 while some openly impose
segregation policies that separate urban and rural children (Nanfang Metropolis Daily,
June 09, 2010). At the tertiary level, the state policy that encourages higher education
institutions to charge high tuition fees effectively deprives many rural people of
education opportunities (Dong 2004). Moreover, with a poor educational background at
the primary and secondary level, rural youths are often streamed into the non-elite,
low-quality institutions. As a result, rural students tend to exhaust their family finances
but are likely to find themselves in a difficult situation at a time of employment crises,
or may become college-graduate-off-farm workers, as will be detailed in Chapters Five
and Six.
79
It is note-worthy that the "state cadre"43 selection system and the higher
education system recruit civil servants and college students from among the peasants,
the small elites that have some capacity for political activity. Since the urban-rural
difference is not immutable like the racial difference, the status of these rural elites can
be altered. Once these elites have been assigned urban status, which they can then pass
down to their children, they are uprooted from rural society. This is in sharp contrast to
the traditional society when one's identity in the rural community represented rights
rather than marginalization. When officials or intellectuals found the environment for
their career too adverse, they could retire to their rural homes -- socially and politically,
as well as geographically. It thus can be seen that, on the one hand, urban-rural
segregation in a way resembles a perpetuated racial segregation; on the other hand, it
manifests some flexibility which is controlled by the dominant group and contributes to
a continuous brain drain from the peasant community. Qin (2010a, under "Difference
between China and South Africa") points to the cadre selection system in particular as
one of the factors making it less possible for a popular leading figure like Nelson
Mandela to emerge from the masses in rural China. This remark may in part explain
why the Chinese peasants seldom protest against the discriminatory institutions in as
rational and systemic a manner as the South African natives did.
It thus can be seen that in the evolution of the state policies one theme is salient:
the peasants are disadvantaged in the power relations, which has been duplicated from
the First Emperor. But the endeavours of the First Emperor turned out to be a great
failure, which led to the first peasant uprising in Chinese history. The downfall of the
giant seemed to have proven the prophecy of Mencius (372-289 B.C.), the ancient
idealist who maintained that the stability of a state lies in its reciprocal relation with the
people. This also helped to create a myth that demonstrated the power of peasant
rebellion. This may in part explain why the ancient rulers who competed for power at
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the top level would more or less leave some autonomy to, and sought to negotiate with
the majority of the population. However, most of the time Chinese history tells us a
different story: most of the monarch dynasties, even though lasting for centuries,
invariably collapsed, and an important force that defined the comings and goings of
dynasties was peasant uprisings. When asked for the countermeasure to prevent this
historical periodicity, Mao gave the solution, "democracy" (F. Huang 2012). In practice,
apparently, Mao went to the opposite extreme, falling back on the First Emperor in
addition to modernity. In this way, the relationship between the modern rulers and the
people was undoubtedly that of the conqueror and the conquered, leaving no room for
negotiation. However, the conquest was bound to be an endless process, for it was a
conquest of the minority over an overwhelming majority, and the conquerors were
extremely afraid of a revolt by the conquered.44 From the very beginning, therefore, the
conquerors made every effort to deprive all resources from the peasants in a way that no
previous dynasties had managed to do. This permanently eliminated the possibility of
the peasants duplicating the rebellions of the past. Most significant of all was the
exploitation of modern education. By persecuting the intellectuals, the First Emperor
mainly persecuted the small number of elites. The modern party-state, on the other hand,
not only denied peasants the right to enlightenment more severely than was done in
medieval times, but also created a culture of violence through the system of populace
education to justify and popularize structural and direct violence. This lifted the
party-state to the level of omnipotent entity, enjoying limitless power and legitimacy.
Rulers in the post-Mao era seem to have inherited Mao's fear of public revolt.
They then resort to direct violence, such as funding "public security" with so much
money that has exceeded expenditures on the national defense (BBC.co.uk 2013, 2014).
They resort to structural violence as well, such as maintaining urban-rural segregation.
In maintaining this structure, they also seem to have inherited what Hamrin and Cheek
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(1986, 10) refer to as Mao's "wartime norms of official flexibility". Acts of direct
violence that are not legitimated by laws are possible due to such flexibility. The
suppression of the student protests in 1989 was a typical example of such flexibility. In
the case of urban-rural segregation, this flexibility may be misrecognized as evidence
that the Chinese peasants suffer less discrimination than did the victims of racial
segregation. The long co-existence of such flexibility and the urban-rural segregation
system confirms Galtung's (1996, 208) statement that a violent structure tends to
institutionalize direct violence. The phenomena, such as what Qin (2010a, under
"Similarity between China and South Africa") refers to as blatantly unregulated, what
Zou and Q. Gao (2010, 42) refer to as disrespect of legal procedures, are invariably
made possible by the flexibility that accompanies the urban-rural segregation system.
When such flexibility is applied in the educational system, it may lead to such
phenomena as follows: rural schools are merged by force; private schools oriented to
the children of off-farm workers are shut down by force, universities and colleges
unduly charge high tuition fees from rural students.
However, the regime has always been under the threat of both fiscal strain and
public revolt: as the party-state expanded, and government inefficiency and waste of
resources continued, extreme exploitation became necessary; when the peasants were
even deprived of what they needed for survival, their instinct to resist was inevitable.
From the very beginning, therefore, the party-state relied on violence and deliberately
and rationally eliminated all elements of humanism inherited from tradition. Today, the
Chinese peasants are more directly exposed to and thus much more aware of the huge
distribution disparity accompanying the economic reform, which is also plagued with
widespread corruption. The educational system marginalizes their children, depriving
them of their last hope for social advancement. This, to a considerable extent, leads to a
situation that CPC propaganda in the ideological arena (i.e. cultural violence that
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legitimates structural violence) has become less effective. And the rulers, in turn, will
more readily rely on direct violence, the other supporter of structural violence, in order
to crush the people's belief in the myth of peasant rebellion, and to make every
individual shudder at the mere thought of party-state power.
3.5. Conclusion
Collins, Skocpol and Goldstone summarize a model of "state breakdown" which is the
combination of the following key factors: state fiscal strain, popular revolt, lack of
legitimacy, intra-elite conflict (Collins 1999, 47, 49). The party-state is being threatened
by the first three of the four factors. Apparently, the rulers do not plan to reform the
existing power relations and find solutions in democracy, which means they will have to
continue to undermine the power of society so as not to repeat the historical periodicity
that saw the eventual fall of the dynasties. Once society has been unduly undermined,
the national economy may also be undermined. This is the price the party-state has to
pay to prevent its collapse, and the conventional measures that the party-state applies in
undermining the power of the people are aimed at depriving the majority of the
population, i.e. the peasants. Since such deprivation is structural, peasants'
disadvantaged status would turn out to be permanent and would pass down to their
children through the functioning of such mechanisms as the educational system. It is
therefore assumed that the urban-rural segregation system is one of the most important
pillars of the party-state and it is used to reduce the peasants to the status of unfree
labourers and, in turn, to control other sectors of Chinese society. The flexibility
inherent in the violent structure shows the institutionalization of direct violence, which
guarantees that the state can undermine the power of the society as much as possible.
In the first half of the twentieth century, direct violence, often in the form of
open warfare, raged across most of China. At a time of ideological conflicts, the
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legitimacy of the traditional local autonomy, which had sheltered the peasants in history,
was in decline. The peasants' vulnerability left room for cultural and structural violence
to penetrate into the rural communities. The newly established totalitarian structure not
only oppresses peasants politically, robs them economically, hurts them physically, but
has also destroyed their values and beliefs derived from their traditional political
autonomy and economic independence. Today, to control the violence of the party-state,
what is necessary is not only a structure that is more sophisticated than the patriarchal
system, but also a culture that is based more on modernity than on traditional
collectivism. Or, to put it another way, only when the peasants are equipped with both
organizational know-how and political awareness will it be possible for them, faced
with the overwhelmingly powerful violence of the party-state, to uphold individual
rights as inalienable, just as they upheld family morals in the past with an almost
religious tenacity.
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Chapter Four: Reflections on the Status of Chinese University Intellectuals
4.1. Introduction
One of the sources on the situation in the university-society dimension is the discussion
in the public media about the moral degradation of Chinese intellectuals. For example,
between June and July in 2009, Xiaokang, a sub-journal of Qiushi (the journal run by
the CCCPC), undertook a survey on the integrity of 49 social categories. Teachers and
scientists, who used to enjoy high social prestige, ranked lower than prostitutes, and
lower than peasants, clergymen, soldiers and students (Xiaokang 2009). There are also
individuals within the establishment who criticize academia. For example, the vice
mayor of Guangzhou City complains that 60% of the national research funding has been
consumed in areas other than scientific research (Lin Zhang 2013). Criticism from
outside the establishment is more common, for example, the President of Beijing
University of Post and Telecommunications, Binxing Fang, who is known as the
"Father of the Firewall" in China, published a Spring Festival greeting on the internet in
2013. Within two days, he received more than twenty thousand derogatory responses
(Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2013).45 Some well-known scholars join in the
voices in the public media, such as Y. He (2010) and Lixiong Wang (2002), who
criticize the intellectual community under the titles "The Most Desperate Degradation"
and "Aspiration for Degradation".46 Yu (2009) says that contemporary Chinese
intellectuals are undergoing a status transformation from the servants of power to
market peddlers.47 D. Liu (2012) warns of the impending overall collapse in academic
ecology.48 X. Ding (2010) declares that Chinese academics are hopeless.49 Q. Zhang
(2011) suggests that the hypothesis that the deterioration of the Chinese intellectuals is
related to the system is so self-evident that it no longer needs verification; what really
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matters is that this community has lost the support of the professional spirit.50 In order
to examine the extensiveness of such criticism, the researcher undertook a simple
experiment in September 2012. Aided by the Chinese internet search engine,
"baidu.com", the search for "university president/academic corruption" has more than
five million hits. Scanning through the first 70 hits one finds the names of presidents or
deputy presidents of eight universities. The above criticism, which mainly takes aim at
the intellectuals' failure to play their public roles properly and at their corrupted
demeanour, is mainly based on the critics' personal observations.
This study is not intended to add another voice to the public media and to
discuss the topic as merely a problem of some individuals. Rather, the aim is to examine
how the deterioration of the Chinese intellectuals is related to the system. In other words,
the state-university dimension in the analytic triangle is the focus of this chapter. And
the discussion will be narrowed down to explore a more specific question, which is
formulated as follows:
How has the structure of the Chinese higher education institutions, under
the influence of their relationship with the state, shaped the university
intellectuals with respect to their mentality and attitude toward their
public roles?
4.2. Methods
Bourdieu's field theory is applied as the guiding approach, which prompts the researcher
to think relationally. The choice of methods is subordinate to the purpose of the study:
to interpret the relationship between different parties, such as how the state influences
the university, how the university influences the intellectuals and how the intellectuals
respond to their context. This is done to demonstrate a dynamic, evolutionary process in
the institutions' structure in relation to its macro-context, not unlike sketching a diagram.
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The objective structure of the university is outlined mainly by referring to relevant CPC
and government policies, as well as regulations within the institutions, or by referring to
some important historical events.
This chapter is mainly based on literature. The different types of material serve
multiple purposes: to outline the structure of the Chinese higher education institutions,
to depict a general background or to provide illustrations for this chapter, to help
identify the gap in which this chapter finds its position, to construct a conceptual
framework for the analysis. The websites of several universities are referred to in order
to present the objective structure. The major sources of information are the internet and
publications outside Continental China, invariably because of the strict censorship; as a
matter of fact, some critics referred to in this chapter have suffered persecution to
various degrees.51 The researcher is familiar with the organization and norms of the
Chinese universities and colleges, which forms part of the basis for the analysis and
reflection.
With its limited scale, this study focuses its analysis on the major frame of the
institutions' structure that is relatively permanent, giving less heed to the details that
vary with the state's shifting political line and contradictory goals. The university
intellectuals are studied as a social category and their habitus is seen as collective: close
scrutiny of the individual habitus at the micro level is not the focus of this study. The
category being studied in this chapter covers professionals and technical personnel
engaged in management, education and research. They have such academic titles as
PhD, assistant lecturer, lecturer, associate professor, professor, PhD supervisor, which
only indicate academic qualifications or positions in the bureaucratic structure, but are
less defined by academic competence, and even less related to the spiritual and
ideological aspects.
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4.3. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
As general background, the history of the modern Chinese university is very short, only
covering a period of one century. The structure modelled according to the Western
university only came into existence two to three decades before 1949 (Hayhoe 1996,
116-17). After the CPC came to power, the "thought remolding"52 of intellectuals was
considered to be one of the most important measures for the realization of "democratic
reform" and industrialization (Mao 1951, 184). Two events in the 1950s could serve as
the milestones in the process. First, the system began an "institution and discipline
adjustment" (yuanxi tiaozheng 院系调整) in 1952, which gradually phased out some of
the former national universities, all the private or church funded universities53 and
terminated some liberal arts disciplines such as law, political science and sociology
(Haibo Wang 2006). The new system was mainly composed of technology and
engineering colleges that were oriented towards economic development.54 Second, the
Anti-rightist Campaign in 1957 marginalized academic authorities and expelled a great
number of the top teachers and students from the campus (S. Ding 1993, 2007).
Intellectuals not only lost the freedom to research and teach, but faced the potential
threat of arrest without recourse to the law (Y. Gao55 2007). These two events are
important indicators: the former meant the reconstruction of the university by
government ordinance; the latter meant the implementation, aided with the reshaped
structure, of more severe state policies that were often manifested in the form of
political campaigns.
The vertical patron-client relations, which were the dominant pattern in the
communication between the state leaders and intellectuals (Goldman, quoted in Hamrin
and Cheek 1986, 15), were strengthened by a series of political campaigns. In the
post-Mao era, an obvious change is that political campaigns as a routine means of
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control have been terminated in favour of other forms. For example, regular field armies
were deployed to put down the student protests in 1989 without providing a legitimate
excuse; some individual dissidents were fired or arrested with recourse to the law.56 But
on the whole, the regulatory approach of the rulers has shifted to a more restrained and
selective approach to control intellectuals, as S. Ma (1998, 450) comments.
Consequently, the intellectuals' living and working conditions have improved to some
extent. Especially since the 1990s, with the economy gaining in importance as a means
of manipulation, the state's political control has been relatively relaxed. Meanwhile,
however, as some researchers have observed, the growing market forces have
increasingly distracted the intellectual community from its public role (E. X. Gu and
Goldman 2004, 12). This may explain the large volume of criticism found in the public
media.
In contrast to what is being said in the public media, it appears that Chinese
researchers on the whole fail to have a corresponding degree of research on intellectuals.
To list a few well-known authors who have made inroads into the relevant areas: Pei
(2004) points out that contemporary China has been largely influenced by the choices of
the intellectual community.57 G. Fu (2008) observes that the intellectual community is
undergoing a great change; this group is now split and no longer shares common
interests, nor do they have common spiritual goals or moral appeal.58 J. Xu (2003) has
identified a salient feature about the intellectual community, seeing that they are
increasingly indifferent to public affairs; if they used to be marginalized in the political
sphere, they are now in turn socially marginalized.59 K. Chen (2004) suggests that the
tension between the Communist regime and academia does not result from the rulers'
personal preferences, but is created by the structure and institution.60 P. Hu (2005, 2012)
analyses the CPC's thought-remolding strategies that they used on the intellectual
community from the perspective of philosophy and psychology; he also assumes that,
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under the market-oriented situation, the CPC rule has converted the Chinese
intellectuals into cynics, or people who only recognize external secular benefits while
ignoring intrinsic virtues and values.61 Xia (2010), in contrast, finds that the
intellectuals are collaborators in government crimes. The above-mentioned researchers
either have a tendency to study the community as a whole,62 or concentrate on specific
cases of some prominent intellectuals.63 When it comes to research specifically aimed
at university intellectuals, much remains to be explored.
In the search for relevant material, the researcher has found only one monograph
(J. Zhang 2009) published in recent years that analyses university intellectuals. This
work defines the field of Chinese research universities not as an academic community
that searches for balanced truth, but as a field in the hierarchical government
bureaucracy. However, it is mainly focused on the young teachers' professional stability
and development trajectory. Such questions as how state political and economic policies
interfere in the higher education system largely remain unanswered. Or, in terms of field
theory, the work fails to give significant consideration to the process through which the
omnipresent political force intrudes on the university field. The researcher has found
only one short paper (L. Gu and X. Zhou 2011) published in Continental China that is
focused on the heteronomy of university. It is very valuable that the authors ascribe the
status quo to the invasion of state power. In conclusion, however, the paper deviates
from the conflict between the state and higher education institutions. All in all, the
above-mentioned researchers rarely incorporate much systematic theories, or focus on
objective structures, and although some of them assumes that the intellectual
community and the objective structure interact, they rarely demonstrate the specific
process of how this takes place.
This chapter follows the idea of Bourdieu's theory to think relationally
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 96) so as to avoid alternating between condemnations of
90
either society or the educational system as the sole culprit of the problems (Bourdieu
and Passeron 1990, 178). To be more specific, this research attempts to relate the higher
education institutions to the state as well as to individual intellectuals; it is focused on
the objective structure of the institutions, and also gives heed to the intellectuals'
subjective response to the structure. To achieve this purpose, this chapter is set within a
conceptual framework which is based on Bourdieu's field theory. The concept of field
generalizes the space within which the university intellectuals live, and thus filters out
the minor details that might interfere with the aim of the research. The concept of
habitus is history-based, which enables this research to cover different periods of time;
in combination with the concept of homology, it explains the relationship between the
objective structure of the institutions and the subjective dispositions of the intellectuals.
Several forces that impact the university field are converted into various forms of
capital that are comparable. The concept of heteronomy summarizes the process through
which the university field has been invaded and helps to discern the heterogeneous
forces that are undermining the field.
4.4. Outline of the Chinese Higher Education Institutions
In spite of all the changes over recent decades, the basic structure of the institutions
remains the same in that the senior leaders of the universities and colleges are appointed
by the personnel department of the CPC committee at the overriding level. Two CCCPC
documents are decisive here: the Cadre Management System Reform Regulations (1983)
and the CPC Grassroots Organizations Regulations in General Higher Education
Institutions (1996; 2010). According to the first document, senior university leaders in
both the party and administrative sections are directly under the leadership of the CPC
committees at the corresponding overriding levels.64 For example, the heads of the two
top universities in China, Tsinghua University and Peking University, are appointed by
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the personnel department of the CCCPC, and the heads of provincial universities are
appointed by the personnel departments of the provincial CPC committees. The second
document is mainly focused on affairs within the institutions. For example, the so-called
President Responsibility System is under the leadership of the CPC committee, while
the institutions' cadres (i.e. heads and directors) at various levels are appointed and
managed by the CPC grassroots organizations.65 In 1999, the Higher Education Law of
the PRC was issued. Obviously, it has never deviated from the above two CCCPC
regulations. It lays down that the university president is an independent legal entity,
while in Article 39, it lays down that the president shall be under the leadership of the
CPC committee of the university; the CPC committee appoints the heads of different
sections and defines the institutional organization. With respect to the cadre
appointment procedures, the university president is subordinate to the CPC committee
on the overriding level, as well as to the CPC committee at the institutional level. In
effect, the Higher Education Law of the PRC fails to provide significant protection to
the president who exercises his powers independently, for it fails to provide any specific
legal guarantee regarding academic autonomy and funding. It is, so to speak, the
CCCPC policy reformulated in the form of law.
Chinese universities and colleges constitute a highly stratified system (Xie 2011,
37-38). Within such a huge, hierarchical structure, there will be differences from
institution to institution. However, within the macro framework of a strongly centralized
state, the major structures of the universities and colleges tend to be homogeneous.
Table 4.1 attached at the end of this chapter, which demonstrates the main structure
within the institutions, is based on the information found on the internet in September
2012. It lists 20 elite universities that function as models for other institutions. It would
appear that the field of Chinese higher education still retains the basic structure that is
the legacy of the 1950s. All the universities are under the top-down leadership of the
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CPC committees and are subordinate to the central or local governments. The major
management sections in the institutions are supervised by the corresponding offices in
the governments.66 Within the institutions, as can be seen from Table 4.1, there are two
parallel leading agencies. One is the CPC apparatus, which controls ideology and
appoints the heads of all the faculties and departments. In this way, it dominates the
university, but may be staffed by non-experts.67 The other is the administrative
bureaucracy, which deals with the daily affairs and whose staff is appointed and
supervised by the CPC. Taking Huazhong University of Science and Technology as an
example, one sees that not only the administrative bureaucracy is under the leadership
of its CPC committee, but also the university administrative leaders, including the
university president, vice presidents and executive vice-presidents, are all members of
the CPC Standing Committee. The Personnel Department of the CPC Committee is
responsible for the appointment and management of all leaders at or above the faculty
and department level, including the heads of the various academic sections. The CPC
Committee of the institution is also in charge of the Youth League Commission and
Student Work Department/Office; the latter sections control the students' political and
ideological actions or manage other student affairs, ranging from the students'
extracurricular activities to scholarship and student loans. The United Front Department
of the CPC Committee controls the members of the many democratic parties that have
no more than a rubber-stamp function. Especially noteworthy is the Security
Department of the CPC Committee, whose "internal security responsibility" (neibao内
保) is similar to the role of political police (Hust.edu.cn).
The Constitution of the CPC (2007, Chapter Five, Item 29, 31) stipulates that
wherever there are three or more formal party members, a grass-roots party organization
should be established. Accordingly, the CPC organization penetrates vertically from the
top down and is linked to academic sections to construct a hierarchy normally
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consisting of three levels: CPC committee of the university, CPC committees of the
faculties and CPC branches rooted in the departments or teaching offices. The CPC
recruits its members from among staff and students who are obliged to promote the
influence of the CPC on the campus. Apart from the above-listed institutions, there are
also quasi-institutional control systems. For example, financial means are used to
encourage the students to become part of a watchdog network, often referred to as the
"the system of teaching information staffs" (xinxiyuan zhidu信息员制度).68 In this way,
the CPC organization penetrates all academic sections and on all levels of the university,
and it could be said that it has constructed a vast nerve system.
In sharp contrast to the well-organized CPC, the intellectuals are "atomized", to
borrow a term from Galtung (1969, 177). There are no system-wide teachers' unions or
other professorial associations that are taken for granted in other countries, while the
teachers' union within each university is not independent but subordinate to the CPC
committee; the leader of the union is a member of the CPC committee.69 The student
union, which is affiliated with the Youth League Committee, is indirectly controlled by
the CPC Committee. As can be expected, it is difficult for teachers to form horizontal
allegiances with each other or with their students, either within or across campus
borders. It is also difficult for peers to form vertical allegiances beyond the institutions:
peers in other countries find their professional standing chiefly in their disciplines
(Clark 1983, 33; Maassen and Cloete 2002, 27); the Chinese intellectuals, in contrast,
find their professional standing mainly within their institutions, with the assessment of
the teachers' qualifications controlled by CPC and administrative officials. Ogden (2004,
115) describes this status quo as "factionalized intellectually and organizationally along
the same lines as the Party-state."
All in all, the university intellectuals manage to survive between the two
intertwined networks of party and administrative bureaucracy, confined in their
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segmented campuses. The following are five examples which illustrate how, at different
times, some Chinese intellectuals cope with their environments. These cases are
widely-noted and involve some very influential figures in the university field:
Example 1. Intellectuals yielded to political pressure and provided false theory. In 1958,
Professor Qian, a world-famous Chinese scientist, wrote an article in support of the
state project called the "Great Leap Forward" in agriculture.70 The project deprived
peasants of food and took over 30 million lives. This came in the wake of the
Anti-rightist Campaign of 1957 during which many intellectuals were persecuted.
Example 2. Intellectuals who refused to yield to pressure suffered persecution. Professor
Wanli Huang, the most renowned hydraulics specialist in China, was sent to a
forced labour camp during the Mao's era because he opposed the construction of
the Yellow River Dam, a symbolic project that caused an enormous ecological
disaster and led to astronomical economic loss. In the post-Mao era, he was once
again marginalized because he opposed the repetition of the same mistake, the
construction of the Three Gorges Dam, a symbolic project that has led to a grave
waste of resources, ecological disaster and social problems (Q. Dai71 1989).
Example 3. Four cases of thought control. Xuesong Lu (2005), a teacher at Jilin College of
The Arts, taught Chinese film history. She discussed an unjust verdict with her
students that was recounted in a documentary about the Cultural Revolution. She
was reported by some of her students to the authorities and was deprived of her
freedom for one year without recourse to the law. Xuesong Lu revealed that there
were students who were paid to inform the authorities about things said in class.
Professor Shiqun Yang of East China University of Political Science and Law, and
Professor Yeling Xia of Peking University were reported by their students to the
95
school authority, the municipal Education Commission, or the Public Security
Bureau, as "counter-revolutionary" or "anti-CPC and anti-socialist" (Kaiwen 2010;
Y. Lu 2011; F. Shi 2008). Yeling Xia is no longer employed by his university. In
2010, X. Zhang, an associate professor of the East China University of Political
Science and Law, opposed the imposition of CPC ideology on the students and
proposed that such courses as Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong's Thoughts and
Deng Xiaoping Theory be removed from the public curriculum; he was
subsequently labelled as academically "unqualified" and no longer entitled to teach
(Hai 2012; X. Zhang 2011).
Example 4. A case of corruption. Professor Jin Chen, the director of the Faculty of
Microelectronics at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, PhD supervisor and "Chang
Jiang Scholar" (Changjiang xuezhe 长江学者), faked scientific achievements and
claimed to have made a historic breakthrough in China's microchip manufacturing
technology. He cheated one research fund out of as much as 100 million yuan.72
This project had been examined by a group of experts who had unanimously
agreed that Jin Chen's innovation was original in China and advanced at the
international level, and could serve as a milestone in the history of chip
development in China. This case also involves the Ministry of Information Industry,
Ministry of Science, Ministry of Education and the Shanghai Municipal
Government. After this case was exposed, none of those who have been involved
has been subject to criminal justice (Q. Wang and Ren 2006).
Example 5. Intellectuals' indifference to crime. In recent years, "group protests" from the
underclasses have occurred more frequently than ever.73 In contrast, university
intellectuals, as a whole, often choose to remain silent. As a case in point, in 2010,
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a car accident killed one rural female student and injured another on the campus of
the University of Hebei Province. It was reported that the culprit openly declared
that his privileged position placed him beyond punishment (Zonghe 2010). The
whole campus, as well as the entire higher education system, remained silent in this
case. Strong condemnations were made on the internet, a locus that allows more
democratic voices.74 As another case in point, during the earthquake in Sichuan
Province in 2008, a large number of primary and secondary school buildings
collapsed, killing more than ten thousand children. According to the local
government, the investigation by such institutions as Tsinghua University (which is
said to have the best architecture faculty in China) reveals that the high degree and
high intensity of the earthquake were "the first and foremost reason" for the
building collapse (People.com.cn 2009). On the other hand, Ai (2009), an artist,
and Xia et al. (2009), a professor in the US, have made documentaries to expose
that poor quality of the school buildings was the main reason for the disaster.
As a qualitative study, this chapter attaches great importance to a few examples rather
than base its arguments on quantitative data obtained through large-scale surveys. The
limited number of examples cannot test how extensively the establishment has defined
the intellectual community. Nevertheless, they may illustrate the degree to which the
former may influence the latter. These extreme examples, as well as the structure of the
institutional organization as has been outlined above and illustrated with Table 4.1,
provide material for the following analysis and reflection.
4.5. Discussion
Bourdieu emphasizes three points in the study of a field: the habitus of the agents in the
field; the relation between the objective positions occupied by the agents in the field;
97
and, most important of all, the relationship between a given field and the field of power
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 104-105). Given that the state, or meta-field, occupies a
special position in the field of power, and that the state of China is monopolized by a
single political party, the interpretation of the university begins by looking at the effect
of the political field.
4.5.1. The invasion of the political field
In examining the state-higher education institution dimension, it is noteworthy that the
university's opponent is the party-state. As Y. Lian (2011) comments, the CPC had to
penetrate the university structure before it took power, and had to subvert the university
once it was in power. Otherwise, it would have been impossible to transform Chinese
society and consolidate the regime.75 From Y. Lian's comment it may be inferred that
the heteronomy practised over the university field by the political field is a precondition
for the party-state's control of society. However, the university's subordination to
external forces places challenges on the entire system of logic under which a university
develops and the rich legacy inherited from the history of the university is lost. Such
re-structuring can only be realized in a step-by-step manner. Although the higher
education "adjustment" formally started in 1952, the prelude to the heteronomy of the
university field by the political field began as early as 1950 when the political
ideological framework for transforming the university was formulated.76 Afterwards,
the administrative authority of the new regime was established at the university, which
involved a large number of party members gradually assuming the key positions in the
colleges and universities, which then made it easier to implement government policies.77
By 1956, the university was institutionally placed under the leadership of the CPC
committee.78 CPC workers dominated the field and some university intellectuals who
lacked academic competence chose to join the party organization and became the CPC's
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constituents, while the academic authorities who insisted on independence were
marginalized. Ultimately, through political campaigns, such as the Anti-rightist
Campaign that created terror on campus, the vertical patron-client relations between the
party-state and the intellectuals were fortified. As a result, not only sociological research,
but also natural science research was dominated by political trends or even by the
leaders' personal whims, as illustrated in Examples 1 and 2 above. Even today, no
matter how much flexibility is incorporated in the control strategies, the primary
concern the authorities have about intellectuals is not their academic achievements, but
their political obedience, as illustrated by Example 3. Currently, all the agents in the
field are products of this re-structuring, and some of them are survivors of political
terror. Due to this type of mentality, which has existed for decades, the patron-client
relation between the party-state and the intellectuals tends to be taken for granted.
4.5.2. The invasion of the economic field
What is particularly noteworthy is the unique characteristic of the economic field in
China. Ever since the beginning of the economic reform in the early 1980s, a
conspicuous trend has been that official corruption and "official profiteering" (guandao
官倒) has become increasingly widespread. This contributed in part to the student
protests in 1989, and, the party-state response was to fall back to the measures of
military suppression. This means that military violence has defined the pattern of the
Chinese market after the 1990s, which is sharply different from how a market is
normally defined in economics. Meanwhile, this military suppression left the rulers
open to a crisis of legitimacy. At such a critical moment, the party-state of China paid
special attention to the knowledge and expertise of its intellectuals, just like other
communist or post-communist regimes striving to base their legitimacy on economic
development and economic reforms, as E. X. Gu and Goldman observe (2004, 7).
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Moreover, the student protests that originated on the university campuses seemed to
remind the rulers that the intellectuals had the potential to consolidate into an opposing
force, whereas the majority of the population, the peasants, who were poor in social,
cultural and economic capital, could not readily muster themselves into a large-scale
threat to CPC supremacy. It did not take long before peasants and intellectuals were
assigned to two extremes in the economic model of the party-state: intellectuals as a
whole were subject to bribery, though they were still under strict control, while peasants
were oppressed, exploited and exposed to whatever might befall them.
With the economic prosperity of the 1990s, the structure of forms of capital in
the university field has undergone considerable change. The CPC still tightly controls
the university and the major structure of the internal management has rarely changed, as
can be seen from Table 4.1; political capital still plays a critical role, although it is no
longer the only dominant capital. Most conspicuous is the intrusion of economic capital.
More attention is being given to cultural capital, often recognized and manifested in
such forms as administrative positions or bonuses. A minority of the academic elite has
been granted additional benefits, such as position allowance, research funding,
favourable housing conditions, conference fees, large bonuses. In some cases, the CPC's
wishes gradually penetrate specific research projects through economic input.79 In
contrast, those who are at odds with the CPC's wishes may be dismissed from their
privileged positions or suffer economic loss, as illustrated by Example 3. Particularly in
the process of the massification of higher education, the state has made use of the great
social demand for tertiary education. Higher education has been an important means to
stimulate domestic consumption and to counteract economic crisis (Lanqing Li 2003,
Part 4). Consequently, state policy empowers the universities and colleges to drain
financial resources from society legitimately and to charge tuition fees that well exceed
the income of many ordinary peasant families (Dong 2004, 60-1, 81-4). The rate of
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income growth of university teachers on the whole is rising significantly above that of
unskilled labourers. In contrast, the peasants, the real creators of the economic miracle
in China, are still subjected to the tyranny of urban-rural segregation that traps them in
poverty, as has been presented in Chapter Three. The rate of their income growth is well
below the consumer-index rate over the last two decades. University intellectuals can
afford a relatively affluent life in part because the large working population lacks
consumption capacity, and the bitter life of the disadvantaged groups may well
intimidate the university intellectuals into obedience.
Ironically, the massification of higher education has further undermined the
foundation of the intellectuals on the campuses: since the finances of the institutions are
controlled by the CPC and the administrative bureaucracy and the sources and
allocation of the revenue are not transparent, political capital, combined with economic
capital, has been further reinforced. Due to this so-called "massification", the number of
doctoral level graduates has multiplied, ranking first in the world.80 As a result, the
position of university teacher has become an even more rare resource, making the
teachers more dependent on their work units. As is observed by researchers, the
growing market forces not only negatively impact intellectuals' critical spirit and sense
of social responsibility, but also erode their autonomy (E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004,
12). With academia exposed to both pressure and temptation, a problem that cannot go
undetected began to impact the university, i.e. academic corruption. The many cases of
plagiarism in papers and research, and faked scientific data have seriously polluted the
research environment, as illustrated by Example 4.
The heteronomy practised over the university by the political forces is a coercive
process by which the university has been reduced to a mechanism that provides
justification for the state deprivation of society, as illustrated by Example 1. The
heteronomy of the economic forces is more like a "soft" process. Especially in the
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process of massification, the university functions as the government's exploiting
instrument, while the intellectuals are lured to directly participate in depriving society,
particularly the poor rural society. In the 1950s, the party-state was able to seize control
of the university field, presumably because the intellectuals were bewildered by the
newly emerged modern state. But by now, the military suppression of 1989 should have
removed the disguise of a paternal party-state. Nonetheless, a large majority of the
university intellectuals chooses to collaborate with the party-state in return for material
benefits. Increasingly dependent on this collaborative process, the university intellectual
community has become trapped in a vicious cycle of destruction and self-destruction.
4.5.3. The value of cultural capital
While Mao (1957a, 337) used the "establishment" as a mechanism with which to
deprive the intellectuals of political capital, the specific measure was to arrange jobs for
them. Therefore, the other side of the story is that the intellectual community has been
quite privileged in many aspects. For example, during Mao's time intellectuals were no
longer exposed to the risk of "unemployment". Their status was that of "state cadres",
i.e. members in the state bureaucratic system, who enjoyed much more state welfare
than did ordinary industrial workers and peasants. With respect to salary, they were a
high-income group comparable to state officials in an era when income was generally
low (M. Chen 2006). Of course, once they were confined within the establishment, they
no longer enjoyed free mobility. And, since the relative values of the various forms of
capital that circulate in the university field are determined by the profile in the field of
power, the assessment of the intellectuals' capital, particularly cultural capital, was
exposed to the domination of the party-state.
Mao's (1957a, 337) scheme was to deprive the intellectuals of "every bit of their
political capital", a process that should continue "until not one jot is left to them".
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Devaluation of their cultural capital in effect contributed to the decline of their political
capital. This, however, was not enough to totally undermine them. Unlike the Chinese
peasants, whose economic capital in the form of land property could be taken from them
once and for all through a collectively-owned economy, the intellectuals possess
academic learning, one form of cultural capital that has been "embodied", or is in the
form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body, as Bourdieu (1986, 243) puts it.
Nevertheless, the heteronomous university structure could serve as a base from which to
launch political campaigns that could reduce the intellectuals to a morally impure
group.81 This in effect would continuously decrease the value of the intellectuals'
cultural capital and continuously deprive them of political capital. This might explain
why, in comparison to other dominated groups, such as the peasants, who were more
severely deprived in economical and cultural capital, the intellectuals were more
frequently subjected to political campaigns.
At the end of Mao's era, the national economy was already "on the brink of
bankruptcy".82 One reason apparently lies in the fact that the excessive devaluation of
the intellectuals' cultural capital is contrary to the goal of constructing a modern state. In
the post-Mao era, intellectuals, as an indispensable force for the modern state, have been
declared part of the working class (Deng 1978, 89). In looking to improve their living
conditions, considerable importance is attached to cultural capital, which they can
exchange for economic capital under some conditions in order to upgrade their material
life. What is most of all evident is that indiscriminate and extensive political persecution
has come to an end. However, the deprivation of political capital has not ceased. One
indicator is that the intellectual community still does not have academic autonomy, and
in turn tends to be deprived of the right to determine the value of its cultural capital. It
can be inferred from the existing organizational structure that the intellectuals are not
the main force in the assessment of cultural capital. As outlined above, the Chinese
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higher education system does not allow horizontal association between teachers, a
mechanism that would have allowed the holders of cultural capital to identify with each
other, nor does it allow vertical association between peers of the same disciplines, a
mechanism that would enable them to assess and apply cultural capital. The lack of
horizontal and vertical allegiances makes it difficult to sustain the value of cultural
capital, and it in effect guarantees the domination of political capital. Academic titles
and positions, which Bourdieu (1986, 247; 1996, 276) categorizes as "institutionalized"
capital with a relatively "dominated status", are resources directly or indirectly
controlled by the party-state, whose power would tend to be unrestrained and in turn
breed academic corruption. In fact, institutionalized cultural capital has been undergoing
a mutation in parallel to the political process. For example, some doctoral programmes
are designed to cater to those who are politically powerful (X. Sun 2009). Many
intellectuals are compelled to invest their efforts in areas irrelevant to academic
activities. They may even resort to plagiarising scientific papers and produce fraudulent
test data, as illustrated by Example 4 and the researcher's "baidu.com" search results.
Bourdieu assumes that the state of power relations between agents defines the
structure of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 99). It follows that when one side
gains in power in a field, the other side will correspondingly and necessarily be eroded
of its power. When the intellectuals only have cultural capital but have no say over their
job assessment and therefore have lost academic autonomy, they bear resemblance to
the Chinese peasants, the most disadvantaged group in Chinese society that has only
physical capital without the right to own land. By exchanging their cultural capital for
economic capital, the intellectuals are much better-off than other groups who suffer
more severe economic deprivation. However, as part of the establishment, they have
always been exposed to more severe thought control and face the threat of being
eliminated from the establishment. These mechanisms of control and elimination are
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evidence that the party-state values their culture capital only on the condition that they
continue to be deprived of their political capital.
4.5.4. Habitus versus the field
P. Hu (2005) and K. Chen (2004) place the blame for the moral deterioration of the
intellectual community mainly on the communist rulers. Their assumption is supported
by Bourdieu's finding that the field contributes to the formation of the habitus (Bourdieu
and Wacquant 1992, 127). On the other hand, Bourdieu claims that a field is not an
"infernal machine". Agents in the field, who occupy unequal positions, are constantly
struggling for their own benefits, and contribute to shaping the objective structure that
has shaped them (102, 136). The concept of habitus, which emphasizes subjectivity,
provides another perspective that focuses on the university intellectuals per se.
Bourdieu (1998, 63) points out that heterogeneous intellectuals constitute the Trojan
horse. This supports the argument of Xia (2010) that the intellectuals are collaborators
in government crimes. If this argument holds true, then it is justified to assume that, to a
considerable extent, the Chinese university intellectuals are collaborators in the process
of heteronomy.
Economic privilege may be one of the many factors that have encouraged
intellectuals to collaborate with the state. However, the economy has been gaining force
since the 1990s. Before that, especially in Mao's era, deprivation in political rights
seems to be a more important cause. Particularly, a sense of fear, a remnant from the
past, may have a profound and long-term effect. Looking back at the post-Mao era, the
most large-scaled and also the only nation-wide challenge that the party-state has ever
encountered, namely the student protests in 1989, stemmed from the higher education
campuses. In response, the party-state promptly imposed military suppression that
shocked the world. But routinely, the control strategies should be less extreme, and an
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elimination mechanism could be one of the instruments.83 Such a mechanism is
intended to nip the forces that may subvert the existing structure in the bud. This may be
accomplished, perhaps, through such a method as thought control. If this first step fails,
the next step may be marginality or the elimination of those who openly challenge the
establishment. Since there is no corresponding mechanism to counteract such
elimination, such as an independent professor association, teachers' union or student
union, the function of the elimination mechanism would be effective and successful.
The control strategies should also include strategic and restricted adjustments to meet
the complex and changeable reality. Higher education policy in the post-Mao era shows
signs of a marked relaxation of controls. However, this is only a change in modes of
leadership because the historical mission of the CPC shifted from taking power to
implementing modernization programmes, as the analysis of Hamrinn and Cheek (1986,
9) finds. Accordingly, whatever liberalization of controls one finds is limited to some
minor issues, such as the intellectuals' criticizing social injustice or mocking the
political figures in private. Some principle issues, such as the CPC's leadership over
higher education, and its organization network rooted on the campus, are never open to
negotiation. When non-collaborators are instantly and constantly eliminated, the
intellectuals would find themselves in a situation envisioned by Bourdieu: their interest
in yielding to the dominant group obviously is more than their interest in overlooking it
(Weber, quoted in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 115). As a result, more intellectuals
would yield to the CPC's flexible policies which have been, as Goldman and Cheek
describe (1987, 13), shifting between repression and relative relaxation. Should this
situation become internalized into a habitus, the intellectuals might develop an
inclination to submit to, or at least tacitly accept violence, such as in Example 5, or even
reject an independent and critical attitude as heresy.
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Bourdieu assumes that the actions of the agents in a field may be defined by
such factors as their trajectory, their objective relation to other positions and the volume
and structure of their capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 99, 108). The majority of
the intellectuals who are located at "the understructure of a national system" (Clark
1983, 109) are carriers of cultural capital. They are inclined to devalue heterogeneous
capital and thus may in effect constitute an anti-heteronomy force. The habitus of the
agents who occupy the dominant positions in the field, such as the presidents and CPC
secretaries, may turn out to be more complex. From the perspective of the structure, the
dominant positions installed in the field are undoubtedly the core parts supporting the
heteronomy. Such positions should generate a habitus that bears the strongest
conservative tendencies. But from the perspective of individuals, their actions are
corresponding to their "trajectory" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 108), and their
previous experiences may render them "primary habitus". This, according to Bourdieu,
is the basis for the formation of later habitus (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 42).
University leaders who are also holders of cultural capital, because of their primary
habitus, may also constitute an anti-heteronomy force. However, the two potential
anti-heteronomy forces, which come respectively from the majority of the intellectuals
and those who occupy the senior positions, have apparently failed to make a profound
difference. Table 4.1 proves that a typical heteronomous structure continues to exist.
Whatever appeals intellectuals have openly made, such as expressing dissent,
demanding autonomy or voicing concerns over social injustice, have never developed
into a culture that may undermine their status of "atomization", and have been less
consolidated into movements of considerable scale since after the military suppression
of 1989. Criticism is allowed to a limited degree, and it is possible to exchange
economic capital for cultural capital, so this may have eased the intellectuals' urgent
demand to put an end to the heteronomy. Moreover, no individual has ever been able to
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hold the dominant position in the field for long if he makes the effort to subvert the
existing structure of the field. And, of course, no one has ever been able to establish
such individual efforts in the field as an institution: there are numerous cases that prove
just the opposite.84 Some representatives of the CPC in the universities may resist
heteronomy within the limit prescribed by the CPC. On condition that the overall
structure remains unchanged, they may, paradoxically, become a buffer between the
dominant and the dominated because between their primary habitus and the habitus of
the ordinary intellectuals there exists what Bourdieu calls "structural affinity" (Bourdieu
and Wacquant 1992, 125). The intellectuals' habitus may exert influence on the
university field, but this is related to what is taking place in the field of power. Or, the
power relations between the university, state, society and market have empowered the
state to manipulate, directly or indirectly, the mechanisms of elevation or relegation,
appointment or elimination. The control over the intellectuals' career opportunities
enables the state to control their thoughts and transform the potential anti-heteronomy
forces.
The few examples included in this chapter to illustrate the habitus of the
intellectuals are not extensively representative. However, the influence of these cases
depends on how much the university field, or rather, how much the field of power, may
empower them. The insignificant number of cases, aided by the dynamics in the field,
could play the role of examples and may contribute to a corresponding habitus in the
large population of intellectuals. This habitus will reduce the mass intellectuals to
automatically impose censorship upon themselves and treat criticism of the
establishment with indifference. To this extent, the heteronomous structure has already
been extensively supported. This may, to a great extent, explain why the party-state
does not mind allowing relative liberalization, like window dressing, for example,
allowing some diverse intellectual groupings and schools, as well as their debates and
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criticism, although censorship is much more strict in the university field than in other
fields, such as the extensive use of the internet, the entertainment industry and the rural
areas. Likewise, this may explain the harmony between the university and the state
which is in sharp contrast to the widespread and frequent protests outside the
establishment. It may well be anticipated that the state will be able to concentrate on
selective repression, and will efficiently duplicate more extreme cases in this structure.
4.6. Conclusion
The definition of establishment intellectuals is ironic because intellectuals are expected
to have anti-establishment tendencies. Contemporary establishment intellectuals have
suffered humiliation for decades. Today, their knowledge and expertise prove to be
indispensable to the modernization of the state, which has altered its control strategies
and improved the intellectuals' living conditions to a limited extent. Consequently, the
university intellectual community has come to terms with the establishment, especially
when it comes to the massification of higher education, where the state uses higher
education as a means to counteract financial crisis. In other words, the intellectual
community, with some important exceptions, has a tendency to shift its role from a
politically marginalized group to promoters of exploitative state policy, which will be
illustrated in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. This does not only represent a passive
mind-set; it may be manifested as corrupt conduct, and may become a way of life,
gradually established as a unique relationship between the dominant and the dominated.
We may consider this from the perspective of the state-institution-society
relationship. The state unduly overpowers the higher education institutions so that the
political forces have managed to invade the university field. When the economic forces
which are dominated by the state have also invaded the university field, they help to
sustain the state domination over the higher education institutions. As a subordinate of
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the state, the unique status and structure of the university would generate a
corresponding intellectual habitus, and this habitus and the structure would promote
each other. The existing pattern of state-institution relationship traces back to the 1950s,
when higher education was converted into the establishment and Chinese society at
large was also undergoing a general transformation. With civil societies prohibited and
the privately owned economy eliminated, the state managed to weaken society and
monopolized the national economy, as has been explained in Chapter Three, 3.3.1.1.
and 3.3.2.1. The university was helpless in the face of the invasion of state power, while
the state had sufficient resources to impose an unequal pattern that violated the logic
and necessity of the university field. At the same time, the subordination of the
university helped the state to further deprive society. Today, society at large, still highly
atomized, has been protesting continuously, often in the form of "group protests,"85
forcing the state to develop flexible and resourceful strategies, but has been
unsuccessful in its attempt to subvert the overall structure. This may turn out to be a
frustrating factor that has negatively impacted the morals of the university intellectuals,
and in turn helped to sustain the existing power relations between the state and
university. Especially after higher education began to charge high tuition fees, society
has developed greater expectations for the higher education institutions, and interaction
on the institution-society dimension has increased. The aftermath of heteronomy is
more easily exposed to the public and more likely to invite criticism. We may also
consider it from the perspective of a hierarchy. Of the different forms of capital
competing for domination in the field of power, cultural capital is inferior to political
and economic capital; on the university campus, the status of teacher is inferior to that
of the party and administrative officials. In the whole social field, however, university
intellectuals as part of the establishment are much more privileged in comparison with
other dominated groups. Now that it is affiliated with the establishment, the intellectual
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community is likely to be targeted when the populace is not allowed to openly direct
their anger at the top rulers. All in all, the situation in China is at odds with what
Maassen and Cloete (2002, 7-30) refer to as the international reform trend. The society
is hardly organized into interest groups that actively participate in higher education, the
university lacks the unique structure characteristic of an autonomous institution to help
it fend off external influence, and the power of the state is still dominant in the
state-society-institution triangular relation. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
tension between higher education institutions and society is to a large extent the effect
of the tension between the state and society.
Bourdieu defines the school as an institution that "most effectively contributes to
the reproduction of the social order" (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 198). The French
university, for example, would reproduce class inequality in a stratified society. But the
French higher education institutions are, after all, relatively autonomous. In contrast, the
Chinese higher education institutions are defined by a totalitarian state which at the
same time also defines the stratification of society. As can be expected, the way that the
Chinese university reproduces inequalities is more effective, arbitrary and extreme,
leading to the following conclusion: with respect to structure, the Chinese university is
fundamentally different from the institutions of education and scientific research as
defined in many other countries; with respect to social function, it is difficult for this
establishment to play the public role of a university.
It is the criticism of the intellectuals' moral problems that has been the impetus
for this research, but the focus here is not on the morals of individuals, but on the
objective structure that has influenced the morals of individuals, including the
organization of the university and the whole system of power relations. Bourdieu's
theory helps to establish a necessary connection between the heteronomy of the
university and the moral deterioration of the intellectuals, and to explain the unique
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behaviour of the university intellectuals. The analysis of and reflection on the morals of
individuals has been made from this point of departure. It is by highlighting the
structure that we can show that, as Bourdieu (1998, 17, 56) describes, the moral
problems of individuals only mask the overall structural corruption. As Bourdieu
reminds us, structure is indispensable for the sustenance of morals, and "for something
like a moral anxiety to occur, that morality has to find support, reinforcement, and
rewards in this structure".
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Note 1. The above listed are chosen from the institutions that the state plans to invest as the key
projects in the 21st Century, 100 universities in all, affiliated to the central government or
provincial governments respectively (the so-called 211-projects, which set models for
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other universities). The data is obtained from the websites of these universities. '+'
indicates that a certain department or office is part of the university organization.
Note 2. The Table shows that the leading apparatus in the universities are highly identical,
invariably including Office of the Party Committee and President Office, etc. In some
universities, the two offices are combined into one. Invariably, the primary task of the
administrative apparatus is to serve the Party.
115
Chapter Five: The Chinese Rural Students in the Higher Education
Institutionsiii
5.1. Introduction
This chapter illustrates how higher education institutions create inequality and lead to
poverty. The application of grounded theory at first directs its inquiry on the economic
aspect of the life of some rural students on the university and college campuses in Hebei
Province, China. Then, through constant comparison and analysis, the research
gradually covers more aspects of the rural students' lives. The fact that rural youths are
increasingly marginalized in the educational system has long been the concern of many
authors.86 However, most research unfortunately indiscriminately lumps the rural
students together. To make a finer distinction and clarification, this study borrows the
concept of two extremes from Trow (1973, 35), who views inequality in the higher
education system as the aftermath of massification: at one extreme are educational
institutions of rich resources and high quality, while at the other extreme are educational
institutions of poor resources and low quality. Chinese tertiary education institutions are
generally divided into four classes and further into eight subclasses. Trow's concept
helps to reduce this huge and complicated hierarchy into a manageable system for study
here.
Since massification was initiated in 1999, the proportion of rural youths on the
university campus has increased considerably. By 2012, the proportion of rural students
in the overall student body was 59.1% (CNS China News Service 2014). However, in
this highly stratified system, the distribution of students between the two extremes is
iii An adapted version of this chapter was published under the title of "A Case Study of 'Habitus' and 'Field': The
Chinese Rural Students on the University Campus", in Problems of Education in the 21st Century 40 No. 3
(2012).
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seriously imbalanced, with most rural students located at the lower extreme, while only
a small proportion of them are admitted to the higher extreme.87 Does the variation in
institutional status and financial resources make a difference to the students? If yes,
what are the factors that influence them? This chapter therefore addresses the following
research questions:
How do the rural students with different positions in the higher education system
respond to variations in resources? What are the factors that influence their
responses?
In order to answer the above questions, a comparison is made between the rural students
who are located at the two extremes of the higher education system, which leads to
these findings: those at the higher extreme, who are more sufficiently funded, are more
likely to have a sense of financial insecurity than those at the lower extreme, who are
insufficiently funded. That is to say, there exists a negative correlation between
objective financial security and subjective sense of financial security. In this grounded
theory research, the rural students' own language is used to label some concepts and
categories. In their language contexts, objective financial insecurity is simply referred to
as poverty; their subjective sense of financial insecurity is referred to as a sense of
financial pressure. Then, a contradictory phenomenon found in this chapter is a
negative correlation between poverty and a sense of financial pressure. In the process of
analysing this phenomenon, the research confirms Bourdieu's assumption that
educational institutions are mechanisms that reproduce social inequality (Bourdieu and
Passeron 1990). In the case of Chinese rural students, the analogy is that universities
and colleges play a critical role in the reproduction of the urban-rural segregation
system.
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5.2. Methods
The study of the rural college students continues with the researcher's Master's degree
studies in higher education. The general background of this chapter is as follows: 1)
China has an urban-rural segregation system, as has been described in Chapter Three,
3.3.2.1., but higher education is one of the few ways in which rural youths can become
permanent urban residents; 2) the Chinese government initiated a massification
movement in higher education in 1999, with the students paying high tuition fees, in
order to stimulate domestic consumption as a countermeasure against financial crisis
(Lanqing Li 2003, Part 4); 3) there has been a drastic increase in the number of college
graduates88 which leads to an employment crisis among these graduates.89
This chapter is focused on the rural students' micro environment for the
empirical data. Although the overall study is directed at the systemic level, the setting to
present this case is within the geographical boundary of Hebei Province, a place of
contrast. Geographically, Hebei encompasses Beijing and Tianjin, two modern
metropolises directly administered by the central government. On the other hand, the
province has a vast underdeveloped rural area with the third largest peasant population
in China. With respect to distribution of higher education resources, Beijing and Tianjin
boast many universities of high prestige (Subclass 1-3), while Hebei Province hosts
institutions that exist in relative obscurity (mostly Subclass 4-8).
Grounded theory is considered suitable for this chapter mainly because this
approach 1) fits empirical situations through discovery of theory from data and tends to
be problem-oriented; 2) allows for the study of an area without any preconceived theory
that defines "relevancies" in concepts and hypotheses prior to the research, which in
turn allows the researcher to be more faithful to the data and more objective; 3) does not
demand a large number of cases or consider accurate evidence as crucial, and therefore
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allows for small-scale research; 4) is readily understandable by a large readership,
including laymen interested in this area (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 1, 30, 33-34, 237;
Mjøset 2000, 393; 2006b, 353); 5) aims to view this world as the research participants
do (Charmaz 2006, 14).
5.2.1. Data
The data presented in this chapter were mainly obtained through semi-structured
interviews, which were designed according to principles of grounded theory: the
interviews were sufficiently open to encompass the entirety of the participants'
perspectives (Giske and Artinian 2007, 69). The researcher's own ideas were not
imposed on the interviewees (Glaser, quoted in Giske and Artinian 2007, 70). The
interview was loosely framed when the researcher guided the interlocutors with the
following hints:
• Family and education background introduction.
• Does the cost of tertiary education put pressure on the family finances?
• What is the proportion of rural students in your class and dormitory? Do you find
rural and urban students different?
• Tell something impressive about the campus, whether it concerns communication,
study or daily life.
As an ex-university teacher, the researcher has witnessed the initiation of the
massification of higher education, both as observer and participant. The interlocutors
came into contact with the researcher through her relatives and friends who worked in
higher education, which means that a relation-bond existed before the interview. As a
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local resident, the researcher had considerable knowledge of Hebei Province. It was
therefore possible to quickly find common interests between the two interlocutors with
topics closely related to the background of the rural students, whether it was geography,
culture or local specialty. Such features in the researcher-interviewee relationship were
presumed as icebreakers between strangers and hopefully added authenticity to the data.
The primary inclusion criterion for the selection of the interviewees was that the
students were from rural areas; most of them were either local residents of Hebei
Province or had education experience within the geographical boundary of the province.
Balance between genders, university reputation and the economic background of the
participants was also taken into consideration. The samples were selected from ten
universities and were at different levels, including undergraduates and Master's degree
students. The interviewees should have some experience on campus. For this reason,
most of them were selected from above Grade 3 of undergraduate studies. For the
Master's degree students, the interviews mainly focused on their recollections of
undergraduate life. The number of samples was not decided at the outset. As the
interviews progressed, similar instances emerged over and over again, which signalled
"saturation" according to the principles of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967,
61). The researcher thus stopped looking for more interviewees when 50 students were
eventually involved.
Although articles and documents published on the internet served as one source
of information, the most important material was the transcripts of audio-recorded
interviews, which were mostly conducted between January and March of 2008 over the
telephone. Follow-up e-mail and telephone communication between the two parties
provided further material. As a result of comparison and selection, 13 students were
deemed illustrative and included in this study. The interviews of the 13 students resulted
in approximately seven hours of recording and over 40 transcribed pages. Eventually,
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information provided by the 13 students was used as the resource for the comparative
analysis. To put the interviewees' answers into manageable form, the information is
summarized in two tables, Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the simplified version of a complex
phenomenon.
Permission was granted by all the interviewees to use the material in the
research on rural students, knowing that the aim was eventually to seek publication.
Confidentiality was guaranteed by the researcher.
5.2.2. Analysis
For quite some time the research lacked focus as the orientation and data-collection
procedures were not defined by some predetermined research questions. Rather, it was
in the process of codification and comparison of the data that the concept of poverty, as
well as the students' different responses to it, emerged from the muddled and jumbled
material. Accordingly, the research questions that emerged were how rural students with
different positions in the higher education system responded to variations in resources
and why they responded in the way they did.
Guided by Strauss (1987, 23, 59, 64, 69), the researcher used procedures which
include: coding data and abstracting concepts; constant comparison; relations between
categories; theoretical sampling; generating theory. These procedures were repeated in
the process of analysis. In the process of open coding, the researcher found such
concepts as: poverty, sense of financial pressure, rich, scholarship, needs-based
subsidies, student loan, family funding, part-time job, academic excellence,
embarrassment, burden to family, mind-set, unfair, disrespect, grateful, disadvantaged,
hard, hard-working, different from the others, they, the urban, we, the rural, all are from
the village, have more communication, tears, angry, poor students, ability, shame and so
on. In axial coding the researcher found relations between these concepts. Several
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categories emerged which, in turn, covered related sub-categories: finances (family
funding, public subsidy, part-time job); environment (urban-rural-student distribution,
hierarchy of institutions, locus of institutions); peer communication (among rural
students, between urban and rural students); personal feeling (sense of urban-rural
differences, sense of financial pressure, sense of unfairness). Undertaking selective
coding, when all categories are systematically linked to the core category, we see the
impact of poverty on the rural students. In a more detailed examination of the categories,
it was found that the interviewees' subjective responses to poverty were obviously
related to the standing of their institutions in the hierarchy of the higher education
system. This was an improvement on the core category. The researcher then once again
compared the core category with the data that had been reviewed before and found that
it was a topic that all the interviewees were concerned about. Bearing this in mind, the
researcher made a further analysis of the original data. This has eventually resulted in a
theory that is grounded in data obtained in the research on Chinese higher education and
might be taken to apply only to that particular substantive area. This theory may be
defined as a substantive grounded theory, according to Glaser and Strauss (1967, 79).
In the data-analysis process, the research increasingly became entangled in what
Potter and Wetherell (2001, 203) call the "complexity of working with extended
sequences of talk rather than the brief isolated utterances". Much of the analysis was
also based on the subjective accounts given by the interviewees, whose language was
defined by their unique interactive context. This material, once separated from its
specific context, may lose some of its meanings which are nuanced but still valuable.
The approach of grounded theory, which emphasizes contextualization as well as
categorization and conceptualization, may meet this challenge. Following the example
of Strauss (1987), the presentation of the research has retained long original
conversations and detailed processes of analysis. This, hopefully, will allow the
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researcher to discover a grounded theory while retaining detailed data as much as found
necessary, i.e. to be focused on analyzing details without at the same time being lost in
them.
In the research process, the first finding was the rural students' different
subjective responses to poverty. As the research progressed and involved such aspects
as their attitudes to studies, aspiration for upgrading of their academic qualification,
anticipation of future employment, it was found that these aspects were invariably
defined by their poverty. In the end, this research approaches Bourdieu's theory of
reproduction and Lindner's (2006) theory of humiliation. On its own, however, this
research is insufficient to arrive at any high degree of generalization, for it is small in
scale and heavily relies on data that reflect individuals' subjective feelings. Nevertheless,
it does serve important purposes in this study: it provides empirical support for the
analysis in the following chapter, and it also relates a local phenomenon to systematic
high-level theories which are extensively applicable.
5.3. Results of the research
The application of grounded theory has eventually generated a substantive grounded
theory as follows: under the urban-rural segregation system, rural students tend to be
reduced to poverty, while their subjective responses to poverty, however, varies
according to how much they are distanced from the metropolis; it is assumed that the
more the students are marginalized, the less they are aware of their marginalization.
The generation of the above substantive grounded theory may be illustrated by
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 as well as the related analysis. The two tables use Trow's concept of
the higher education system as divided into two extremes: universities and colleges at
the higher extreme versus those at the lower extreme. The students are categorized
according to their monthly expenditures and their subjective sense of financial pressure.
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Comparison between the two tables reveals a contradiction: the six students at the
higher extreme had easier access to financial aid or had more affluent family conditions,
but five of them claimed to have a sense of financial pressure; in contrast, the seven
students at the lower extreme were less financially aided and were from poor families,
but only two of them claimed to have a sense of financial pressure. It is this
contradiction that justifies further, detailed analysis.
Table 5.1. Variation in students' objective financial security in relation to variation in
students' standings in the hierarchy of the higher education institutions.
Students
Universities
High economic standard
(expend 1000 yuan/ month)
Low economic standard
(expend 200-300 yuan/
month)
Lower extreme
(universities affiliated to Hebei Province
or municipalities of the province)
Group 1: Group 2:
Student A, B, C, D, E, F, G
Higher extreme
(universities affiliated to the central
government, Beijing or Tianjin)
Group 3:
Student H, I
Group 4:
Student J, K, L, M
Table 5.2. Variation in students' subjective sense of financial pressure in relation to
variation in students' standings in the hierarchy of the higher education institutions.
Students
Universities
With less subjective sense of
financial pressure
With more subjective sense
of financial pressure
Lower extreme Group 1:
Student A, B, C(state
scholarship winner), D, G
(state scholarship winner)
Group 2:
Student E, F
Higher extreme Group 3:
Student H
Group 4:
Student I, J, K, L, M
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The interviews, first of all, reveal much similarity among the rural students.
Coming from poor families, they are usually highly motivated and extremely diligent in
their academic studies. In contrast to the large population of rural children, they are the
rare ones (about 10% of their rural peers) who finally made their way to tertiary
education institutions. As opposed to their urban peers, most of them had one or more
siblings in the family. Their costs of tuition and living per year would consume all, or
more than, the family annual income. They paid approximately 4,500 yuan each year for
tuition and housing. Their monthly expenditure on subsistence was around 200-300
yuan or less. There were only two exceptions: Student H, who consumed more than
1,000 yuan each month and Student I, who spent approximately 20,000 yuan on tuition
and subsistence each year. In 2005, the minimum subsistence rate for residents in the
provincial capital of Shijiazhuang City was 220 yuan, which serves as a reference to
indicate the low living standards of the rural students. It can be envisioned that most of
the rural students were considerably confined by their poor economic conditions and
most of their student life was limited to only meals and their studies.
The students are generally required to reside in student dormitories, with four to
eight students sharing a room. Since cooking is basically banned in the dormitory, they
normally dine in school canteens, where meals are offered at a less expensive price than
at commercial restaurants. As most frequent contact occurs in the dormitory, it was
natural that the interviewees paid much attention to daily details, such as the necessities
of life, meals and consumption standards, factors which often symbolized a student's
identity.
5.3.1. Higher extreme versus lower extreme: Different responses to poverty
The first comparison is made between students at the lower and higher extremes,
respectively, to interpret the contradiction: at the lower extreme, the students were
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relatively poor, but tended to have less subjective sense of financial pressure, while it
was the opposite at the higher extreme, where students were relatively well provided
for.
5.3.1.1. Lower extreme: Village on the campus
Extract 1. Actually whether it's tight or not depends on how you see things. (... ) I feel 200
yuan is acceptable. (Student A)
Extract 2. 200 yuan per month, passable, that means, you can't eat as you please, but you
don't have to be too hard on yourself. (Student B)
Extract 3. (Do you feel your university life is very hard?) I don't find it very hard. It's OK.
And I didn't draw too much from my family savings. (Student G, state scholarship
winner)
By referring to "how you see things", Student A in effect set the living standard at a
relatively low level and readily accepted the status quo. This attitude might be related to
a student's earlier experience in his or her rural home. But it might be more related to
the living standards of schoolmates that constituted part of his or her daily life. The
student canteen was not likely to serve very expensive meals. Yet, most rural students
had to impose restrictions on themselves so that "you can't eat as you please" (Student
B). Meanwhile, "you don't have to be too hard on yourself" (Student B) indicates a
sense of contentment. Obviously, they knew that there were students who depended on
an even smaller budget. What Student A and B say suggests that whether the rural
students have a subjective sense of financial pressure or not to a considerable extent
"depends on how you see things" (Student A), or their mind-set.
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The families of Student A, B and G did not depend totally on farming or other
manual work, and the costs of tuition and living were tolerable, or within the financial
capacity of their families. Their universities charged relatively low tuition fees, they
studied in cities with relatively low consumer standards. If they had excellent grades,
they could earn a scholarship and further lighten the family burden. Thus they would
find that university life was "OK" (Student G).
Most students were aware of urban-rural differences, especially when urban
students' monthly expenditures nearly doubled that of the rural students (Student C).
The following extracts illustrate how rural students reflected on their urban peers:
Extract 4. [Urban students] indeed have a sense of superiority when they are together with
us. (... ) I don't look up to them. (Student E)
Extract 5. (Whether there is pressure in communication with urban students:) No pressure.
I'm not under pressure living here, because, I don't mean... mmm... sometimes I
envy them, for they are better off financially. But for my part, I do not envy them.
(Student F)
The attitude that they did not "envy" or "look up to" their urban peers (Student E
and F) was common among the interviewees at the lower extreme. Why did they appear
indifferent to the obviously advantaged position of their urban peers, then?
Extract 6. (More rural students win scholarships:) [Urban students] seem to have put less
effort into their studies than rural students do. (Student C, state scholarship winner)
Extract 7. (Do you find that rural students feel somewhat inferior?) In::fe::rior::? (drawn
out) Inferior, of course, in certain aspects, say, in comparison with them, that is, the
urban students are very versatile, (... ) for example, they sing and dance and
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participate in collective activities. (... ) (Are there rural students who want to
overtake them and inwardly make an effort in this respect?) In fact, as an innermost
thought, yes. (... ) I used to have that thought, why did I lag behind them [in
studies]? (... ) I must push forward, I must make an effort [in studies]. (... )
(Whether it's financial pressure that makes rural students less active?) Maybe this is
one factor. I find that my classmates are from very poor families. In general, the
ones from poor families tend to have greater motivation and are very hard-working.
Maybe this is the reason. I think we are all very excellent in our studies. (Student
B)
Extract 8. As far as I see it, urban people, especially nowadays children, have no more
merit than us. (... ) After all, since childhood, they are the only child of their
families, living in the city, which is simply a nest of abundance and ease. (... ) (Any
special talents in urban students?) Special talents... in some respects they do have
more extensive knowledge than us, say, in playing games. Some of them know
everything about playing computer games. (... ) (Do they read more books than
you?) Reading books... also... varies from person to person. Some people read
more books. They, the urban people, like to read such books as Harry Potter.
(Student E).
The idea that urban students were "versatile" and had "extensive knowledge"
(Student B and E) was more or less a common view among the interviewees. At the
lower extreme, however, these advantages were not much admired. Rural students
deemed their experience in the countryside as a source of merit, attaching importance to
their capacity to endure hardship and their excellence in their studies. This could be
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seen from the case of Student B, who redundantly emphasized school grades and
associated this merit to poor family background.
Admittedly, at the lower extreme, more rural students win scholarships, a fact
which they take pride in. But multiple factors work together to accomplish this. First,
rural students make up the major bulk of the lower extreme students. Second, rural
students who finally made their way to university are the rare ones among their rural
peers. Third, many urban students tend to have more extracurricular interests and "put
less effort into their studies" (Student C). Since their basic education, the rural students
are mostly focused on subjects that are included in the National College Entrance
Examination. Some schools drop such subjects as Physical Education, Music and Fine
Arts. As a result, rural students have a narrower scope of knowledge and their outlooks
are confined. They are unfamiliar with and consequently give less heed to the
knowledge of human cultures, being unaware of how such knowledge might help them
forward in their future development.
Extract 9. Maybe I feel that students from the village, sometimes, many of them, don't
accept the habits of those brought up in the city, thinking their way of life
extravagant, that kind of life style, [rural students] dislike it a lot, it seems. (Student
D, parentless)
In spite of the great disparity between rich and poor in China, most urban
students at the lower extreme are from families of average income, or "belong to the
salary-earner class" (Student C). It is not likely for most of them to have a very high
standard of consumption. Urban and rural students dine at the same canteens. Urban
students may choose meals of better quality, while rural students may mainly depend on
vegetables and cereal. Once rural students make up the great majority, urban students
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become the exception. Especially to those from very poor families, the consumption
standard of urban students would be considered "extravagant" (Student D).
More than taking poverty for granted, rural students might gain a sense of moral
superiority from it. A life of simplicity is up to the standard of morality, while a wealthy
life could be considered a corrupting factor. Such an assumption tends to confine the
students to a stereotyped belief that poverty is not one's misfortune, rather, it makes one
mature and perfect; when poverty is used as motivation, whoever works hard and has
academic excellence will be eventually lifted out of poverty. Consequently, many rural
students found encouragement and standing from their academic excellence. They were
not put off by the hardship they experienced in the present as long as brilliant prospects
awaited them in the future.
Extract 10. All [roommates] are from the village, are easy-going. And we have more
communication, talking about each other's habits and customs and the like.
(Student F)
Extract 11. There were so many students who had the same or similar [poor] family
background. On the contrary, these [poor] students tended to gather together and
have relatively rare contact with the small circle of rich people. (Student C)
As can be envisioned, rural students, as the majority, tend to be dominant in the
small student community. When conversation concerns rural topics, urban students do
not have much to say. This constitutes an important source of comfort and complacency
for the rural students so that urban students' versatility and extensive knowledge have
rarely interfered with their confident poise. There is, so to speak, a "wall of culture,"
which not only separates them from their urban schoolmates, but also provides them
with a temporary psychological shelter against the impact of the unfamiliar urban world.
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But this wall also functions as a segregating mechanism so that they hardly have access
to the rich cultural resources that the city could offer, and they hardly realize this
deprivation.
In fact, the whole group of rural students at the lower extreme is shrouded in
poverty. Financial aid supports a very small fraction of the students. In some cases, a
school scholarship could be as symbolic as 100 yuan (Student F). Needless to say,
poverty is an adverse factor in anyone's life, yet none of the above interviewees
mentioned the negative effect that poverty brought upon them as a whole. They did not
even refer to money as a necessity for their sustenance. As such, the rural students at the
lower extreme have more or less transplanted their rural society onto the campuses so
that they are still living in a small niche not quite far away from their home villages.
5.3.1.2. Higher extreme: Impassable gap
Extract 12. (Something deeply impressive:) When I had just arrived here, I felt rather
depressed. My tuition fees were, were... anyway were put together with much
difficulty. At that time and, every day, I felt that I, anyway I was... different from
the others, under very heavy pressure. Anyway, when I was alone, I was always,
very gloomy and, wanted to cry. (Student M)
Extract 13. Sometimes a meal alone could provide enough evidence. When we all brought
meals to our dormitory to dine, you see, the money tho-those better off spent on
one meal equalled your costs for one whole day. So maybe the meals they bought
were pro-probably better. Mmm... in this process, maybe, urban roommates, by
comparison, could develop a sense of superiority, while rural roommates could
more or less feel hurt. Although this would not lead to the kind, the kind of trouble
or conflict in speech, it was there all the time. At that time I, although we got along
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well, this kind of thinking per-persisted in me. So, sometimes I found it
embarrassing to take my meal to my dormitory (chuckle). (Student L)
Extract 14. (urban-rural differences on campus) Mmm... it's something that sometimes
makes us more inferior.90 (... ) Actually, I feel that one perceives these differences
only when one is on the dark side. (Student K)
At the higher extreme institutions, the rural students are obviously in the minority. More
financial aid is available to them. Living in a metropolis, they should have a better
quality of life than their peers do at the lower extreme. However, in their immediate
contact with urban students, the differences between them and their urban schoolmates
made them feel "depressed," "hurt," embarrassed and "inferior" (Students M, L, K). In
the meantime, the sense of being hurt and inferior must have been mistaken more or less
for a sin, for such feelings were attributed to "the dark side" of one's thinking (Student
K). It might be an effort to lessen their pains by imposing a strict moral standard upon
themselves, which would doubly burden them. However, they spoke their mind in a
straightforward way and admitted their embarrassment or "dark side." Being frank and
honest, alone, was not enough. They must have been exposed to continuous suffering
and repeated pain, which they dwelt and reflected on.
Extract 15. Now my parents are old, can make little money. My father is now over 50 years
old. Going out, anyway, normally, going out yet you find that you can't do
anything. (... ) And my mother, by herself, totally... totally helpless. So now they
two... just put up with it, accept whatever they can make. (... ) You cannot expect
too much. Everyone has his own way to survive. Those of lower status make do
with a lower standard of living.
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Say, when I told [urban students] about my folks, (... ) they just couldn't understand.
Your monthly cost of living, they say, you earn so little money, that little money?
How did you manage to get along, how do you stay alive? (... ) They simply
couldn't understand what I told them, just couldn't understand how rural people got
along, how they survived. (Student J)
Extract 16. (urban-rural trouble?) Er... trouble.... My dormitory was a relatively
harmonious place, everyone on good terms. In other ways, er, it, it's inevitable,
definitely there was a very big difference. (... ) (Urban-rural distance in culture and
life?) Yes, right, right, right, it's very apparent, relatively apparent. (... ) Although
they didn't speak openly about it, but sometimes some people's expressions, some
expressed meanings, or bearings, as if telling you that you knew nothing, you rube
(chuckle). (In such a case, did you sense disrespect for us rural students?) Mmm...
yes, there are such elements in it. Some students did, of course not all students
behaved like that. (Student L)
Income from farming is seriously insufficient, and off-farm jobs have become
vital for many peasants. For those who are no longer fit for long-distance migration and
heavy physical labour, the problem is a matter of survival more than a matter of living
standards. The remark that one had to "accept whatever they can make" conveys a
message of desperation. At present, fully representational and accurate reports on the
economic situation in rural areas are rare. Urban students, without personal experience,
would find it very hard to understand the desperate poverty in the rural areas.
Difficulties in communication would estrange the young peers. Against a macro
background in which the city dominates over the village, this estrangement may
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ultimately be manifested as feelings of superiority on the part of urban students and
inferiority on the part of rural students.
Extract 17. (Something impressive on campus:) A lot of students around me, they're
directly divided into two groups upon university admittance. (... ) Some [rural
students] would change in character and began to contact some... but some
students from badly-off backgrounds could not possibly go with others to dine, to
sing. So, on the whole, they tend to be very restrained and withdrawn. So, in such
affairs as making a speech in the class, including campaigning for class cadres,
they are all... anyway, there's this disadvantaged group on campus. (... ) So, their
developments are much impeded in some respects.
As I told you just now, probably they just spontaneously divide into two groups.
No matter how friendly they are to each other on the surface, there definitely is that,
that, that kind of invisible gap, the kind of gap that is impassable. (Student H)
The higher extreme, where more urban students gather, obviously offers more
privileges than the lower extreme does, both when it comes to the academic atmosphere
on campus and the urban culture outside the campus. The rural students, however, tend
to be excluded from these benefits for a number of reasons. Such factors as culture and
personality are relevant, but what the interviewees were most concerned about was still
poverty. Poverty left them disadvantaged. They tended to be "very refrained" from
social activities, which could erode their confidence and in turn "much impeded" their
development in other respects (Student H).
5.3.1.3. Higher extreme: A different perspective on poverty
In the transition from basic education up to higher education most rural students have to
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drain their family finances. To relieve pressure, many rural students choose to take
part-time jobs. Because of the surplus in the labour force, possible jobs and income are
very limited. Invariably, the experience of making money is filled with hardship, while
the attitudes of students at the different extremes may vary, as is shown below:
Extract 18. (Impression of the university's host city:) People [in this city] lead a life of ease.
(... ) Anyway, I don't enjoy staying in this city. (... ) (Do you still remember how
you felt the first time you got paid for a part-time job?) Yes, I do. (Can you tell
me?) Ai (sighing)... it's, ac-actually nothing much. Only, only shed some tears....
(... ) Ai, this, this is, unfair. (Student M, at the higher extreme)
Extract 19. (First part-time job:) Very exhausting and a heavy workload. In the end, the
payment was very small, which they nearly denied us. (... ) Almost started a quarrel.
We insisted on what was ours. After all we made an effort and it was our first time.
We were so abused, very unhappy, very uncomfortable. (Student A, at the lower
extreme)
Both students recalled hardship, but Student A at the lower extreme focused on
details that were "very unhappy, very uncomfortable," while Student M at the higher
extreme, being more directly exposed to the "life of ease" in the big city, arrived at a
more general conclusion that it was "unfair", pointing to social injustice.
Extract 20. "Tough life spurs you while soft life spoils you (classical proverb)." This
"tough life," I don't prefer to interpret it as having a poor family background. Even
if you're born in affluence, you might as well "get prepared for danger in times of
safety (classical proverb)". With such an attitude, you may very well make use of
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the privileged condition that is denied to your peers and enhance yourself in all
respects. (Student L)
Extract 21. I used to believe that most of those who got excellent grades were from poor
families, while those from affluent families tended to have a relatively poor
academic performance. But in senior high school, my beliefs were thoroughly
subverted. In senior high school, I found that, in fact, the better the family
condition, the better the student's academic performance and the greater his
capacity to cope with practical affairs. (Student I, from Southern China)
Students L and I talked about a phenomenon which students at the lower
extreme neglected: an advantaged socio-economic position, rather than being a
corrupting factor, is actually favourable for one's development. Once arriving at the
higher extreme, these rural students were confronted with a new situation in which their
urban peers obviously had more merits, such as better school performance and greater
capability to cope with practical affairs (Student I). This would upset their established
stereotypes, evoke their reflection and restore them to the common sense notion that
poverty is, after all, not a blessing.
In contrast, students at the lower extreme appeared less alert to the harmful
effect of an adverse background:
Extract 22. (Why do you think there are so few urban students in your class?) Why there
are so few urban students? For one thing, for one thing, this school is not very good,
not famous; for another, it's... mmm... mmm? I don't know (laugh). (Student F,
at lower extreme)
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On elite campuses, rural students make up a disproportionately small number of
the student body. This is evidence that diligence, a merit in which rural students take
such great pride, has not in the least altered the urban-rural student distribution in the
higher education system and, in turn, is evidence that adverse life does affect rural
students negatively. However, none of the interviewees at the lower extreme inquired as
to why there were so many rural students in their classes or wondered where their urban
peers had gone. Nor did they question why they were accumulated on the lower extreme
when most of them were so excellent and hard-working in their studies. On the other
hand, to some rural students at the higher extreme, the urban-rural gap just emerged
"certainly," "directly," and "spontaneously," and the gap was "impassable," "inevitable,"
"definite," and "apparent" (Student H and L). These ideas could not be triggered by
accidental emotional impact, but were the result of careful reflection. Furthermore, they
saw that the harsh experience was no longer just a private affair or a matter between
peers. Such vocabulary as "disadvantaged group" (Student H) and "unfair" (Student M)
indicates that these rural students were capable of seeing beyond the individual
experience and of generalizing to their groups. This indicates that although the rural
students on the whole tend to be poor, the different contexts in their universities and
colleges may result in different mind-sets. It seems that only in the on-campus "village"
are they capable of overpowering their poverty. But this may indicate deprivation in
such aspects as political, social and cultural capital.
5.3.2. High economic standard versus low economic standard: Same poverty
The following comparison is made between the interviewees who had a "high economic
standard" and a "low economic standard", respectively, with the intention of revealing
their similarities in spite of the variation in their economic conditions.
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5.3.2.1. Lower extreme: High university tuition versus limited student revenues
Extract 23. (The cost of higher education:) Not so much as pressure, but my family is not
so affluent as to take it easy. Anyway, family funding is hard earned. The
economic conditions being just so-so, the funding for studies is not a problem, but
there's not much surplus. (Student B, family income not purely from farming and
manual work)
Extract 24. (Financial pressure:) Quite big, there's pressure. (... ) My family is just an
average one. (... ) Because villagers don't have many sources of income, I'm totally
dependent on my parents' work. Money is hard earned. (... ) I spend 7000-8000
yuan a year, including tuition fees and cost of living. (You consumed all the family
income). (... )Yes. It's common in the village. (Student E, family income purely
from farming)
Universities at the lower extreme enrol a high proportion of poor students and at
the same time are insufficiently funded. It is therefore difficult for such institutions to
provide aid to sufficiently support poor students. For those who are not excellent in
studying and whose families are not in extreme poverty, the availability of scholarships
is scarce and the intensely contested need-based aid is more or less inaccessible. These
students, who are primarily dependent on family funds, have suffered most from the
high tuition. Even Student B, who estimated education costs as tolerable, felt guilty that
the costs put such a large dent into the family finances. Many among the rural students
at the lower extreme have such feelings of embarrassment and guilt.
Extract 25. (Something impressive on campus:) Found it rather unfair, anyway I was rather
angry at that time. It has been in my mind for years. (... ) Maybe [we roommates]
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were relatively open-minded about the cost of meals and ate a bit better. After all
we were studying, afraid of damaging our health. (... ) [Students in other
dormitories] all criticized that we spent money too casually, etc, etc. In fact, we just
ate slightly better than they did. They only ate wheat bread and salted vegetables,
while we sometimes ate eggs and fried vegetables and the like. (... ) As a result, in
the first semester, five out of six in our dormitory were electediv as poor students,
while, later, there were none (laugh). (... ) (Poor students need to be "elected"?)
There were too many who applied for need-based subsidies in our class. Our class
was better, we did not ask the poor students to present family conditions. Many
schools asked students to stand on the classroom platform and read their
applications, shedding much tears.91 (Student G, state scholarship winner)
With very limited funds, very few students can be granted aid. In Student G's
class, for example, only two out of more than 30 students received a state scholarship of
4000 yuan in 2007, a year that witnessed a great increase in state allocations. Earlier, in
the case of Student C, only two or three students were granted a state scholarship in a
faculty comprising six classes. Since students from poor families are favourably
considered for scholarships and other subsidy grants, a unique "poor students election,"
as Student G put it, was developed, which was a public appraisal of presented
conditions to decide who deserved subsidies. When it is difficult to obtain accurate data
about rural family economic details from authentic institutions, slight differences in the
students' daily lives may be decisive in the public appraisal. When an applicant could be
considered ineligible only because his or her diet included an egg or fried vegetables, it
was obviously a case of exaggeration. To most rural students, financial aid is very
important since many of them are at a critical point: with a slight increase in financial
iv Student G used the word "elected", as if it was a campaign for president.
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help they can complete their studies; with a slight increase in financial burdens they will
suffer great deprivation or even fail in their academic endeavours. It was only natural
that Student G took the competition for the subsidy very seriously and felt "rather
unfair" and "rather angry".
Obviously, with very limited funds, it is impossible for all poor students to be
granted relief, even if the "poor student election" was abolished. The indignation against
the "poor student election," and other unfair treatment could have been aimed at a
higher level, at the problematic system, and could have led to such questions as why
rural students were almost unanimously poor, and why so many poor students had to
compete for so little money and suffer the humiliation of "poverty presentations."
5.3.2.2. Higher extreme: Debtor mentality and subdued attitude
Extract 26. (Something impressive on campus:) My class had team spirit, very good. Like,
say, my family was very poor, they, most of them could understand. And in all
respects, like scholarship applications, they gave priority to me. (... ) I felt quite
grateful to them. At first I felt they looked down upon people, disdained me. It
turned out that it was not the case. All were very nice, much concerned about me.
(Student J)
Extract 27. (Something impressive on campus:) I feel that I am very lucky, lucky that I'm
in this school. (... ) I feel that my classmates are very helpful to me, very supportive
to me. Mmm, feel that I have gained much in this area. For example, work-study
programmes, state needs-based subsidies and the like. (... ) And there are also state
student loans, thankfully, although the application procedure is very complex.92
(Student K)
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The interviews show that most rural students at the higher extreme may be
granted various types of financial aid in the form of scholarships, needs-based subsidies,
student loans, work-study programmes. This aid either comes from government
allocations or bank loans. However, poor rural students, such as Students J and K, felt
grateful to their classmates, who could be their rivals in reality but who were entitled to
decide whether they should be granted financial aid. As it was revealed above, rural
students at the higher extreme tended to be sensitive to the rich-poor disparity among
students. When others did them substantial favours, such as give them priority in
financial aids grant, something intangible like "disdain" (Student J) tended to be ignored.
Such gratitude did not seem to result from friendship between equals, but could be
interpreted as a response to a favour. Meanwhile, a very practical problem can be
illuminated: if most of the students were poor, as at the lower extreme, rivalry for
financial aid would become unavoidable and the atmosphere would become unfriendly.
Extract 28. (Something impressive on campus:) After all, my family condition was thus, so
it was natural that in daily expenditures you had this kind of mind-set: to spend as
little as possible. (... ) Every time, after vacation, when a new semester began, (... )
I would take as little money as possible. After all, the family was burdened with
costs of farming production. So, every time before leaving home, I felt gloomy.
(Student L, scholarship winner)
In the case of Student L, higher education took a heavy toll: a younger sibling
dropped out of school to save money. At the level of basic education, many rural
students' family finances were already overdrawn and on the verge of bankruptcy. At
the level of tertiary education, financial aid granted to them is not so substantial as to
make a fundamental improvement in the situation. As a result, many rural students at
141
the higher extreme, just as much as those at the lower extreme, are heavily in debt to
their families.
The following quotation is from Student H (from a civil servant/peasant family
in the North), the only student who studied within the geographical boundary of Hebei
Province and consumed more than 1000 yuan a month:
Extract 29. (Funding:) It's OK in my case. I fully depend on my family. Everything,
including cost of living expenses, is covered by my family, because my family is
relatively well off.
(As a rural student, you have been very successful breaking through urban
exclusion.) The reason lies in this: financial concerns are the underlying cause of
many phenomena. As I told you just now, I spent 60 thousand yuan during my four
years in university. This may not be very much for some urban students, but it's not
that easy to accumulate this sum from the village.
It was [the rural students'] subdued attitude, as well as their hard-working character,
that pulled them through in their endeavours (...). (Student H)
To Student H, the price of higher education was great. However, this expense
could not be spared, for money functioned as a stepping-stone, without which the
mainstream student community would be inaccessible. While he could gain admittance
to university with finances that would seem luxurious for peasants, they were not
abundant for life in a metropolis. Student H is contrasted to his urban peers who had a
whole system of privilege, including good basic education, cultural familiarity and a
curriculum that favoured their background. Although declaring that he had no financial
problems, Student H could not possibly be exempted from it. To span the urban-rural
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gap, Student H expended extra money on, so to speak, an "admission fee". Money may
be the most straightforward approach, although the gap may have been created by many
other factors, including information and culture. However, to most rural students,
whether they depend on family funds or scholarships, this route is blocked. Furthermore,
the case of Student H can be contrasted with Student I, who studied in a southern
metropolis, where social disparity is more salient. Student I claimed to have a subjective
sense of financial pressure, even though his consumption standard is similar to that of
Student H. A survey made in Guangzhou, a large southern city, reveals that students'
monthly expenditures vary from less than 300 to about 8,000 yuan (J. Fu and C. Wang
2010). Had Student H studied in a southern metropolis, then the cost of higher
education would have indeed resulted in a subjective sense of financial pressure.
Many rural families have to reduce their standard of living or go into debt to
support their children. As a result, many rural students have a guilty conscience.
"Taking so much money at once from the family savings, I felt very sorry" (Student B,
at lower extreme, who found higher education costs bearable). "After all, a grown-up
now, anyway, finds it embarrassing to ask for money" (Student M, at higher extreme,
who found higher education costs unbearable). On the whole, rural students, whatever
their category, are invariably burdened under the heavy cost of higher education. These
elites among rural youths, though physically present in the city, still remain in the
shadow of their impoverished rural homes. As such, the division that intersects across
the four groups of rural students in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 becomes blurred, while the
border that separates them from the city has become more distinct.
5.3.3. Higher extreme versus lower extreme: Illusion or marginalization
The following comparison is made between students at the lower and higher extremes,
respectively, in order to uncover how rural students' standing in the higher education
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hierarchy may influence their future orientation. This touches upon such aspects as
upgrading academic qualifications, employment. Finances, though, remain a visible
theme in this section.
5.3.3.1. Lower extreme: Illusion
Extract 30. I'm also looking for a job, because graduation is nearing.... Not easy, not at all.
(... ) [In finding a job] I guess the most important factor is still the personal factor,
for even if you enter a company through social relations, your merits still need to
be verified. Your ability can serve as the marker of your strength. (... ) (What, if we
only look at the initial recruitment?) Maybe it equally depends on both, on social
relations and on yourself as well. (Do you have relations in Shijiazhuang (the
capital of Hebei Province)?) No, not influential relations. (Do you feel you have a
chance in Shijiazhuang?) Er... I guess chance... chance, well, only for positions
that are not so good. (Student A)
Extract 31. After all, there are too many college students now. It's difficult to find a job.
Sure there's pressure. (... ) (Those who graduated earlier and are still without work,
what are they doing now?) Some are running small shops, selling ice cream near
school, ice cream; some sell clothing, rent a shop and sell clothing. Engaged in
various kinds of things.93 (Are they all from the village?) Yes, from the village, all
of them are from the village. (Do you think it fair?) It is quite fair as I deem it. In
the present day society, capable persons get on. (... ) When you can't find a job, you
can't blame it on others. You can only say that you have no ability. (Student E)
In their childhood, most of the rural students showed outstanding performance in
their studies among their peers. It is understandable that they are very proud. However,
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the inadequacy of the way they have been educated has restricted the structure of their
thoughts and knowledge so that many of them are clever in school examinations only.
Universities and colleges at the lower extreme indiscriminately duplicate the stereotypes
that adhere to unenlightened teaching methods. As a result, school products tend to be
identical. Outside the campuses, Chinese economic development heavily depends on
labour-intensive industries, which mostly recruit workers with low educational levels,
leaving little room for college graduates, as will also be discussed in Chapter Six,
6.3.4.1 and Chapter Seven. In this situation, the major factors that affect employment
obviously go beyond personal ability. In fact, rural students at the lower extreme are
challenged from both sides: on the one hand we find the students at the higher extreme,
who have the advantages of their prestigious schools, on the other hand we find the
urban students, who have more resources and shelter in the city. Students A and E,
however, failed to see the factors causing the employment crisis because university
education did not deepen their insight into the existing system.
5.3.3.2. Higher extreme: Marginalization
Extract 32. As far as I'm concerned, the main purpose of leaving home is to find a job. (... )
They're urban children and seek help from their parents, while we can only rely on
ourselves. (Thought about going up to graduate studies?) Certainly did. Mmm, had
better make money first and support myself. (... ) Family has provided me for so
many years, anyway, almost all the money is used up to support me through. In the
end, if I go home and continue to rely on my family, it's really unacceptable. Too
shameful to go home. (Student K)
Extract 33. I feel that anyway we are different from people here. After all, we want to come
out [of the village] and it's just for this aim that we have made all the efforts.
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Unlike [the urban students], they've always been here and don't have to worry
about some future plans. (Student M)
Extract 34. For graduate studies, I applied to X University (a subclass-1 university). (... )
We were three candidates for the final interview. Three candidates and the other
two graduated from X university. The supervisors used to teach them and they
were in the same faculty. Then I was eliminated and was transferred to this
[subclass-2 university]. (... ) Anyway this is very common. Because at that time I
was told.... So, now many people ask me why don't you apply for the position of
civil servant. Because, considering many factors, you can't just rely on your
academic scores and take it for granted that you can make it.
(The experience of studying:) If I could choose, I would have rather been
saved from such an experience. Too heavy. (... ) Had to persevere. Persevered not
because of strong will, but because there was no other choice. (Student H)
The following extract is from Student C, who had undergraduate education at
the lower extreme in Hebei Province, but had graduate education in a southern
metropolis. Once located at the higher extreme, where the students' socio-economic
background differed sharply, Student C became aware of the disadvantaged position as
a rural youth:
Extract 35. (Family influence in obtaining a position:) Er, right, there are such cases. But at
the university [in Hebei Province] it did not impress me very much in that way. (... )
On the contrary, I find this phenomenon more common in X City (the southern
metropolis). In X City, you are more aware of the dependence on friends, parents
and circle of friends, to look for a job. (In the big city, you can obviously sense this,
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is that so?) Yes, I have a more obvious and more salient sense of this phenomenon
than I did when I was in Y City (the city in Hebei Province where Student C took
undergraduate studies). (Student C)
The opportunities to be admitted to elite universities are based on a quota which
heavily favours residents in the metropolises.94 Therefore, rural students at the higher
extreme are the winners of a competition with the strictest elimination criteria, and it is
reasonable to deem them as more competitive academically. However, they seem to be
less confident and more aware of the fact that, unlike urban students, they could not get
help from social relations in search of employment. They did not equate school grades
and individual ability with a good work position. Their practical attitude might be a
"subdued attitude" (Student H), or concession to humiliation.
To some extent, students' perceptions of reality seem to vary according to how
much they approach the metropolis, where social stratification is salient: Student I
became aware of the correlation between school grades and socio-economic status at the
senior high school stage; Student H did so when admitted to university; Student C found
social relations counted much when he arrived in a big southern metropolis; Students A
and E, who were away from the big cities, were convinced that individual ability was
decisive. Students' future strategies could be affected by how much their judgments
about themselves and society were realistic.
5.3.3.3. Dilemma
Extract 36. This was my first choice; I directly applied to this school. And feel it was safer
in this way. Applications for better schools might fail. Better to be safe. (Student
D)
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Extract 37. One goal was to be admitted to a school. (...) In fact I was very blind, so to
speak. (In this blindness, there is one very important theme, that is, to leave the
village as far as possible, right?) Right, right, right, find a school in the first place.
(...) (Had you a very affluent family condition, would you give priority to your
interests?) Er... as to interests, because at the bottom level, in general, I do not
feel that enough attention is given to cultivating interests. As to the students' own
interests... they hardly know what they want to do in the future, or where their
interests lie. (Student C)
Extract 38. This [better-off family condition] and the fact that my parents had no regrets at
breaking away from the soil provide financial and psychological support to a rural
youth who chose to go in for higher education. (Student H)
Many rural students who study hard with the purpose of leaving the village are
in fact more inspired by the present plight than by their studies or by some grandiose
promise in the future. Higher education paves a route to the city. However, peasants,
living in the closed rural environment, are unfamiliar with school affairs. Teaching staff
in rural schools tend to be poorly informed about the university curriculum. As a result,
most rural students are more or less blind about choices of schools and subjects.
Nevertheless, behind this blindness lies the solitary goal: an urge to uproot from the soil
and therefore to be admitted to a school at any rate. In this case, they would choose
schools and majors of less prestige and less competition in relation to their urban peers.
In so doing, they choose a position that is disadvantageous for their future upgrading
and employment.
Confronted with poverty, it can be inferred from the interviews that rural
students tend to falter between two choices: upgrading their academic qualifications or
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employment. On the one hand, they look forward to financial self-reliance and then to
reward their families. On the other hand, finding themselves in a disadvantaged position,
they endeavour to upgrade their academic qualifications as a way of increasing their
competitiveness. This puts them in a Catch 22 dilemma: they must have good
qualifications to get satisfactory jobs, they must have money to upgrade their
qualifications, and they must have satisfactory jobs to make money. Urban students
have the advantage of social relations and economic conditions to buffer the impact of
an employment crisis to some extent. In contrast, once back in their home villages, rural
students would lose their foothold in the city and have even less chance to find jobs. In
addition to this, they will find that their parents are too worn out to continue manual
labour. The remark that it was "too shameful to go home" (Student K) reflects a typical
mind-set that hangs heavily over many rural students.
Rural students at the lower extreme are in the most unfavourable position. With
limited financial aid, they are more likely to sink their families into desperate poverty.
"The village on campus" may temporarily buffer them against the impact from the city,
but it may also slow down their active response to the external changes. Once they are
precipitated into the employment crisis, they may have to pay a very heavy toll, and
may even think that they are tangled in a trap of their own making. One incident that
may confirm the findings in this research is the following: Wei Liu, a rural student who
lost all hope about her employment prospects, chose suicide in February 2009, only half
a year before graduation. Wei Liu was a typical poor rural student at the lower extreme:
although she excelled at her studies and was once granted a state scholarship, her family
was in debt and her younger brother discontinued his education to save money. Wei
Liu's diary reveals that she used to be a very confident and very strong girl. She would
rather "be thankful to poverty" than complain, for poverty was supposed to make her
"strong and mature". In the long run, poverty put her under pressure with her family
149
heavily in debt, while she, "a grand university student," continued to draw on the toil of
her parents without the hope of finding a job -- "How shameful!" To overcome her
frustration, she relied on her "mind-set": "The key to a healthy mind-set is yourself....
Study harder, get equipped, perfect yourself, and the situation will improve." However,
her mind-set failed to save her (Jingdong 2009). The fact that Wei Liu's diary overlaps
with the extracts cited above is no coincidence. The data and analysis reveal that many
of the rural students arrived at university with confidence. From there they have fallen
financially and morally into debt. In the end, disillusionment about the future may be
the last straw and they see no way out. While Wei Liu chose a drastic way out of her
agony and guilt, her experience is not unique.
5.4. Epilogue
One of the advantages of grounded theory is that it is open to further modification.
Therefore, the substantive grounded theory generated in this chapter has the potential to
be improved by comparing it to more samples. Another way of strengthening it
theoretically is to relate the findings in this chapter to high level theories that are
extensively applicable. In the next chapter, Bourdieu's theory on capital reproduction
via the educational system may further shed light on the problem of the rural students
with respect to deprivation in different forms of capital, and Lindner's theory of
humiliation helps us to delve further into the rural students' mind-sets. This also agrees
with the assumption of classical grounded theorists that a literature review may follow
the independent analysis as a way of urging novice researchers to discover fresh
theories (Charmaz 2006, 6). The existing literature may also have a reciprocal effect by
providing different lenses. While the above substantive grounded theory may view this
world from the perspective of those being studied, the existing literature that will be
applied may highlight power relations and help to set this chapter in the macro context.
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Borrowing Bourdieu's concept of field, the Chinese higher education institutions,
apart from comprising a university field, are a locus where the rural field and urban field
overlap. The higher extreme tends to be dominated by urban students, while the lower
extreme tends to be dominated by the rural students. This is a unique feature of the
Chinese higher education system that results from the urban-rural segregation system so
that the Chinese university reflects Chinese society. Rural China and urban China
belong to two separate spaces, or even two different eras. Other societies that have
applied welfare measures have greatly reduced disparities in necessities of life between
the various social strata. For the Chinese students, however, daily details such as meals
serve as indicators of "the rich" and "the poor," and, in turn, as indicators of "the urban"
and "the rural." The rural students' close contact with their urban peers may intensify
their sense of belonging to the village, and they may see the village in opposition to the
city. In the existing pattern, resource distribution between the rural and urban areas is
seriously imbalanced. The higher education system, which Bourdieu defines as an
instrument that reproduces class inequality, may eventually entrench the urban-rural
disparity by streaming urban and rural graduates to unequal social positions. Especially
when they are exposed to employment crisis, the rural students are at risk of being left
in a desperate situation to repeat the tragedies that are bred in poverty. More
fundamentally, via the durable and transposable habitus developed in the university
field, the urban-rural segregation system, an example of external government coercion,
will have become internalized into people's mind-sets by the way the universities
function.
However, the higher education institutions reproduce the unequal structure of
the society indirectly and may appear to be neutral in comparison with the government
policy that imposes urban-rural segregation directly. With respect to its influences on
people's mind-sets, the effects of the university, as an institution that exerts symbolic
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violence, could be much more profound and lasting. A combination of Bourdieu's and
Lindner's theories, which give heed to both the objective structure of the society and the
cognitive structure of social agents, will help to expose the process that has been
camouflaged by this feature, and then reveal the potential influence that it may exert
upon Chinese society.
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Chapter Six: Comprehensive Analysisv
6.1. Introduction
To the Chinese higher education system, peasants and off-farm workers constitute an
important source of revenues. They provide financial support to their children, i.e. rural
students, especially those enrolled at the institutions in the lower level of the system. In
this way, the distance between the higher education institutions and the rural society has
been shortened since massification in 1999. As late as the end of the 1980s, higher
education was still part of the planned economy. The government controlled the entire
process, from the enrolment of new students to the assignment of job positions to
graduates. With funding entirely covered by governments at different levels, students
admitted to universities and colleges enjoyed free education as well as free medical care.
All graduates had the status of state cadres and earned salaries defined by uniform
standards. Access to higher education meant being upgraded in status and guaranteed
financial comfort. Therefore, the National College Entrance Examination had a strong
influence on Chinese society and was very competitive. In 1965, the year before the
Great Cultural Revolution interrupted normal examination and enrolment, only 0.164
million students were admitted (Editorial Department of the Education Yearbook of
China 1949-1981, 969). In 1977, the system was restored to normal operation, which
continued the old mode of operation with a limited enrolment scale and uniform
government allocation of work opportunities. Since the 1990s, education policies
underwent some evolution. The old notion that the governments should provide free
education and assign job positions gradually gave way to the market-oriented idea that
v Part of the content in this chapter was published under the title of "A Case Study of 'Habitus' and 'Field': The
Chinese Rural Students on the University Campus".
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students should share part of the cost and find jobs on their own. This gradual evolution
continued for nearly ten years until 1999 when there were drastic changes.
On July 06, 1999, only twenty days before the National College Entrance
Examination, a new education policy was issued to counteract the Asian financial crisis
and promote domestic consumption (Lanqing Li 2003, Part 4). This new policy, the
result of the combined efforts of the National Development Planning Commission and
the Ministry of Education, was issued in the form of an urgent notice. Accordingly, the
previous plan made at the beginning of 1999 was modified to further increase the
enrolment scale: a total of 1.53 million students were to be admitted to formal education
institutions, an increase of 42% (L. Cheng 2008).95 At the same time, tuition was
increased. From 1989 to 2012, student tuition fees have increased 25 times, and it would
take a peasant's net income of 13.6 years to support a student through his or her
undergraduate period (Y. Wang 2012). Apparently, this education policy, whose
objective was openly declared as promoting the state economy, foreshadowed the
employment crisis for college graduates, and has paved the road from higher education
into poverty.96
On the one hand, peasants are disadvantaged when it comes to economic capital;
on the other hand, the cost of tertiary education has increased dramatically, while
college graduates' prospects in the employment market are far from optimistic. This
gives rise to a series of questions. What is the motivation of the rural students who seek
higher education? What kind of process have they been through when they have been
admitted to higher education institutions? What kind of role do the Chinese higher
education institutions play in such public issues as equal opportunity for rural youths?
How do the experiences of the rural students on the university and college campuses
shape their mind-set? And how might their mind-set, in turn, impact Chinese society? In
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applying the theories of Bourdieu and Lindner, these inquiries may be formulated into
the following research questions:
How have the Chinese peasants' reproduction strategies, in the form of
investment in higher education, come into being? After the Chinese
university, as an instrument of capital reproduction, has absorbed the
peasants' investment, what dividends will it pay? Specifically, what
kind of mind-set will it leave the rural students with? And what will the
significance of such output be to Chinese society?
The previous chapters may have shed some light on these questions: the state has
imposed urban-rural segregation which has reduced the peasants to the status of unfree
labourers and the state has reduced the higher education system to a heteronomous
institution which serves the purpose of the state rather than play its public role properly.
This chapter will apply the theories of Bourdieu and Lindner to analyse the life of the
peasants' children in a heteronomous higher education system as presented in the
previous chapter. It will shed light on the effects of using higher education as a
mechanism of capital reproduction, and on how this mechanism may influence the
cognitive structure of the rural students.
6.2. Literature review
As a disadvantaged group on the campus, rural students have been the subject of a
considerable amount of literature. This literature records their lives and academic
studies, and has attracted deep societal concerns about their plight. But the literature that
can be defined as scientific research is rare and limited.97 Among the scientific research
papers that the author has so far reviewed, the ones that are considered relevant to this
research can be roughly divided into four categories. The following authors and papers
are considered to be illustrative: research on the rural students' socialization (e.g. Lai
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and Z. Wang 2002; X. Xu 2003, 2007), on their adaptability (e.g. Yiquan Zhang and
Yijie Wang 2006), on their ideological and moral value to education as well as
employment education (e.g. W. Zhang 2006; T. Lei 2005; Yi Liu 2006), and on their
interpersonal relations from a sociological perspective (e.g. Xin Zheng 2002). Most
researchers agree that the urban-rural segregation structure and the differences between
urban and rural cultures are the main reasons for these problems. Some researchers also
attribute the plight of the rural students mainly to their own characteristics, making little
further exploration of the cause of these characteristics.
The above literature review, which is limited in scale, tends to lead to the
following conclusion: these researchers approach the topic from different perspectives,
but have some common shortcomings. First, although some researchers relate the plight
of the rural students to the urban-rural segregation system and rural culture, they fail to
trace the roots of the system and culture, and in turn fail to point to areas beyond the
rural society. Second, although their subjects live on campus, these researchers rarely
reflect on the higher education institutions' role in exacerbating the plight of the rural
students, and in turn fail to criticize the structure and nature of the specific environment
in which the rural students live and study. Third, in most cases, the researchers almost
invariably lump rural students together for study. Up to this point in time, the author has
been unable to find researchers who focus on how the unequal positions in the hierarchy
of the higher education institutions may create differences in the way the rural youths
are treated, or how the students subjectively respond to the different standings in the
hierarchy. Fourth, given that scientific research within China is exposed to strict
censorship, most research within Continental China tends to be focused on short-term
and immediate events, stopping short at looking into the political perspective and thus
not studying the rural students in relation to the state. Moreover, so far, the author has
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been unable to find even one piece of Chinese research that applies systematic theories
to analyse the conditions of the rural students.
Bourdieu's theory on strategies of capital reproduction will guide the analysis
and help to uncover how educational institutions, through capital conversion, may
influence the behaviour and economic conditions of the rural students. According to
Bourdieu (1996, 219, 276-77), those who invest in education have strategies which may
be influenced by such factors as: the volume and structure of their capital in relation to
the education system; the relative value of the profits that they expect from their
investments; the distance between them and the appropriate information. The return on
the investment may vary because different social classes have different educational
chances, and different sections and types of schools promise different chances of
success (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 158). School benefits, such as academic capital
(e.g. diplomas), may give economic and social return but in many cases are determined
by the social capital or even economic capital. And the transformation of one type of
capital into another means displacement between fields (Bourdieu 1996, 276-77). It is
therefore assumed that what is ultimately decisive is the pattern in the field of power.
6.3. Discussion
Bourdieu (1996,1-2, 228) emphasizes the relation between the acts of construction
performed by agents and the social genesis of the cognitive structures of the agents, i.e.
the homology between the habitus and the field. The previous chapter presented the
rural students' accounts of and comments on their life and studies, and analysed their
mind-sets to a certain degree. Here, the chapter will trace the social genesis which may
help us to understand the rural students' presentations and practices, as well as the
underlying cognitive structures. It departs from giving a presentation and analysis of the
rural field, or the origin of the peasants' strategies of reproduction.
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6.3.1. The rural field, the capital and habitus of peasants
For a long time, a large population of rural labourers have quit farming and are making
a living in the city. For instance, a considerable number of restaurants and grocery
stores in urban areas are run or staffed by peasants; sweatshops are mostly staffed by
off-farm workers. However, their status is still institutionally bound to the village,
making it difficult for them to become integrated in urban society. This excluded status
helps to preserve the habitus that they have developed in the village. From some terms
currently adopted in the Chinese media, such as "off-farm worker" and "rural college
student", as well as "college-graduate-off-farm worker" that has more recently come
into use, it can be seen that, people with rural status dwell in a space that has already
extended into the geographical boundary of the urban areas. Therefore, it is more
precise to describe their microcosms using the concept of "rural field" rather than "rural
area".
Regarding the peasants' capital, deprivation in economic capital is a feature that
can be easily identified in the structure of their capital. However, as has been revealed
in Chapter Three, deprivation supported by a systematic structure will necessarily lead
to comprehensive poverty, i.e. deprivation in political, social, cultural and economic
capital. Regarding political capital, as has been presented in Chapter Two, Section
2.7.2., the field of politics in China is a closed space within which most of the agents
tend to have secured tenure positions in the establishment while peasants are almost
completely excluded. What is apparently shared by all in the rural field is a rural
identity, which is their label by birth, or a bond that relates them to one another. To
enter other fields, the social agents must have a special capital that Bourdieu calls the
"admission fee" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 107), while in the rural field, one must
have special capital, or pay a ransom, in order to escape the field. Or, in other fields, the
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losers in the competition get out of the arena, while in the rural field the winners get out.
Therefore, the rural field possesses less unique capital and has less vitality than any
other fields, although it is the largest in size. It is subordinate to the urban field in that it
not only provides manpower and material resources for the city, but also bears the
consequences of economic crisis in the city. For example, at times of employment crisis,
peasants are more likely to lose their temporary jobs in the city.98 At present, nearly
260 million off-farm workers are working in the urban areas (Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security of PRC 2011). Because of urban-rural segregation, the
few big cities where a large population of off-farm workers lives, such as Beijing,
Shanghai or Shenzhen, implement highly exclusive policies.99 Even some cities which
claim to offer open access to rural migrants impose strict criteria.100
The subordinate status of the village to the city is only one of the numerous
pieces of evidence showing that, deprived in political capital, peasants are subsequently
deprived of other forms of capital, and have no institutionalized guarantee to voice their
case and impact policy-making. As has also been revealed in Chapter Three, the
Chinese peasants have been deprived of land property as economic capital. A decline in
rural schools deprives the peasants in cultural capital. Regarding peasants' social capital,
we can turn to Bourdieu (1986, 249): the volume of the social capital possessed by a
given agent largely depends on the size of the network of relations he can effectively
utilize and also on the volume of the economic, cultural or symbolic capital possessed
by him or by all members in this network. Now that the traditional rural society has long
been atomized, it is assumed that the peasants' small network of kin (who tend to be
equally poor) can yield insignificant profit.
With respect to the habitus of the Chinese peasants, Arthur Henderson Smith
(1900), who lived in China more than a century ago, made observations and
summarized some of the characteristics of the Chinese peasants. To list a few examples:
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frugal, hard-working, polite, absence of public spirit, patience and perseverance, content
and cheerful. Yen (1933, 54) reflected on the culture of rural China and diagnosed four
diseases: illiteracy, poverty, vulnerability and privacy/selfishness. The above characters
listed by Smith and Yen illustrate habitus corresponding to a diseased society where the
peasants were segmented, incapable of establishing a welfare system that covered the
whole society, but had to rely on extended families or closed patriarchal communities
that were deeply rooted in the private economy. After the CPC had seized state power,
peasants were deprived of their land and patriarchal autonomy. Urban-rural segregation
further deteriorated their social and economic ecology. Since field and habitus are
homologous, the existing structure of the rural field tends to bring some of the peasants'
practices to the extreme, as for instance, more than ever, peasants are inclined towards
such features as self-control but submission, independence but selfishness, endurance of
hardship and poverty but leaning towards contentment, and, in particular, unawareness
of political rights. The urge to break away from their ancestors' roots should be part of a
newly developed habitus. The rural field may have also profoundly shaped rural
students. For instance, such virtues as diligence and endurance may be attributed to the
autonomy that peasants enjoyed in the traditional society, and their efforts in higher
education may reflect their desperate efforts to rebel against the existing urban-rural
segregation system that has reduced them to extreme deprivation. Some rural students at
the lower extreme of the higher education system consider poverty as a positive factor
for promoting their progress in academic studies, as has been presented in Chapter Five,
as they are unaware of their deprivation in other forms of capital. This may be the effect
of urban-rural segregation as a mechanism of segmentation.
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6.3.2. Access to higher education
6.3.2.1. Peasants' reproduction strategies
Under the urban-rural segregation system, peasants without a retirement pension or
sufficient social welfare mainly depend on their children as they get older. Given that at
present Chinese manual labourers generally have a low income, if the children repeat
the life of their parents, they may even not be able to properly support their parents who
are in old age. Therefore, manual labourers tend to have a strong urge to transform their
capital into a new, more profitable form before they have become physically exhausted,
as for instance, by investing in their children's education. While capital conversion, as
Bourdieu (1996, 276-77) points out, is a way of maintaining one's position in social
space, different agents would prefer different strategic systems according to the amount
and structure of their capital. The inclination to invest in education, in particular,
depends on how much one relies on the cultural capital. The Chinese cheap labourers
are not likely to possess significant economic and social capital. They have only limited
alternatives when they want to make investments. However, apart from physical capital,
peasants have one more resource which they can develop, i.e. the talent of their children.
Moreover, investing in children's education is a traditional practice. Peasants are
different from those who are, according to Bourdieu's categorization, best equipped with
the forms of capital giving access to the new instruments of reproduction (278). Just the
opposite, peasants' capital tends to be under threat in a rapidly changing time and,
therefore, they tend to be traditional in their choice of capital reproduction strategies. As
can be anticipated, with higher education, the next generation would have better income
and consequently improve the living condition of the families. And tertiary education
qualifications, as an institutionalized form of cultural capital, objectified in the form of a
diploma, may impress people as being substantial. Under the urban-rural segregation
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system, government household registration policies grant considerable privileges to
holders of tertiary education qualifications.101 Higher education holds promise for rural
youths who wish to enter the city and avoid the life of off-farm workers like their
parents, even though families which invest in higher education may risk bankruptcy.
Given urban-rural segregation and the peasants' lack of economic capital, the rural
students' motivation to higher education is understandable. Indeed, the Chinese
peasants' endeavour to support their children in higher education regardless of its cost is
a reproduction strategy that they have developed in a state of desperation, based on
rational choices.
6.3.2.2. Removed from the appropriate information
Bourdieu refers to capital conversion as "cost" because it means changes in conditions
objectively imposed by the need to maintain the value of an inheritance. This would
also entail a comprehensive change in subjective experiences (Ibid, 277). From the
outset, the Chinese peasants' plan of capital reproduction is bound to be more costly.
They are confined in the rural field and their practices are defined by rural habitus.
Particularly, they tend to be removed from the appropriate information about higher
education. Currently, more than 60% of the rural children quit school at the basic
education stage (M. Han 2009), and only promising children enter senior middle school.
On the other hand, in most provinces the higher education system admits as many as
80% of senior middle school graduates (Ministry of Education 2012). The identity of a
college student is no longer the marker of success. The focus has shifted to employment
prospects, where for many urban students the competition is over admittance to
high-level and famous institutions. It is not easy for many peasants to understand the
relationships between the multiple categories of disciplines and institutions, nor do they
fully comprehend the significance of the differences between the categories. Often, they
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will not have good insight into the overall situation until after they have witnessed
specific examples. Bourdieu (1996, 219) terms this phenomenon as "structural
hysteresis of the categories of perception and appreciation". This structural delay will be
greater when one is more distanced from the necessary information. In the case of China,
the peasants, compared to other disadvantaged groups, such as the urban poor who have
no choice but to invest in higher education, are exposed to more risks, for they are even
more distanced from updated information by the segmentation mechanism of
urban-rural segregation.
6.3.2.3. Disorder as revolt against inequality
The data in Chapter Five was mainly collected through interviews conducted in 2008.
At that time, the students at the lower extreme did not appear to respond strongly to
inequality in higher education. In recent years, however, information spreads more
efficiently and rural people have become more aware of the inequality in education. One
example of this is the National College Entrance Examination of 2013, where some
examinees and their parents attacked invigilators who were stopping candidates from
cheating. "We want fairness; no cheating, no fairness", the local attackers declared (L.
Lei 2013). This occurred in a town that has an examination preparation centre that is
both famous for its high rate of admission to tertiary education and noted for cheating.
Senior middle school education in China is not free and may even be a lucrative
business. The town's high admission rate has brought it honour as well as huge revenues.
A high number of students from other areas come to this famous examination
preparation centre and pay tuition fees and accommodation fees. This encourages
persistent and wide-spread cheating, which even involves some local officials and
teachers. Cheating has already developed into an industry, where "companies" supply
special cheating instruments or supply agents. When the invigilators were strict with the
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rules, the money that many examinees invested in cheating would have been paid in
vain. The rural people were angry because they thought they were being treated unfairly,
and the invigilators, who were non-locals but were hired in to supervise the examination
in this county, became the targets of their anger. Needless to say, their way of seeking
fair treatment can only have detrimental effects. In this way, children of poor peasants
are incapable of establishing an institutional guarantee of their rights. Some university
intellectuals have voiced their opinions on an institutionalized elimination of
inequalities in admittance to higher education. However, such a proposal has irritated
the authorities, as will be illustrated below by the case of Zhiyong Xu (2013), who has
been arrested and imprisoned.
6.3.2.4. How intellectuals act on the issue of inequality
The big metropolises, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, accommodate the
largest population of off-farm workers. Residents in these big metropolises enjoy more
high-quality education resources and are allocated more quotas for admittance to the
more renowned universities than the rest of the population.102 Consequently,
competition for admittance to elite universities is much less intense in these cities than it
is in the other provinces. However, the children of off-farm workers who work and live
in these metropolises are excluded from this privilege. Before 2013, the children of rural
residents who have received secondary education in the city had to return to their
hometowns to sit for a tertiary examination where they had to compete with young
people of their own category. At the end of 2012, the Ministry of Education proposed
that municipal governments should permit students to participate in the examination in
the cities where their parents stay rather than in their hometowns.103 But the big cities
that accommodate a large population of off-farm-workers set very strict regulations to
exclude the rural children; Beijing, in particular, simply does not accept non-local
164
examinees. Thus, the big cities where a large population of rural children live and study
do not accept or tend to exclude rural examinees, while the smaller cities that are open
to rural examinees do not accommodate a large population of off-farm workers, nor do
they have ample education resources. In the National College Entrance Examination of
2013, of the 9.12 million examinees, less than 5000 were non-local examinees (J. Guo
2013). Evidently, rural examinees are still excluded from the urban examination room.
By now, people come closer together both physically and digitally. Meanwhile,
the human rights ideal has become more widespread. In this case, as Lindner (2006, xv,
xvi) points out, people tend to accept such a notion as: any attempt to lower the
expectations of any one group becomes an offence against all individuals. In China,
however, nearly 260 million off-farm workers fail to form a powerful voice when they
are exposed to a social injustice that can no longer be concealed. In 2012, Zhiyong Xu
(2013) and several other university intellectuals proposed to the Premier of the State
Council that the children of off-farm workers should be entitled to take the National
College Entrance Examination in cities where they live and study (S. Guo 2013). This is
the first time since the economic reform that university intellectuals have openly
appealed to the government through public media on this long-existing problem.
Zhiyong Xu was also involved in the petition that some non-local student parents
delivered to the Ministry of Education. In comparison with other appeals made by a
small number of intellectuals, such as those on civil societies or constitutionalism which
have the potential to challenge the regime, topics related to higher education appear to
be much less a politically sensitive issue. Nevertheless, very few university intellectuals
openly challenge the system, and participate even less in such petitions. Zhiyong Xu
was arrested in July of 2013 and one of the causes was the appeal he made on behalf of
the children of off-farm workers (Li Li 2013). On the whole, the university intellectuals
are conspicuous with their absence on some issues that are closely related to their public
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roles. For decades, only a few have spoken up, and never have they had any impact on
government policy-making. Zhiyong Xu's arrest shows that the reason for this absence
is the threat of direct violence.
6.3.3. Process of higher education
Bourdieu (1996, 141) finds a correlation between the different higher educational
institutions that the students enter and their different social-class backgrounds. Students
within the same categories of institutions tend to come from the same positions of the
field of power and have dispositions that are similar. When the proportion of
working-class students is significantly increased, the correlation between academic
performance and social-class background will become apparent. In effect, one type of
social inequality would be transmuted into a specific educational inequality (Bourdieu
and Passeron 1990, 76, 158). As an illustration of Bourdieu's assumption, the National
College Entrance Examination of China, particularly after the system has enormously
expanded and admitted more rural youths, tends to channel more urban students to the
higher extreme and more rural students to the lower extreme of the system.104 The
effect of this unfairness will be significant and far-reaching for the rural students. They
have habitus and capital that are structurally similar. Once they are assigned to the
higher extreme and the lower extreme respectively, they will interact in different
manners within their different environments.
6.3.3.1. Lower extreme: The village on the campus and absolute deprivation
At the lower extreme, rural students make up the majority and are capable of extending
the boundary of the rural field onto the campus of universities and colleges. As can be
seen from the interviews in Chapter Five, they tend to be confined in a closed mini rural
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society duplicated on the campuses, living under financially harsh conditions but
maintaining a poised mind-set. Bourdieu relates habitus to the field and may explain
this phenomenon as follows: habitus means being "at home" in the field one inhabits
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 128). Bourdieu's study of the working-class students
indicates that they become inured to harsh conditions and take them for granted. Those
who are academically excellent tend to be more rigorously selected in the education
process and therefore have better school performance. Yet, they are not inspired to a
level of ambition that corresponds to their academic excellence. Moreover, exposed to
the cultural arbitrary of their class, they have developed a corresponding habitus which
is homologous to the harsh environment. As a result, they are not likely to show moral
indignation at forms of repression which anticipate the treatment most probable for their
class (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 16, 72-80, 207; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 24).
Lindner (2006, 18, 165) has also observed that traditionally there have been situations in
which underlings may accept the pain that comes with their lowliness, seeing it as
honourable medicine. The Chinese tradition was not an exception in this regard. In this
study, even though the interviewees are from different villages and families, they used
to live in the same field and had a similar habitus. This ensures the overall harmony
between them and exempts them from a feeling of isolation and marginalization
(Student F). Their habitus tends to be at odds with the urban students who lead a more
affluent life (Student D). When some rural students slightly adapted their habitus to the
new environment, for example, a slight improvement in diet, the students as a whole
showed disapproval. The slight change appeared to be so provocative for the group that
those who intended to make the change suffered unfortunate consequences (Student G).
Such events illustrate the durability of the rural habitus, i.e. while agents in the field
compete for interests, the basis for establishing a criteria of judgment is their shared
habitus. The fact that the rural students take the harshness of life for granted is
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apparently related to their rural habitus, which, to a considerable extent, is the
internalization of an objective structure that reduces peasants to a poor condition.
Traditionally in China such merits as thriftiness, diligence and devotion were
emphasized. The state makes use of these traditional merits with the intention of
imposing the values of the dominant culture. For example, the CPC set some moral
models with such traditional merits.105 Propaganda promoting such models is still being
churned out today even though the disparity between rich and poor is appalling. This
overstates the effect of honourable medicine, so that the rural students let obvious social
injustice go undetected or un-remarked. In particular, they may overlook the fact that
they have been excluded from the city, or even mistake poverty as the source of virtues
(as for instance, the rural student Wei Liu, referred to in Chapter Five, Section 5.3.3.3.).
Bourdieu finds out that in matters of culture, those who are exposed to absolute
deprivation may be unaware of their status as victims. This may be even more to the
point in matters of education, as the pedagogic authorities may conceal the correlation
between the symbolic violence exerted by an educational institution and the existing
power relations (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 65, 210). The rural students at the lower
extreme seem to have a feeling of being "at home" in their small village on the campus.
If this feeling largely results from absolute dispossession, the rural students would
inevitably have to pay a price for that. For example, they tend to misrecognize one fact:
they are rewarded with better academic records largely because the educational system
has imposed a much more rigorous selection process on them than on their urban peers.
Sometimes they have to deliberately contain their ambition and reduce their ultimate
goal to something "practical" so they can merely break away from the village and enter
the city (Students C and D). This impedes the realization of their potential. To prepare
for the National College Entrance Examination, most rural students sacrifice
extracurricular studies and have a limited knowledge structure. They may look upon the
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urban students' advantages in this respect with disapproval, thinking of them as
something dispensable, like games and entertainment. Therefore, they do not experience
the pain of dispossession (e.g. Student E). It seems that their illusion about higher
education persists, even though the system drains financial resources from them, but
fails to sufficiently convert their merits, such as diligence and perseverance, into deep
insight and high competence on the employment market.
To interpret the unawareness of humiliation, Morton Deutsch (quoted in Lindner
2006, 31) points out: "Discontent and the sense of injustice may be latent rather than
manifest in a subordinated group. Neither the consciousness of oneself as victimized or
disadvantaged, nor the consciousness of being a member of a class of disadvantaged
may exist psychologically". In the case of the Chinese rural students, this unawareness
may deflect the realization of humiliation, yet it rarely relieves their pain, or helps them
out of their plight. Rather, this unawareness may lead to a more disastrous end. An
illustration can be found in the case of Wei Liu as mentioned in Chapter Five, Section
5.3.3.3. She surrendered to her strong sense of shame rather than seeing herself as the
victim and then feeling indignant. And worse, she was not inspired to action to change
her environment. Each year, millions of rural youths leave their villages and enter the
higher education system and then enter society. The course of their stay on the campus
may also be a latent period of humiliation for them.
6.3.3.2. Higher extreme: Humiliation and relative deprivation
At the higher extreme, a field where the urban students make up the majority, it may be
inevitable for the rural students, being in the minority, to feel out of place. They have
already entered a new field where their old habitus impedes them. It may be frustrating
to find one's habitus under challenge, and it would take much effort to readapt one's old
habitus, which is durable and transposable, to a new field. But that alone does not
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necessarily lead to humiliation. As long as the university is not neutral, the higher
extreme of the system, which is dominated by the city, would invariably respond to the
overall hierarchical structure of urban-rural segregation. In this overriding structure, the
existing power relations have assigned the village and the city unequal status. It follows
that the urban field would not only find the rural habitus out of place, but also reject it
as unworthy. As a result, the rural students will find themselves marginalized in matters
of culture, as well as proletarianized in matters of economic and social capital. Bourdieu
assumes that the move of an agent in a certain field may be defined by both the volume
and structure of his capital and his objective relation to other agents (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992, 99). Therefore, the feeling of frustration that the rural students have
experienced tends to be the effect of a class opposition between those with rich capital
and advantaged positions and those with poor capital and disadvantaged positions, more
than it is the conflict between the rural culture and urban culture.
When the rural students have entered the higher extreme, they witness urban
luxury. When they live in the same dormitories with their urban peers, they have the
opportunity to observe every day in detail the differences between the two groups, or
rather, two classes, including some differences that can be quantified, such as the
expense of the necessities of life. They may go beyond a superficial observation of the
city and experience psychological impact (e.g. Student L). The rural youths would be
reminded that they are exactly the same kind of human beings, but with different
identities. Lindner (2006, 43) gives a vivid illustration: it is like being shown the
amenities of modern life in Western soap operas and being invited into the family of
equal human beings, while at the same time being deprived of those very amenities.
Lindner (xv, 29, 42-3) tells how negative psychological impact could be created in such
a situation. Unawareness of absolute deprivation may be replaced by an awareness of
relative deprivation. This process may be accompanied by an awakening, which,
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paradoxically, may become the source of such ill feelings as humiliation. It takes a long
mental and emotional process to become aware of such humiliation, and to see the
difference between "honor humiliation" [sic] and human rights steered "dignity
humiliation". Tradition or the official propaganda machine that recommend this
honourable medicine would define the dispositions of the rural students at the higher
and lower extremes. But those who have come to the higher extreme in the big cities
have been directly exposed to the sharp contrast between the urban and rural areas.
They may come to realize that they are deprived of the very benefits entitled to their
urban peers, and that the gap between them and the city is "impassable" (Student H).
They can wear the halo of famous institutions and can receive various types of financial
aid, but this can hardly make up for the humiliation that they have suffered as an
inferior group. When they begin to reject the honourable medicine and refuse to accept
their situation as normal, they will become aware of the truth about their status and
context.
If such awareness is achieved due to the feeling of humiliation, a negative effect
would be inevitable. Lindner (2006, 21) may define this negative effect by
distinguishing between shame, i.e. a humbling experience a person agrees to, and
humiliation, i.e. those experiences a person does not agree to. The difference between
the two states lies in the fact that one person may feel ashamed and humbled without
feeling humiliated; another person may feel humiliated but not ashamed. Using Lindner,
it can be seen that the delimitation of these two feelings is context-sensitive. It is a
common practice in many societies that some students need to do part-time work to
support their studies while some do not, or some students have a higher level of
consumption while some are thrifty. Most rural students are used to poor conditions,
and many of them have had experiences of hard physical labour since they were very
young. In their rural homes, this rarely leads to humiliation. While at the higher extreme,
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this signifies more than physical labour and material inequality, it may give rise to a
sense of humiliation (e.g. Student M). In some cases, rural students, probably in an
attempt to alleviate the pain derived from a sense of humiliation, may deliberately
attribute the awareness of urban-rural disparity and a consequent sense of inferiority to
"the dark side" of one's personality, as Student K did. Due to moral self-discipline, a
feeling of humiliation may be misrecognized as a feeling of shame. In other cases,
however, vocabulary choices that are not proper, or facial expressions that are not
appropriate, may constitute humiliation; even the urban students' relatively better meals
may embarrass the rural students (e.g. Student L). As long as human beings are
classified into the superior and inferior classes, as long as the gap between them is
found impassable, in short, as long as the existing structure imposes humiliation on
some, the feeling of being humiliated is bound to develop, even when there is no
specific person responsible for humiliating the other or any intended humiliating acts. A
sense of humiliation could easily develop where there might be a sense of shame. In
comparison to their counterparts at the lower extreme, the rural students at the higher
extreme are more likely to be reduced to an unstable condition in that they are faced
with two dichotomies, one between segregation and integration, and the other between
humiliation and shame.
6.3.3.3. In scholastic areas
With respect to the attitude towards study and academic achievements, Bourdieu studies
different categories of students in France and lists two points. First, bourgeois students
tend to have such attitudes as "dilettantism, self-assurance and irreverent ease"; their
advantage is more marked in those areas least directly controlled by the school system.
Second, working-class students tend to manifest "tense application and educational
realism"; as a highly selected group, they may perform at least as well as the upper-class
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students in the most scholastic area. With the criteria governing elimination becoming
more rigorous, the structure of the population of selection-survivors is changing
constantly and the direct relation between social origin and academic success tends to
be progressively weakened, or even reversed (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 74-76, 82,
160-61). Using Bourdieu, it can be seen that, at the high extreme in the Chinese system,
the first point may be exemplified by answers from the interviewees. As to the second
point, urban students tend to have advantages in both the scholastic area and those areas
least directly controlled by the school system. Rural students who have somehow made
their way to the higher extreme have survived the most rigorous elimination process:
60% of the rural children have been eliminated from the education system before the
senior-middle-school stage (M. Han 2009). Moreover, the way that the elite universities
allocate quotas in favour of metropolitan residents has eliminated most rural senior
middle school graduates from the higher extreme.106 Yet, the reality in the elite
universities of China fails to confirm Bourdieu's assumption of the French example.
This may be due to the rural students' experiences before they have entered university:
disparity between the urban and rural areas in the allotment of educational resources,
which means that the form and content of rural basic education impedes the
development of the rural youths. But if the focus is on the process of higher education,
one more factor should be considered: the political and economic forces that have
dominated the university field. That is to say, the university is incapable of protecting
the rural students from the impact of external forces as it does not have the mechanisms
to redress social injustice, even in the scholastic area.
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 76) finds that if the proportion of
working-class students entering university were significantly increased, a correlation
between academic performance and social-class background may become more
apparent. This is true in the overall higher education system of China: with more urban
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students at the higher extreme and more rural students at the lower extreme. But if we
only look at the lower extreme, the Chinese case, again, appears to be puzzling: the rural
students tend to excel in most scholastic results. Is it possible that the "village on the
campus" has contributed to Bourdieu's (Ibid 82, 160) assumption that, in the scholastic
area, the direct relation between social background and academic success tends to be
weakened, or even reversed? It is important, therefore, to examine how this village has
been constructed on the campus. The fact that the rural students have some advantages
in this symbolic village seems to be the effect of the rural students' power as the
majority. So far, no evidence has been found by the author that non-elite institutions
have made more efforts than elite institutions to help the rural students in the academic
areas. The interviews reveal that in this small rural community the students (e.g.
Students A and E) tend to resemble their parents who are distanced from the necessary
information. It is true that among the students who are academically excellent, for
example, scholarship winners, rural students make up a greater proportion in
comparison to their urban peers, but this is partly related to the greater proportion of the
rural students in the overall college student body. In comparison with working-class
students in France who have entered non-elite institutions, the Chinese rural students,
the rare ones in a very large population of rural children, are more rigorously selected
but have found their way into tertiary education institutions of an inferior status than the
elite universities. Thus, their excellent academic records may indicate that the Chinese
examination system wastes the potential of the rural students due to the urban-rural
segregation. Or it may indicate that the rural students bring more interest to their studies
because their social success depends on their academic success to a greater degree than
their urban peers. This does not likely indicate that in Chinese non-elite institutions the
dispositions of the privileged groups are, in Bourdieu's (1996, 288) words, "relatively
unpromising for success in the strictest academic competitions".
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6.3.4. Graduation and employment
Bourdieu assumes that children of working-class origin are more likely to "eliminate
themselves" from the educational institutions by declining to enter it. He also notices
another form of elimination:
[T]hose who do not eliminate themselves at the moment of moving from one stage
to another are more likely to enter those branches (establishments or sections) from
which there is least chance of entering the next level of education.... [Such]
institutions and school careers [may] entice them with the false pretences of
apparent homogeneity only to ensnare them in a truncated educational destiny.
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 153, 158)
"Deferred elimination" is what Bourdieu labels such de facto self-elimination,
which is in fact the consequence of relegation to a second-order branch (Ibid, 153-54).
The focus of such a phenomenon may be on two types of relation: first, the relation
between those who enter a stage of schooling and those who have successfully
graduated; second, the relation between those who have graduated from the previous
stage and those who enter the next stage. In many cases, the latter relation is neglected.
Deferred elimination may reduce the role of self-elimination at the end of the previous
stage of schooling. When the students enter the next stage, "chances of entry" may be
disguised as "chances of success" (159). This represents a "gentle style of elimination",
but is a slow and costly process. The victims of deferred elimination not only include
the so-called "failures," but also those who hold titles that "normally" would give them
the right to a privileged occupation, yet who cannot fully realize the value of their titles
on the market, usually because they are not from the right class (Bourdieu 1996, 287).
Therefore, deferred elimination is a way of concealing the elimination of the working
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classes (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 159). The discriminatory nature of the Chinese
higher education system has been concealed partly through its function of deferred
elimination, which often occurs after graduation.
6.3.4.1. Employment trap at the lower extreme
It turns out that while most Chinese universities and colleges establish relatively high
thresholds for admission, they have much less rigorous criteria for graduation, which
leads to an average graduation rate of 97% (Xiaodong Lu 2011). When students have
the opportunity to ascertain whether the university can give them what they have been
expecting, they are in most cases already off the campus. Upon entry into the workforce,
according to Bourdieu (1996, 168, 276), inherited social capital or even economic
capital, rather than the criteria for academic selection, begin to gain in force. As long as
most rural students relegated to the lower extreme will graduate with relatively less
academic capital, as long as they might be confronted with elimination at the moment
when inherited social capital or economic capital, which they are short of, recovers all
their efficacy, as long as academic capital, which is almost their only asset, tends to be
devalued in relation to political, social and economic capital in the unique social field of
China, and most importantly, as long as the target of the massification policy is
equivalent to the economic goals of the state rather than to a goal of upgrading the poor
peasants' economic situation, a "truncated educational destiny" would be a de facto trap
for the rural students.
In the eleven years from 2003 to 2013, the mass system has produced nearly 55
million graduates, including urban students and rural students (S. Shi and N. Li 2014).
In 2013, for instance, the student body on campus was 33.252 million,107 and there
were more than seven million graduates.108 Comparatively, the United States with the
biggest economic scale in the world had about 1.7 million graduates in 2010 (Hacker
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2012). Given the current economic situation in China, a large number of tertiary
education graduates are bound to become victims of deferred elimination. The real
estate industry, which contributes to one third of GDP, the manufacturing industry,
which is mainly based on labour intensive enterprises, and the services industry, which
is mainly based on traditional service, are mostly staffed by workers with low
educational levels. Meanwhile, the government economic policies are increasingly
biased in favour of occupations monopolized by the state.109 SMEs, the most important
employers of rural graduates, are taxed heavily and are dealing with a difficult
situation.110 Some occupations related to the life and wellbeing of the large population
of peasants, such as rural basic education or rural medical care, could have been a huge
market for college graduates, but the state rarely makes an effort to develop them. The
most attractive positions are those of civil servants and state employees, whose welfare
and income are much higher than employees in other occupations (Heilongjiang
Morning News, March 25, 2013; Hua Wang 2013). Competition for such positions has
been intense, often with hundreds of applicants competing for one position. Many,
including Master's degree holders, compete for positions of manual workers to clean the
streets or dig dung, since holders of such positions are formal employees of the
municipal governments (Zheng Xu 2013; Ke Yang 2009). Considering both the amount
of college graduates and the existing economic situation, it can be seen that the
industrial structure of China, which is dominated by the state, cannot possibly
accommodate the huge number of graduates. Under such circumstances, even those who
are located at the higher extreme may have to, as Bourdieu (1996, 229) puts it, accept
being turned away from the positions of power made available by their academic
excellence. Those who arrive at the lower extreme, with their diplomas unfavourably
rated on the labour market, are more likely to find themselves in grave situations, such
as unemployment.111 Some rural students have to join their peers who do not have
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tertiary education qualifications, migrate to urban areas, take temporary jobs and
become a college-graduate-off-farm worker. According to the State Statistics Bureau,
the population of this unique groups amounts to 14.96 million, making up 5.7% of the
total off-farm peasant population; among those under the age of 30, one eighth have
tertiary education qualifications (Worker's Daily, June 28, 2013, parag. 1).
People try to upgrade their social and economic status through higher education,
but a common phenomenon is that this system, rather than eliminating class differences,
tends to entrench the existing social order.112 However, the case of China is unique. It is
true that, according to Bourdieu, universities in different countries tend to reproduce the
status quo through a similar logic and may repatriate the working-class students to the
lower classes or socio-economic levels, but in the Chinese case, the rural students may
be exposed to bankruptcy. This is different from the "self-elimination" prior to
admittance to higher education, where the magnitude of the inequalities, as Bourdieu
suggests, can be evaluated more precisely or more eloquently with a simple
mathematical device (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 156). In many cases, the process of
"deferred elimination" lasts until after graduation, which is difficult to indicate through
quantitative data. The university is likely to escape criticism, although it consumes more
of the peasants' time and charges them higher prices. Both the peasants' determination to
invest in higher education and the rural students' hesitation about their further plan after
graduation may appear to be lost causes. However, as the analysis has shown, their
investment strategies are in fact the best that they can afford. Such strategies are in fact,
as Bourdieu (1996, 220) puts it, "strategies of despair". A higher education system that
lacks innovation and an economic pattern that does not support mass higher education
have destroyed the employment market, especially for the rural students who graduate
from the lower extreme. But the peasants' weak position in the field of power, as well as
the state monopoly over education and economy, could be the more crucial factors.
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6.3.4.2. The role of higher education in the imposition of the dominant culture
The moment of graduation is the time when peasants test whether their reproduction
strategies have been successful. At this point in time, they will find themselves facing
the college graduate employment crisis, which by now has become a serious social
problem.113 Some may even find that they have been ultimately excluded from the
arena after, rather than before, they have exhausted all their resources in exchange for
tertiary education qualifications. Such a large population of graduates each year should
have converged into a significant source of power. But, there have never been
nation-wide appeals since the massification process started in 1999. Likewise,
university intellectuals, having witnessed the plight of the rural students, have never
publicly come forward as a collective voice. Invariably, the most important reasons
include atomization of Chinese society at large and in turn atomization of the college
student community, i.e. the difficulties of the rural students in finding employment are
related to their weak status in the field of power. But the university, which has been
under a heteronomy, cannot escape without blame.
The heteronomous university field also shapes the rural students, making them
co-conspirators with their oppressors. One of the factors that constitutes such
co-conspiracy might be pedagogic authority. Bourdieu points out that pedagogic action
is invested with pedagogic authority. Therefore, from the very beginning, the pedagogic
receivers tend to recognize the dominant culture that is being inculcated as the
legitimate culture and internalize the message received. As long as the system of
pedagogic actions is subject to effect of domination by the dominant pedagogic action,
it tends to impose the dominant culture as the legitimate culture. The reproduction of the
dominant culture then contributes to reproducing the power relations, while the power
relations determine the characteristic mode of imposition (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990,
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15, 21, 22, 31). Subject to the party-state, the Chinese university imposes the dominant
culture in a mode that tends to be direct and arbitrary. A CPC document issued in 2004
targets the students and claims that college students are under the impact of Western
culture and values, and that "we" are at war with international hostile forces to win over
the next generation, and the struggle is intense and complex.114 Another CPC document
issued in 2013 continues the same view, which targets the teachers and claims that it is
necessary to educate the young university teachers, who come into direct contact with
and are similar in age to the students, thereby reinforcing the unique Chinese mode of
socialism theoretically, politically and psychologically.115 With the ruling group
changing their strategies, the role of the CPC has gradually become less highlighted in
the teaching of the dominant culture. Rather, the propaganda institutions, aided by
mechanisms of direct violence, choose to impose so-called "nationalism" on the
students. The most important thing is not what is being taught, but what is prohibited in
pedagogic actions. There are strict rules on the content of education. In May 2013,
Associate Professor X. Zhang revealed in his personal microblog that the teaching staff
at his university was warned not to discuss with the students such topics as universal
values, freedom of the press, civil society, civil rights, CPC mistakes in history, Chinese
bourgeois in power and the independence of the judiciary.116 In April of 2014, Y. Gao
was detained because she confirmed that the above contents were part of a CPC secret
document (Bao 2014). In such an environment, tertiary education may change the rural
students in their knowledge structure, but is not likely to enlighten them, to encourage
them to confront the sources of their humiliation and frustration or to uncover the state's
reasons for imposing urban-rural segregation on the people, i.e. to expose the nature of
the relationship between the state and themselves as individuals. Nor are they really
encouraged to acquire the necessary skills which they could use to change their
atomized status, subvert the existing power relations and upgrade their classes. The
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dominant culture imposed by the university is not likely to erase their memory of the
hardship and humiliation they have experienced as rural residents, or prevent them from
rejecting the urban-rural segregation that has imposed inequality, but they may just stop
there. Or even worse, as Lindner (2006, xvi, 31-2) envisions: those who have learnt to
consider themselves as victims of undue humiliation may fall victim to self- and
other-destructive rage, spiralling into another cycle of humiliation. Reports of some
Chinese rural students' murder or suicide cases117 may illustrate the above remark made
by Lindner. More destructive is that the state may, through the teaching of the dominant
culture in the university, make use of the humiliation China has suffered in the past as a
nationalist rallying cry to stimulate the rural students into emotional responses. Just as
Bourdieu suggests, the collaboration of the dominated may contribute to their own
exclusion and subordination (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 24). Should this happen,
the university, which is invested with pedagogic authority, may make the rural youths
identify with the totalitarian state and become less alert to the fact that their emotions,
aroused by the state rulers, may further strengthen the power of the state and, in turn,
further victimize themselves, because one of the most important pillars of this state is
the urban-rural segregation system.
6.4. Conclusion
Applying the theories of Bourdieu and Lindner, the research arrives at conclusions that
are formulated on three points. First, in confirmation of the substantive grounded theory
in Chapter Five, the rural students who are located at different levels of the hierarchical
system have different subjective responses to their tertiary education experiences,
presumably because they are exposed to absolute deprivation and relative deprivation
respectively. Second, since the university field is heavily dominated by heterogeneous
forces, even in scholastic areas it is not likely for the rural students to find a platform
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where they may compete with the advantaged groups on an equal basis. Third, since the
pattern in the market and society are largely defined by the power of the state, the rural
students' efforts to reproduce capital via higher education tend to be low in efficiency,
or even in vain. While Point One indicates the rural students' subjective response to
deprivation, Points Two and Three identify two specific forms of deprivation that the
rural students may be exposed to either during the process of gaining a tertiary
education or after their graduation. The urban-rural segregation system is one of the
most important pillars of this state. In such an overall structure, the rural students are in
a disadvantaged position from the very beginning. They struggle through the process
from admittance to higher education to graduation and employment. They do this to
upgrade in position, but in spite of all their efforts they may find that they never in fact
get far from their original disadvantaged position. The fact that some rural youths
follow a historic cycle with their status shifting from that of rural students to that of
college-graduate-off-farm workers, in particular, vividly illustrates Bourdieu's definition
of the educational system as a mechanism of reproduction of social inequality. In the
reality of contemporary China, this mechanism of reproduction, which duplicates a
social structure of urban-rural segregation, tends to condemn the children of peasants to
poverty and expose them to humiliation. Obviously, as long as the situation in the field
of power persists, or as long as the power relations between the three agencies in the
analytic triangle remain unchanged, with the party-state dominating over the university
as the establishment, and over a society handicapped with urban-rural segregation, the
situation of the rural students can hardly be fundamentally improved.
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Chapter Seven: Epilogue
In the previous chapters it has been revealed that rural students as well as their parents
have been marginalized in the triangular relation between the state, society and higher
education institutions. As long as a similar structure continues, and as long as no new
forces are introduced into the power relations, it is reasonable to assume that the status
quo will tend to be reproduced in the future. In other words, what may be more
representative of China, more than the great economic changes in the past three decades
that have attracted world-wide attention, is what has remained unchanged in this
country. As the following figures will show, the underlying power relations not only
define the present situation, but also may be significant for the future.
The party-state is the dominant force that maintains existing power relations. By
now, much change has taken place in the profile of the society. Especially in this digital
age, the thoughts and ideas of the populace are undergoing profound changes. To
counteract the challenges this brings, the state is constantly expanding its control
mechanisms. Huge government expenditures and decreased funding for social welfare
and education, as noted in the previous chapters, have exposed the state to a new spiral
of challenges. Some recent issues may illustrate a new tendency in state policies in
response to the challenges: more control over the internet, for example. The internet has
always been a relatively democratic phenomenon. Restrictions are being imposed on
people who express themselves freely on the internet. Internet users who register their
account must use real names. Anyone giving false information or using seditious
language may be sentenced to imprisonment for three years if the published content is
viewed over 5,000 times or forwarded over 500 times.118 In order to dominate public
opinion and supervise the internet, the state hires internet policemen and the higher
education institutions hire student information workers. Governments at various levels
183
hire "public opinion analysts" with qualification certificates. The number of people
engaged in this trade, as is revealed on the internet, is more than two million. Many
college graduates are formally employed in this trade (Tu 2013). Needless to say, the
cost for the state to maintain its existing power relations is rapidly increasing. In spite of
that, new state leaders declare that in the state security system, the most important
aspect of all is political security (J. Xi 2014). This is an open and avowed declaration
that the state intends to maintain the power relations which is characteristic of Mao's
time.
Mao's time was characterized by a heavy death toll, which can be documented
quantitatively. A salient difference in the post-Mao era is that the economy, rather than
political campaigns, is one of the most important means by which the state controls and
undermines society, and particularly rural society. It is not easy to obtain quantitative
evidence about destructive practices in the economy as it is about death tolls.
Nevertheless, quantitative data are sufficiently available to prove that rural China is
being exploited more seriously than ever before. First and foremost, the urban-rural
segregation system continues to deprive rural society. According to official statistics, by
2012 the urbanization rate in China is at 52.57%. However, the survey of China Data
Center of Tsinghua University proves this as a case of pseudo-urbanization, for
"urbanization in household registration" is 27.6% (China Youth Daily, November 05,
2013). This means that half of the urban population included in the official statistics is
made up of those formally registered as permanent rural residents but granted a
"long-term urban residence permit." In addition to these "long-term" residents, there are
nearly 260 million off-farm workers who migrate between the urban and the rural areas.
They contribute to urban prosperity, but are not covered by many of the municipal
welfare policies, such as retirement pensions and minimum subsistence allowances.
Under urban-rural segregation, low income is characteristic of the peasant community.
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According to a survey in rural areas carried out by the Rural Survey Group of China
Society of Economic Reform (2014), in 2012, the 20% of the rural population with the
highest income had an average annual income of 33469 yuan, while for the 20% with
the lowest income, the figure is 1925.
Another vivid quantitative illustration is a brief overview of the prosperous real
estate industry, as well as other related fields. Many foreign travelers may be impressed
by the modern facilities and magnificent buildings in urban China, without knowing that
much of the resources have been seized from the peasants. Since peasants are only
allowed to use rather than own the land, governments at various levels expropriate lands
from them and pay compensation not for the land, but only for the houses and the crops
on the land, using very low rates.119 Licenses to exploit the land are then sold to
construction companies at market prices, which brings extra revenues for governments
at various levels. In 2013, for example, local governments sold licenses to users of land
and had revenues of 4125 billion yuan from this. In the first quarter of 2014, this extra
income amounted to 1080 billion yuan. As a point reference, the local fiscal revenue
over the same period was 1950 billion yuan, and normally 15% of this fiscal revenue
comes from taxation on the real estate industry (K. Xu 2014a; 2014b). These figures are
intended to show the importance of the real estate industry to government income. By
2007, the number of peasants who have no access to land was estimated at 70 million
(Min 2007). From 2000 to 2010, 0.9 million villages, some with a history stretching
back over two thousand years, disappeared. This means that within ten years, the
number of Chinese villages has decreased by one fourth, and each day 300 villages
disappeared (J. Li 2014). There have been countless peasant protests against
government expropriation of land, but they are always suppressed by the police or
armed police.120 All in all, structural violence aimed at peasants continues, while direct
violence tends to be more frequent and intense.
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As the lack in legitimacy increases, governments at various levels tend to strictly
control the media so that news about their violent acts are not on the public record. This
differs from an earlier time when the authorities propagandized and justified acts of
direct violence to create a violent culture. However, the dominance of structural and
direct violence will foster cultural violence. Such destruction may be manifested in such
areas as social order or family ethics. The fact that 260 million off-farm workers are
migrating between the urban and the rural areas may especially have detrimental impact
on family ethics, a core element of the Chinese traditional ethical system. What is most
destructive about cultural violence is that it is durable and transposable, and may exert
influence on the future of the country. Supported by the existing structure and
accompanied by the disparity in wealth distribution, cultural violence may become more
prevalent, contributing to a vicious circle, and destroying society in a more fundamental
way than the quantitative destruction in the economy. And the aftermath is increasingly
more difficult to redress. L. Sun (2011a) goes as far as to declare that Chinese society is
falling apart.
The present conditions and prospects of the rural students are of course affected
by such general trends. Most of the revenues that governments have collected from the
land and real estate industry are used in urban construction rather than in rural
reconstruction (J. Qu 2014). Land prices, which are controlled by governments at
various levels, rise drastically, leading to skyrocketing house prices. In some big cities,
the price of each square meter of housing is more than the annual income of off-farm
workers (S. Huang 2010). This represents another impediment blocking the rural
students who want to settle in urban areas. Large populations are flooding into the city.
Many have to share a rented room, with each person occupying only a few square
metres. They are often referred to as members of an "ant community", which includes
rural college graduates. Surveys reveal that of the ant community members who have
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tertiary education qualifications, 95.3% were born after 1980, i.e. admitted to
universities and colleges after the massification of higher education (S. Lian 2009).
They are not necessarily unemployed, and they may even have found jobs relevant to
their academic qualifications. However, they have to accept low income standards and
poor living conditions. This, to a great extent, is the effect of the employment crisis for
college graduates.
China does not promise a favourable prospect for industries that employ a large
number of college graduates. Factors that contribute to such a situation include: first, the
regime bases its legitimacy on rapid economic development (E. X. Gu and Goldman
2004, 7), and the state pushes for speedy development with the focus on short-term
effects rather than on high-tech industries that demand long-term planning and
investment; second, it needs to collect revenue in support of its expanding control
machinery; third, the heavy focus on the construction and real estate industry has
excessively absorbed capital and resources, leading to insufficient investment in other
high-tech industries; fourth, the educational system impedes individual development
and academic freedom, which in turn has undermined the creativity of the technical
community. One of the results is under-development in high-tech industries, and in turn
less employment opportunities for college graduates. The state policies are what lead to
the deprivation of land from peasants, high housing prices, the unfavorable industry
structure and employment crisis, which combine into a detrimental chain of effects on
the rural students as individuals.
In the meantime, it is noteworthy that the rural society is undergoing
considerable changes. One change, which is related to the massification of higher
education, is that nearly 15 million of the rural college graduates are in the force of
off-farm workers, leading to an identifiable change in the education structure of this
social category (Worker's Daily, June 28, 2013, parag. 1). Another change in the profile
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of the off-farm worker community lies in their typical age bracket, with 70% of the
population born after 1980 or 1990 (Dingjun, et al. 2014). It is noteworthy that strikes
aimed at the protection of workers' rights have increased in number in recent years,
where the prime movers behind the strikes are workers from the young generation (Y.
Yang 2010). The authorities often employ military forces to suppress the strikes and
block related news. Therefore, further investigation is needed into the role that the rural
college graduates play in such strikes.
Another noteworthy phenomenon is the change in the demographic structure of
China, which is significant for the future of higher education. In 1990 there were 23.54
million new-born babies; in 2000, the figure was reduced to 13.79 million; in 2010,
concerned experts revealed the figure was as low as six million (B. Wang 2012).
Because of the rapid decrease in the number of young people, local governments, with
the intention to save expenses in education, have merged and shut down many primary
and middle schools (China Youth Daily, December 24, 2011). As rural children are
further distanced from schools, rural basic education is further declining (M. Han 2009).
By now, higher education expansion seems to have reached its maximum limit, with
most provinces admitting 80% of the senior middle school graduates (Ministry of
Education 2012). As may be envisioned, there will be a decline in higher education in
the coming ten years, which in turn will have an effect on many university and college
intellectuals. Some rural college graduates who are now successfully employed in the
university field may lose their jobs in the future. On the other hand, however, the rapid
decline in the youth population, especially urban youths, combined with the rural
population undergoing a change in educational structure, implies that the status of rural
students will become even more important.
After the massification in higher education, colleges and universities have
absorbed huge resources from society. However, society, particularly the rural society,
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fails to have an influence that corresponds to their investment in the university field.
This, again, is related to the fact that the power relations remain basically unchanged in
the analytic triangle. The large Chinese peasant population is the foundation of the
national economy and the rural field determines the people's livelihood. The rural
students, as the elite of the grassroots, encompass both the rural field and the university
field where the educated elite are mostly gathered. In this sense, the condition in the
rural field is closely related to the situation in the university field. Whether the two
fields can interact positively is a critical matter for the future of China. The rural
students are better equipped than the average peasants because they have more cultural
capital. And they are not isolated as the intellectuals because of their kinship with the
largest segment of the population. They are the majority in the student body, which
implies the potential to make a difference to the future of the country. However, they
have suffered discrimination under the urban-rural segregation system and in the
establishment university. How such a bitter life may influence them, and whether or not
they can transcend the numerous instances of humiliation and become the bridge
between the rural field and university field are questions worthy of further research. A
point of departure for improvement, presumably, could be to give more attention to the
micro-context of the rural students and their subjective experience of oppression.
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End Note
Chapter One
1 Currently, several terms are used to designate the same group, such as "migrant workers", "peasant
workers", "farmer-turned workers". "Off-farm workers" is the term the researcher finds to be less
misleading.
2 Tian was the vice premier of the State Council of PRC between 1983 and 1993, in charge of
economy.
3 Gov. doc. 1949.
4 Works of S. Ding (1993, 2007) give a systematic account of this event.
5 The proportion of the age group admitted into the Chinese higher education institutions had been
lingering under a level of 5% until 1997 (World Bank Report 2002, p 30). As late as the end of
1998, official resistance to massification still appeared to be vigorous (Dong 2004, 83).
6 Lanqing Li was the vice premier of the State Council of PRC between 1998 and 2003, in charge of
education.
7 To illustrate, the student body on campus at undergraduate and master level amounted to
approximately 4.256 million in 1999; in 2012, the figure increases to approximately 25.35
million (Moe.edu.cn 2005-2013).
8 Gov. doc. March 2013.
9 In 1993, the Chinese government promised to allocate 4% of its GDP in education. This promise
was not realized until 2012. Moreover, the education budget includes the funding for military
schools, party schools and pensions for those who are retired from the education field. Within 18
years, the governments owed 1600 billion yuan to the education sector (Lujing Zhang 2011; X.
Xiong 2014).
Chapter Two
10 Xin is a well-known Chinese historian specializing in the history of the CPC.
11 Xia is a Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Center and the College of Staten Island, the
City University of New York.
12 According to X. Cheng (2014), a well-known journalist, one of the CPC leaders, Chen Yun, gave
a secret speech after the student protest in 1989, which urged: "還是我們的孩子可靠，不會掘自
己的祖墳"。"江山是我們打下來的，因此繼承這個江山也應該是我們的後代"。[Our own
children are more reliable, they will not subvert everything. We are the ones who established the
regime, it is justified to pass the regime to our own descendants]. J. Yang (2008), also a
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well-known journalist, quotes the same clauses in his study of the party-state hereditary power,
although he does not mention the name of the speaker.
13 Those who were from a "working-class family" were considered politically trustworthy; those
who were from "exploiting-class families" were considered politically unreliable. A more
detailed explanation is provided in Chapter Three, 3.3.1.
14 In the Mao era, each individual had an "archive". The contents in the archive began to accumulate
from middle school at the latest, including the evaluations of the individual by the dominant
groups. This archive would affect the individual for life, but its contents would remain a secret to
the individual per se.
Chapter Three
15 CPC doc. 1947.
16 The intrusion of the armed "work groups" into the villages has been recorded by Guan according
to his personal experiences. This serves as an evidence that the violence in the land reform
process mainly came from the military power rather than from conflicts within the village (Guan
2004).
17 Ancient Chinese humanitarians proposed measures to strengthen society so as to balance the
power of the state, including the incorporation of family order into the state governance and
privatization of land. See Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and Mencius (372-289 B.C).
18 For example, Tan (1865-1898), a Chinese democratic pioneer, pronounced that Chinese political
ideology was no longer based on the Confucian tenet that viewed man as naturally moral, and
that elites establishing the morals of the society no longer consisted of critical and enlightened
intellectuals. See Tan (1865-1898). For another example, Yen (1929, 47) diagnosed it as a
Chinese social disease that traditional structure tended to confine peasants to the private sector so
that they were indifferent to public affairs.
19 For example, Xun Lu (1918), a contemporary writer, depicted the closed and decaying rural
society, which tended to discourage individuality and creativity, as a destroyer of human beings.
20 It was a convention that, in the process of land property transaction, the kin and neighbours of the
land owner enjoyed priority over other purchasers.
21 The ruling groups in ancient China were small in size, for the Crown of ancient China was based
on family, while bureaucrats, for the most part of history, were not privileged aristocrats
affiliated with the monarchy, but intellectuals whose roots were in the clan. The ruled tended to
be more dissociated from the ruling authorities when the emperors were alien conquerors.
22 CPC doc. September 1951; December 1953; October 1955; August 1958.
23 "Forced labour " was one form of imprisonment without recourse to the law.
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24 PRC doc. January 1958.
25 CPC doc. 1952.
26 Gov. doc. April 1953.
27 Gov. doc. November 1953.
28 Gov. doc. November 1955; 1957.
29 Chinese peasants were excluded from the state welfare system. Take for example medical care,
villagers collected private funds to form a "cooperative medical system"; the medical
practitioners in the village, or the "bare-footed doctors" who were mostly without professional
qualifications, were supported by the village economy rather than receiving salary from the state.
Since the peasants were invariably poor, the cooperative medical system in most villages was
next to nothing.
30 Gov. doc. 1978.
31 Professor L. Sun is a well-known sociologist in Tsinghua University.
32 In Guangdong Province, an area of relatively high income, the minimum wage per month used to
vary from 1300 to 850 yuan. As an illustration: Workers hired in Foxconn in Shenzhen City work
more than 100 hours overtime each month. Some even work 140 hours overtime each month. In
2010, Foxconn witnessed 14 suicide protests. On June 02, the company raised workers' payment
standards from 900 to 1200 yuan per month, and raised this again four days later to 2000 yuan. In
2011, the local government issued the minimum wage standard as 1320 yuan per month. It is
assumed that workers' suicides forced an upgrading of payment standard (Cnwest 2010; China
Securities Journal 2010; Feng 2011; Gov. doc. 2011).
33 In 2011, there were approximately 252.78 million off-farm workers in China (Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security of PRC 2011).
34 In July 2010, the average house price was 23,883 yuan per square metre in Shanghai; 20,000 yuan
in Beijing and Shenzhen (S. Huang 2010).
35 The government terminated agriculture tax in 2006 (Gov.doc. June 1958; GOV.cn 2006). The
general background was that in 2003, there were 60 thousand "group protests" in China; in 2008,
the figure rose to 120 thousand; and in 2009, 230 thousand (Xin 2010a). In 2011, according to L.
Sun (2011b), there were 180 thousand protests or conflicts.
36 The "armed police" force is organized in the same way as the national defense army force, the
PLA. The difference lies in that the PLA targets alien enemies, while the armed police targets
domestic enemies.
37 At a time when China was under attack from Japanese invaders, even Yen, a liberal, was deeply
impressed by the power of the USSR (1935, 126; 1936, 173-4).
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38 Among ancient Chinese intellectuals, it was a consensus that the First Emperor's dynasty was
overthrown because of his extreme exploitation of the people. This consensus was expressed in
many widely read classical works, including "Condemnation of the First Emperor's Dynasty"
(Guoqinlun过秦论) (Yi Jia 200-168 B.C), "Comments on the First Emperor's Palace"
(Epanggongfu阿房宫赋) (Mu Du 803-852).
39 In the Chinese version of the Constitution of the PRC (2004), peasants were put under the
leadership of the industrial workers; the latter were formal employees of the state-owned
enterprises.
40 Mao (1949, 1477), in his discussion on the people's democratic dictatorship, said that a serious
task was to "educate" the peasants and adapt them to a "socialization of agriculture".
41 Off-farm worker families that cannot afford to pay extra fees to municipal schools have to send
their children to private schools oriented to non-local residents.
42 Public primary and middle schools are allowed by state laws to charge extra fees from children
whose parents are not permanent local residents (Gov.doc. 1998, No. 2, Item 11).
43 In a general sense, "cadre" refers to leader, head or official, for example, "leading cadre" of an
enterprise, "production brigade cadre" in the village, "class cadre" among students. But "state
cadre" refers to a status in the state bureaucratic hierarchy. This is a huge, highly stratified system
initiated in Mao's time, covering the governments, the management sectors and technical
communities in the industrial, agricultural or military field. The scientific field and tertiary
education system, as well as urban primary and secondary schools, were included in this state
bureaucratic system. College graduates were automatically granted the status of "state cadres".
Ordinary factory workers, peasants or soldiers also had opportunities to be admitted to the "state
cadre" system, without articulated technical criteria, though. In the post-Mao era, the private
sector has emerged, where management personnel and intellectuals employed by private
enterprises and educational institutions no longer have the status of "state cadres". But in the
public sector, Mao's initiation on the whole continues.
44 Mao's works included redundant speeches about class struggles, repeatedly warning that class
enemies would one day subvert the power of the CPC (see Mao 1957b, 375). This may be
evidence that the rulers were afraid of public revolt.
Chapter Four
45 Binxing Fang is the designer of China's Firewall which filters out politically troublesome voices
from abroad and blocks Facebook, Youtube, Twitter and other websites from Chinese internet
users. The news was originally published in NetEase, but the site is discontinued.
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46 Y. He is a researcher at The Development Research Center of the State Council of China; Lixiong
Wang is a well-known Chinese writer.
47 Yu is a well-known Chinese American professor specializing in Chinese history, and winner of
the Kluge Prize.
48 D. Liu is the Vice Dean of The Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning.
49 X. Ding is professor of The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
50 Q. Zhang is a professor of Peking University.
51 To list a few examples: Lixiong Wang and Ai were detained; Q. Dai has been sentenced to
imprisonment; Y. Gao has been sentenced to imprisonment twice, and in April of 2014, she was
detained again; Guoyong Fu, as a prominent Chinese researcher on intellectuals has been jailed
five times.
52 By referring to P. Hu (2012, Chapter One, Section 9), "thought remolding" may be defined as the
reshaping of the value system. The works of Mao and S. Liu (Chairman of the PRC before 1966)
may shed light on the content and method of the remolding: The foundation of ideology should
be Marxism-Leninism rather than any other points of view; the ideological system of such classes
as the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and peasantry are incorrect (S. Liu 1951, 292-3). The people
should rid themselves of "the bad habits and ideas acquired in the old society." A method of
persuasion should be applied to the people, while coercion should be applied to reactionaries
(Mao 1949, 1476-77).
53 Gov. doc. 1949; July 28, 1950; January 1951.
54 Gov. doc. October 1951.
55 Y. Gao is a well-known Chinese journalist, winner of several prizes, including the
UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize.
56 There are two cases in point: Quan Guo (Lawxp 2009), an associate professor of Nanjing
University, and Zhiyong Xu (2013), a teacher at the Beijing University of Post and
Telecommunications, were sentenced to imprisonment because they dared to challenge the
establishment.
57 Pei is a well-known Chinese writer, professor of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.
58 G. Fu is a well-known Chinese historian and independent writer noted for his research on
intellectuals.
59 J. Xu is a well-known Chinese historian, professor of East China Normal University.
60 K. Chen is the Executive Chairman of the Princeton China Initiative.
61 P. Hu is the Chief Editor of Beijing Spring.
62 For example, K. Chen; Guoyong Fu; Gu and Goldman; Y. Gao; Hu; Pei; M. Xia.
63 For example, Goldman and Cheek; Hamrin and Cheek; Ma; Xu.
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64 Item 4 of this document is related to higher education institutions.
65 It is regulated that the CPC leadership should be strengthened and improved in higher education
institutions in general.
66 Take, for example, the Department of Education of Hebei Province, which is part of the
provincial government. The "Higher Education Organization and Cadre Office" of the
Department is in charge of the following affairs within universities and colleges: appointment of
cadres at the institutional level, construction of grassroots CPC organizations in the institutions,
ideological control of the institution leaders and appointment of members of the CPC committee,
affairs regarding cadres at the middle level and candidates for leading positions at the
institutional level (Hebjgbz.gov.cn 2010).
67 Government bureaucrats or ex-army officials without relevant expertise could be appointed to
staff the university CPC system.
68 To confirm the existence of "information staffs", refer to: X. Li (2009). For evidence that
information staffs act as political police, Dezhou University could be a case in point: In this
university, student information staffs form a "secret force on the campus." The connection
between the members within the organization is linear and top-down, without vertical
communication between each other. The organization is included in work-study projects for poor
students, and the staffs must provide at least three pieces of valuable information each month in
order to be paid salary. The regulations for information staffs "are formulated based on the
instruction of the superior authority and the university leaders, as well as illuminated by the
experiences of other universities" (Dezhou University 2005). The regulation was originally
published at: http://211.64.32.2/bumen/bwc/show.php?id=331 (site discontinued).
69 CPC doc. 2008, art. 3, 6 and 9.
70 Professor Qian (1958) assumed that if plant photosynthesis efficiency could be as high as 30%,
and if 1/5 of the plants could be converted to edible foodstuff, it would be possible to yield over
29 thousand kilos of grain per mu (1 acre = 6.07 mu). According to Jiaying Tian, Mao's secretary,
Mao pronounced that his "Great Leap Forward" was based on the assumptions of the great
scientist Qian. There were two witnesses to what Jiaying Tian said: R. Li (1999), who was also
Mao's secretary, and Hui Zhou, who was a member of CCCPC and the first secretary of the CPC
Committee of Hunan Province during Mao's Great Famine (Quan and L. Huang 1997).
71 Q. Dai is a well-known Chinese writer.
72 Professor Jin Chen bought a MOTO-free scale 56800 chip made in the US, erased the original
mark, put on his own mark, and pronounced it as his achievement with "complete independent
intellectual property rights".
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73 In such cases as "Dazhu Protest of 2007" and "Shifang Protest of 2012", middle school students
were active participants (Yunyong Jia 2007; Global Times, July 06, 2012). Also refer to Note 35.
74 Aided with the internet search engine, "baidu.com", the search for "My Father Is Li Gang" has
about 3.49 million hits, accessed July 31, 2013.
75 Y. Lian was a consultant on CCCPC policy in Hong Kong from 1998, and was removed from
office by the Hong Kong government in 2004.
76 Gov. doc. July 1950, 175-176.
77 CPC doc. November 1951.
78 According to The Constitution of CPC (1956), Chapter Six, Item 51, the grass-roots party
organizations in enterprises, villages, schools and army troops should lead and supervise the
administration agencies and mass organizations in their work units.
79 From 1991 to 2010, the National Social Science Fund invested 2.65 billion yuan in 24,283
projects of various categories, which were intended to strengthen the dominant position of
Marxism in the area of ideology. In 2011, 70 works were selected into the National Philosophy
and Social Science Achievements Library. Of the top 10 works, five achievements based in
universities are related to Marxism theories; two projects study the ideology and history of the
CPC. Some of the above projects were awarded prizes by the provincial authority in addition to
being granted state funding. In 2012, the National Social Science Fund gave grants to 3291
projects that fall into 23 categories, including those that are not much related to political ideology,
such as linguistics, archaeology, physical education, religious studies, management and
ethnology. Of the 3291 projects, at least 240 are about the history, theory and ideology of the
CPC. Of the 154 key projects, 26 are directly related to the history and ideology of the CPC, such
as the theory of unique socialism, socialist core values (National Planning Office of Philosophy
and Social Science 2010;Wenku. Baidu.com 2011a, 2011b, 2012).
80 According to the Ministry of Education, in 2011, there were 271,262 PhD candidates and 50,289
PhD graduates. According to estimates for 2012, there would be nearly 300,000 PhD candidates
and 60,000 PhD graduates (International Finance News 2013).
81 In 1970, nearly twenty years after the CPC took over the universities, Mao (1970, 171) said that
the party-state did not have its own university professors, middle school teachers or primary
school teachers. The teachers who dominated the field of education were the leftovers of the old
regime. The Great Cultural Revolution targeted them.
82 Gov. doc. 1978.
83 The elimination mechanisms may take different forms. For example, the primary requirement of
the teachers in their annual job assessment is compliance in political ideology; this is defined and
legitimated by relevant items in CPC regulations, laws and government decrees (CPC doc. 1987;
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PRC doc.1993; Gov.doc. May 2012). For another example, the above-mentioned student
information staffs may provide information with which to determine whether a teacher is being
compliant in political ideology.
84 The following are some examples of people who challenged senior authority and were removed
from their positions of university leader: Yinchu Ma, president of Peking University from 1951,
forced to resign in 1960; Daoyu Liu, president of Wuhan University from1981, forced to resign
in 1988; Weiyan Guan, president of University of Science and Technology of China from 1984,
removed from office in 1986; Lizhi Fang, deputy president of University of Science and
Technology of China from 1984, removed from office in 1987.
85 Refer to Note 35 and 73.
Chapter Five
86 For example, Yao Liu (2003) and Yulin Zhang (2003) are among the researchers who have been
concerned about equality of education for rural youths.
87 In "211-projects universities" (in the 21st century, the state plans to invest in the 100 key
universities; these institutions are referred to as "211-projects"), there are less than 20% rural
students (B. Xiong 2014), while in polytechnics, rural students make up more than 70% (Bai
2013). Also refer to Jingyi Dong (2004, Table 3.4,120, 64-9).
88 In the eleven years from 2003 to 2013, the mass system has produced nearly 55 million graduates
(S. Shi and N. Li 2014). To give some specific figures regarding graduates in recent years: 2.12
million in 2003; 2.8 million in 2004; 3.38 million in 2005; 4.13 million in 2006; 4.95 million in
2007; 5.59 million in 2008; 6.11 million in 2009; 6.31 million in 2010; 7 million in 2013
(Baiqian 2010; Gov. doc. November 2012).
89 In 2013, 35% of graduates at the undergraduate level signed work contracts; 32% of those who
graduated from polytechnics signed work contracts (Lu Zhang 2013).
90 In confirmation of what Student K says, refer to: "Poor Rural Students Shed Tears over Their Life
in Tsinghua University: Inferiority and Great Pressure" (China Youth Daily, September 26,
2013).
91 In confirmation of what Student G says, refer to: Shenyang Evening (October 16, 2013), "The
University Requires the Poor Students to Present Their Poverty; The Winners Get Financial Aid."
92 Student loans must be repaid two years after graduation, even if the student has not found a job.
93 "Small business" in urban areas used to sustain peasants or those without a "profession." Later, a
large number of laid-off industrial workers, and by now, college graduates, also step in, making it
more difficult for those who previously made a living in that arena. Also refer to Note 98.
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94 For example, in 2012, two top universities in China, Peking University/ Tsinghua University,
respectively enrolled 150/210 science students and 83/10 liberal arts students from the City of
Beijing, but enrolled only 9/44 science students and 18/4 liberal arts students from Hebei
Province. In contrast, the average scores of the students admitted to Peking University/ Tsinghua
University were 660/659 (science) and 622/615 (liberal arts) for Beijing students, but 692/691
(science) and 659/657 (liberal arts) for Hebei students. Applicants for admittance to higher
education was approx. 73 thousand in Beijing and approx. 459 thousand in Hebei
(Information source: Eol.cn 2012; Ministry of Education 2012).
Chapter Six
95 In fact, student enrolment in 1999 was more than the state plan: approximately 1.6 million, an
increase of 48% (Edu.ifeng.com. 2010).
96 There are numerous articles and reports on the fact that higher education may impoverish rural
people, and here are some examples: Ye and Q. He (2010); Q. Liu (2006); Haoguang Liu (2006).
97 To take as an example, a noteworthy work is "Tears are Gold" by J. He (2009), but this work is
categorized as "reportage".
98 From the end of the 1970s when the economic reform was first initiated, a large number of
peasants migrated to the urban areas to take part-time jobs or run small business. They made up
for labour shortages and added vitality to the urban market. Since the 1990s, a trend of
underemployment began to affect regular workers in state-owned enterprises. The municipal
governments ran re-employment projects and helped the laid-off workers to open up new areas of
employment. This, however, has largely encroached upon the space where the peasants used to
make a living.
99 For example, non-local residents applying for permanent settlement in Shanghai must have
second-level technician qualifications or above, and must live in the city and pay taxes to the
municipality for seven years before they are considered eligible (Gov. doc. 2009).
100 For example, the City of Jinan claims to have an open policy, yet its regulations provide that
applicants must fully own a dwelling of more than 100 square meters (Gov. doc. 2005).
101 Non-local residents who apply for a permanent residence permit in many cities need to
accumulate enough "credits" before their cases are considered, and tertiary education
qualification holders may earn more credits. The specifications may vary from city to city and
from time to time. For example, the required minimum in Shenzhen is 60 credits. In Guangzhou
it is 85; an undergraduate qualification/junior middle school qualification brings to the holder
60/5 credits respectively (Gov. doc. August 2010; November 2010).
102 Refer to Note 94.
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103 Gov. doc. August 2012.
104 Refer to Note 87.
105 An example of such moral models may include Lei Feng, who symbolizes "A Screw in the
Revolutionary Machine", and Jiao Yulu, who is known as "Chairman Mao's Good Student." They
were invariably hard-working, thrifty and devoted.
106 Refer to Note 87 and 94.
107 Gov. doc. October 2013.
108 Gov. doc. November 2012.
109 Examples of such state projects include "the Project of Three Gorges Dam" and "the Project of
South-to-North Water Transfer", in which the state invested 480 billion yuan and 203.9 billion
yuan, respectively (Xinhuanet.com 2002, 2003).
110 Especially in some small cities, local SMEs tend to adopt a more open recruitment policy,
making no difference between local and non-local residents (China Education and Research
Network 2014). However, approximately 55% of the profit made by SMEs goes to tax or various
fees (Y. Zhou 2012; Hanyuan Liu 2013).
111 According to Social Blue Book: Analysis and Prediction of Chinese Social Situation in 2014, the
average employment rates for college graduates are: urban students/ rural students 87.2% / 81.2%;
for those who graduate from general higher education institutions at the lower extreme, the
figures are 87.7% / 69.5% (ScienceNet.cn 2013).
112 See, among many others, Bourdieu 1990; Craig Calhoun 2000, 49-50; Peter Scott 1998, 111.
113 Refer to Note 89.
114 CPC doc. October 2004.
115 CPC doc. 2013.
116 X. Zhang's personal microblog is now blocked and can no longer serve as an information source.
But The New York Times reveals that what X. Zhang refers to is in the secret CPC Document No.
9 (Buckley 2013).
117 One example is Wei Liu, mentioned in Chapter Five, Section 5.3.3.3. Another example is the
widely known case of Jiajue Ma, who killed four schoolmates (News.SOHU.com 2013).
118 PRC doc. September 2013
119 To illustrate the low standard: In Hubei Province, a place of fertile soil in Central China, the
local authority took cultivated land away from local peasants and gave compensation at the rate
of 120 yuan per mu (120 yuan = approx. USD 20; 1 acre = 6.07 mu) (J. Han 2003).
120 The peasants' protests against the government's confiscation of their lands are widely noted. The
researcher undertook a simple experiment in May 2014: Aided by the Chinese internet search
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engine, "baidu.com", the search for "expropriation of land/ police/ suppression" has more than
384 thousand hits.
